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Abstract  
 
The practices of NGOs and development agencies located in the global North 
have been criticised for displaying (post-)colonial continuities. Concurrently, 
western feminism has been critiqued for assuming universality in the 
experiences of white western women. Hence there is a need for reflection on 
operating within and resisting of these power structures. 
 
Using interview data, this thesis investigates the reflections of women NGO 
workers located in the global North working on gendered issues to support 
women in and from the global South. The thesis situates the women‘s 
reflections in the context of the critiques arising from feminist theory, 
postcolonial theory, global civil society and critical development literature. In 
this theoretically informed empirical study it is analysed how the women NGO 
workers understand their own work practices and how they negotiate their 
relations with the women they seek to support. This work can be placed within 
a relatively new genre within critical development literature, which focuses on 
the subjectivities, experiences, and identity construction of NGO and 
development workers.  
 
The aim of the thesis is first to contribute to our understanding of the 
complexities and contradictions in the positioning of women who engage in 
justice seeking practices related to gendered issues in a global context. 
Second, the intention of this work is to enhance the reflexive and analytic 
practices of NGOs/IGOs and their employees. The thesis sketches a multi-
faceted picture of the women NGO workers that transcends the good versus 
bad binary; it argues that while the narratives of the women NGO workers 
underline their complicity in hegemonic discourses, the narratives also show 
their awareness of the contentiousness of their position and point to possible 
ruptures of and resistances to the dominant power structures.  
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1 - Introduction 
 
In 2008, women comprised only 18.4 percent of national 
parliamentarians worldwide, with the number of female heads of state 
or government totalling 17 (UNIFEM). Women are not systematically 
included in peace negotiations and only comprise 2.4 percent of the 
signatories of peace agreements (UNIFEM). As the Women‘s Refugee 
Commission points out, almost 80% of the displaced worldwide are 
women and children (Women‘s Refugee Commission 2010). At least 
one third of women worldwide have suffered some kind of physical 
abuse, such as coercion into sex, and violence is one of the main death 
causes for women between 15 and 44 (UNIFEM). Every eight minutes 
a woman dies after having had an unsafe illegal abortion (Women on 
Waves 2004). It is often maintained that women are disproportionately 
losing out in the globalisation game (Hennessy 2003, Mohanty 2003). 
At the dawn of the millennium 70% of the global poor were women, 
owning less than one-hundredth of the world‘s property, while the wage 
gap is still at 17% (Hennessy 2003:69, Mohanty 2003:234-235, 
UNIFEM). In the growing fields of home-working and the service 
economy mainly women have been victim to exploitation (Hennessy 
2003:69). Women trafficking is still a major part of global trade 
(Hennessy 2003:69). In addition, it is expected that the current 
economic downturn particularly affects women adversely, as many 
women are working in vulnerable export-led factories and service 
industries (UNIFEM).  
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These are some of the issues that concern national and international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs and INGOs) in the fields of development, 
women‘s rights, health and migration. While few people doubt the need to 
address these inequalities and injustices, since the 1990s the work of those 
organisations has been highly debated (Shiva 1989, Escobar 1995, Sogge 
1996, Stirrat and Henkel 1997, Gronemeyer 1999, Kothari 2005, Nederveen 
Pieterse 2006, Duffield 2007). Jan Nederveen Pieterse maintains that the role 
of NGOs ―is now viewed with less naivety and more discrimination 
concerning the institutional, discursive, economic and political constraints 
under which they operate‖ (Nederveen Pieterse 2006:85). Initially, NGOs had 
been hailed by political scientists for their potential as players in new forms of 
global civil society compared to older ‗conventional‘ political institutions 
(Morris-Suzuki 2000, see also Hahn and Holzscheiter 2005 on first generation 
of NGO literature).  
 
Nowadays, NGOs are often contrasted with social movements, with the former 
characterised as more bureaucratic, more hierarchical, more dependent on 
external funding, and less radical or political than the latter (see Kothari 2005 
and Chhotray 2008 for critique of technocratic approach to development). 
Whereas social movements instigate social mobilisation, ―NGOs emphasise 
projects, not movements‖, and hence are said to be less threatening to the 
fundamental structures of neoliberalism (Petras 1997:14). For example, Tully 
speaks of ―CONGOs‖ (co-opted NGOs) to refer to NGOs that operate in 
favour of hegemonic powers (Tully 2005:14, see also Spivak 2000:123). As 
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Petras (1997) describes, NGOs have been linked to neo-liberal developments 
like the decline of the welfare state, as NGOs have increasingly become 
service providers taking over the tasks of the welfare state (see also Alvarez 
1998, Roy 2004, Dagnino 2008). Other critics have pointed out that NGOs, 
rather than being answerable to those they seek to represent and/or provide 
with services, are in fact only accountable to their donors (Roy 2004, Eyben 
2006, Dagnino 2008).  
 
Feminist NGOs and NGOs focussing on women‘s rights have been subjected 
to a similar critique. It is argued that women‘s organisations with a neo-liberal 
agenda have been more successful in attracting funding from the UN than 
more radical organisations, and that service-delivery type organisations have 
been more successful than conscious-raising groups as ―women‘s practical 
needs are prioritised over their strategic needs‖ (Silliman 1999:29). While 
many have recognised the successes and achievements related to the women‘s 
movement‘s engagement with the UN1, for example, in terms of agenda 
                                                 
1
 The women‘s movement has always had an international orientation -as famously expressed 
in Virginia Woolf‘s claim ―as a woman I have no country‖ (quoted in: Yuval Davis 
2006b:278-279)- though globalisation has changed the nature of this orientation (Naples 
2002a, Ferree et al. 2004). First wave feminism already organised internationally around issues 
such as abolitionism and women‘s suffrage and engaged with the UN; for example through 
organisations such as WILPF, YWCA (Desai 2002, Moghadam 2005). In 1975 the UN 
declared International Women‘s Year and organised the first international women‘s world 
conference in Mexico City, which was followed by the declaration of the UN‘s International 
Women‘s Decade in which the Copenhagen conference (1980) and the Nairobi Conference 
(1985) were organised (Desai 2002, Moghadam 2005). The (preparation for the) Nairobi 
conference is generally regarded as an important break-through moment in the cooperation and 
communication between women from the global South and the global North and as the 
moment when ―a collective sense of injustice‖ (Moghadam 2005:1) and a ―reflexive solidarity‖ 
(Desai 2002:27) was formulated. Before that, this relation was fraught with tensions on both 
sides illustrated by a divergence of interests with the Southern women focussing on the 
consequences of colonisation, poverty and other non-gender specific issues, and the women 
from the North concentrating on body politics (Moghadam 2005, see also Tripp 2006:61). This 
tension was exacerbated by the dominance of the Northern women‘s movement. Other major 
milestones for the international women‘s movement are the adoption of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 and the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Common Action (1995) (see Moghadam 2005). The transnational 
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setting through slogans such as ‗women‘s rights are human rights‘2 and the 
allocation of funds to women‘s projects, they also argue that women‘s NGOs 
have been co-opted by the agenda of the UN and that the powerful NGOs are 
mainly dominated by the highly educated elites from the global North and 
South
3
 (Silliman 1999, Desai 2002, Moghadam 2005). Chandra Mohanty 
speaks of a ―mainstreaming of the feminist movement‖ since feminism has 
been replaced by (women‘s) rights discourses (Mohanty 2003:249). It has also 
been argued that there has been a depoliticisation of the women‘s movement 
as a result of the ―NGOisation‖ of the women‘s movement (Lang 1997:115, 
see also Alvarez 1998, Silliman 1999, Menon 2004, de Alwis 2009). It is now 
common to distinguish the women‘s movement from feminist NGOs as two 
separate projects fragmenting the women‘s movement (Alvarez 1998, Squires 
2007). While it is recognised that this ‗NGOisation‘ has provided relative job 
security to former activists, it is also feared that this has led to a reduction of 
radical feminist political spaces, to an increasing dependence on the state, to 
the emergence of the ‗career feminist‘ and to project-based work that negates 
long-term political goals (Alvarez 1998).  
 
In the light of the above criticism, this thesis investigates the reflections of 
women NGO workers, who work with gendered issues, on their practices. The 
central question of this thesis captures issues raised in feminist theory, post-
                                                                                                                                 
orientation of the women‘s movement is often seen as exemplary for the labour movement (see 
Waterman 1993 and Moghadam 2005), due to its flexibility in organisation, its use of 
technology, and its presence in mainstream forums such as the UN and alternative ones, such 
as the World Social Forum. 
2
 ‗Women‘s rights are human rights‘ and other similar frames are described as ―signifying a 
process of mutual accommodation between radical feminist demands for transformation of 
gender relations and the dominant institutional discourses of individual rights, human capital 
and personal self-fulfilment‖ (Ferree and Pudrovska 2006:294).  
3
 The use of the terms ‗global South‘ and ‗global North‘ in this thesis will be clarified in 
Chapter Three.  
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colonial theory, global citizenship theory and critical NGO literature: ‗How do 
women NGO workers located in the global North working on gendered issues 
understand their own work practices and negotiate their relations with the 
women in/from the global South whom they seek to support?
4‘. These theories 
have challenged the idea that those active in NGOs or in the feminist 
movement have a moral innocence by virtue of their good intentions. This 
research will not repeat those critiques, but rather try to understand the 
perspectives of women situated at their nexus. My focus on the reflections of 
the women NGO workers is inspired by an interest in the ethical and political 
positioning of people who are situated at a complex intersection of Western 
feminism and post-colonialism when following justice-seeking or ‗helping‘ 
imperatives.  
 
A range of structural issues and questions are implicated in and subsumed 
under this larger research question. For example, the question requires 
exploration of how the position of women worldwide is framed in the first 
place and how the women that are supported are imagined and constructed. 
Moreover, the question implies an investigation of who is in the position to 
support or speak on behalf of these women, and what they gain from their 
work. More generally, it requires an analysis of the operation of power in 
helping relations. The question also needs to be placed in relation to historical 
                                                 
4
 I have chosen to use the generic term ‗women they support‘ rather than female beneficiaries, 
target group or clients as it serves as an umbrella term for those more specific designations, 
which are all used differently by the interviewees. Moreover, ―women they support‖ (also 
rather than ―help‖) is intended to be a neutral term, since the notions of beneficiaries, target 
group, or clients have been all subject to debate and have particular histories. As Eyben 
(2007b:34) for example explains, while 30 years ago the ‗target population‘ was an innovative 
term from development literature, now it ―has become a relatively unfashionable phrase 
because a generation of practitioners (…) objected to the term, pointing out that ‗targets‘ were 
something you shot at‖.  
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continuities and discontinuities for example with regard to colonialism and 
Western feminism. Rather than seeking one definitive answer to the central 
research question, I want to create a dialogue between the reflections of the 
individual NGO workers and the critical issues associated with their work by 
drawing on the interview material of 20 interviews with women NGO 
workers.  
 
Earlier development critiques have mainly been concerned with the macro-
structures and the organisational dimension of NGOs and development 
organisations (Shiva 1989, Escobar 1995, Sogge 1996, Petras 1997, Stirrat and 
Henkel 1997, Gronemeyer 1999, Kothari 2005, Nederveen Pieterse 2006, 
Chambers 2006, Eade 2007). For example, Mokbul Ahmad argues that most 
of the critical development literature focuses merely on the activities and tasks 
of NGOs, while the ―opinions of fieldworkers [are] an underused resource 
rarely consulted by (…) academics‖ (Ahmad 2002:177). Maria Eriksson Baaz 
has argued that the discussions about development have been strikingly silent 
about the influence of the identity of aid and development workers on aid 
practice (Baaz 2005). And Dorothea Hilhorst (2003), in her ethnographic 
study of a Philippine NGO, maintains that if researchers want to understand 
NGOs, they should focus more on how the agents of NGOs negotiate the 
local, national and global complexities that influence the values and practices 
of NGOs. In recent years, an increasing number of books have been published 
which are written by ‗insiders‘ of the development and aid industry who look 
back on their own practices in the light of the critique or who have used their 
own experiences as a basis for further critical research (see e.g. Vaux 2001, 
Goudge 2003, Eyben 2006, Heron 2007). These publications have introduced 
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a language of reflection and a focus on the personal in critical development 
studies. In addition, in recent years the field of critical development studies 
has been enriched by the work of researchers who spent a considerable time 
researching or working within the organisation (Hilhorst 2003, Hopgood 2006, 
Kapoor 2008). However, most of these ‗critiques from within‘ tend to focus on 
larger NGOs and on those active in the global South. There seems 
comparatively little on national NGOs that work in the global North with 
people from the global South or on international organisations with 
headquarters in the North that are small-scale and less well-known. 
 
This study should be read as part of this newer set of studies, as it uses 
individual experiences as material to explore wider structural issues of 
inequality, power, altruism, and post-colonialism. It thus works with the 
assumption that these micro processes can tell us something meaningful about 
developments at the macro level. In that sense this thesis also follows Trinh 
Minh-ha when she says,  ―every single tiny action we carry out reflects and 
affects our politics‖ (Minh-ha 1996:13). It also suggests that the research 
participants‘ experiences and reflections can only be understood in interaction 
with (in resistance to and as co-opted by) these structures. As Chandra 
Mohanty formulates it:  
 
―This issue of subjectivity represents a realisation of the fact that who we are, 
how we act, what we think, and what stories we tell becomes more intelligible 
within an epistemological framework that begins by recognising hegemonic 
histories‖ (Mohanty 2003:195).  
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Hence, this thesis will elaborate on hegemonic histories of white middle-class 
Western feminism, post-colonialism and dominant understandings of 
representation and responsibility and the critiques that have emerged in order 
to then trace the women‘s position in and responses to these histories.  
 
Theoretical critiques rather than personal experiences have been used as the 
starting point of this research. Earlier I pointed to some questions raised in 
critical development research. Critical NGO studies/critical development 
studies have borrowed from feminist, post-colonial and global citizenship/civil 
society theory to analyse, reform and critique the practices of NGOs. These 
bodies of thought problematised the position of the women working for NGOs 
and thus formed the main point of departure for this research. In the next 
chapter, I will situate this research project and the central research question in 
the context of the debates in post-colonial theory, feminist theory and global 
civil society/global citizenship theory.  
 
What has become clear from the outline of critical NGO literature above is 
that ―the path of aid is laid with mines‖ (Bulbeck 1998:187). On the one hand, 
helping can be read as a continuation of imperialist practices while on the 
other hand, passivity or even paralysis in the face of this critique is to ignore 
the reality of the unequal relations between women globally (Bulbeck 
1998:187, see also Varadharajan 1995:xvi). Hence, as there is no outside of 
the power structure, one needs to act critically and reflexively from within. 
Sara Ahmed (2000b:180) speaks of an ―in-it-ness‖ as the starting point for 
politics. Passivity and paralysis are not viable options –as Spivak states: ―I am 
not asking metropolitan feminism to stop. I am asking it to take more trouble‖ 
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(Spivak 2000:28:ftn.2) – and, since paralysis implies inaction, this was 
apparently not the default position of the NGO workers in action, currently 
doing work for organisations that seek to improve the lives of women in and 
from the South. Hence one of the further purposes of this research is to 
untangle and analyse some of the tensions, dilemmas and complexities for the 
women NGO workers and to explore the ways in which the women NGO 
workers negotiate potential complicities in their work.  
 
The notion of reflexivity as used in feminist theory (Harding 1991, Haraway 
1991) and the notion of constructive complicity as introduced in post-colonial 
theory (Spivak 1999) are both useful responses to the need to find ways to 
operate productively and responsibly within unequal power structures. 
However, as accounts of reflexivity and of constructive complicity are often 
highly theoretical or merely framed as questions (Ahmed 2000b:171) or as 
imperatives without much practical guidance (Kapoor 2008:73), I became 
interested in potential examples of practised embodiment of constructive 
complicity and reflexivity.  Or to put it differently, how this more abstract 
philosophical concept of ‗constructive complicity‘ and the theoretical notion 
of reflexivity plays out in the practice of women‘s work on gendered issues for 
NGOs.  
 
This thesis is structured according to four theoretical critiques: feminist 
theories (Chapter Four), post-colonial theories (Chapter Five), global 
citizenship/civil society theories (Chapter Six) and finally, critical 
development theories (Chapter Seven). The first motivation for this structure 
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is to address the respective themes suggested by those critiques in a systematic 
manner. The second reason for this structure is that through reading the 
narratives of the women NGO workers through four different theoretical 
lenses, a nuanced and multi-faceted picture of the women NGO workers can 
be sketched which takes account of their multiple positionalities.  
 
Chapter Two discusses the analytical framework of this research. While the 
theories mentioned above have served to problematise the position of the 
women working for NGOs as the point of departure for this research, they also 
contribute to an understanding of the complex positioning of these women. In 
Chapter Three, I will discuss the methodological implications of the research 
focus and outline my empirical methods.   
 
The fourth chapter situates the women NGO workers and their organisations 
in relation to feminism. As Sherene Razack writes, ―tracing complicity (…) 
begins with a mapping of relations among women. We can then critically 
examine those constructs that homogenise our differences or package them as 
innate, decontextualised, and ahistorical‖ (Razack 2001:21). Thus 
subsequently, the fourth chapter will explore the women‘s understanding of 
sisterhood and (the critiques of) the assumed universality of women‘s 
experiences, specifically referring to the shifting understanding from 
sisterhood to solidarity. Through the concepts of ‗reflexivity‘ and 
intersectionality it will be discussed how some of the narratives challenge the 
erasure of privilege caused by simplistic notions of sisterhood. 
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Chapter Five first looks at some direct references in the interview narratives to 
colonial times, both in relation to the NGO workers‘ own position and in 
relation to their organisation. It then builds on Razack‘s argument to unpack 
the participants‘ assumptions about cultural difference and the way ‗culture‘ is 
used as a proxy for ‗race‘. In this context, the interviewees‘ understanding of 
racism will be explored and alternative understandings of racism will be 
proposed. The final section of the chapter will focus on ‗ruptures‘ and look at 
how colonial and racial discourses can be challenged using Spivak‘s notions 
of ‗constructive complicity‘ (Spivak 1999) and ‗privilege as a loss‘ (Spivak 
1990).  
 
The sixth chapter highlights and analyses issues of representation, the 
public/private divide and (global) responsibility within the theoretical 
framework of global civil society/global citizenship. I explore critiques of 
representation in the context of the absence of global democratic procedures 
and relate these to the women‘s narratives about their attempts to facilitate 
representation. In addition, related issues of power are discussed and the way 
in which the representative role can reinforce power differences. In the second 
section I explore global citizenship and the notions of responsibility in relation 
to alterity. The third section discusses the public/private divide as the central 
defining feature of the concepts of citizenship and civil society with its 
associated ambiguities. I explore how the women NGO workers position 
themselves at the private/public dichotomy.  
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Chapter Seven discusses how the women NGO workers negotiate their 
relation with the beneficiaries across spatial distance. In these cases, the 
women working for the NGOs are far removed from those who are eventually 
supposed to benefit from the lobbying, advocacy and project work of the 
NGOs. In relation to this bridging of the geographical distance, the chapter 
first critically engages with the function of fieldwork and the creation of 
stories about the beneficiaries. I then explore the relationships with partner 
organisations in the global South as an essential element in understanding how 
the participants bridged the distance between themselves and the final target 
group of their projects, while paying attention to critical accounts of the power 
differences in such relationships. 
 18 
2 - Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
Feminist theory, post-colonial theory, global civil society/global citizenship 
theory and critical development theory have all problematised the specific 
position of women NGO workers and therefore prompted my research 
question. At the same time, these theories, and those produced at the interface 
of those fields (like post-colonial feminism, or critical development theory 
with a feminist or post-colonial approach), are instrumental for establishing an 
understanding of the complex positioning of these women and therefore serve 
as the theoretical framework of this thesis. Hence, this chapter will refer to 
these bodies of thought and discuss them in a more detailed and focussed 
manner in order to begin outlining how the research problems and questions 
will be addressed. It first needs to be observed however, that the different 
bodies of thought engage on different levels with the position of women NGO 
workers. While feminist theory, postcolonial theory, and global civil 
society/global citizenship theory provide a more structural critique of key 
issues such as global relations of responsibility and power inequalities, critical 
development theory, as an emerging field informed by the former three 
traditions, is more applied and offers insights from practitioners themselves.  
 
Postcoloniality 
One of the main claims of post-colonial theory is that there are certain 
continuities between the colonial era and the current ‗post-colonial‘ time. One 
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of the most poignant examples of post-colonial continuities is the practice of 
development, both in its continuation of imperialist intervention and in its 
‗civilising mission‘ (Stoler and Cooper 1997, Spivak 1999). Ilan Kapoor 
identifies that discourses of development display a ―relative amnesia about 
(neo) colonialism‖ (Kapoor 2008:xv), while Gayatri Spivak states in the 
context of the work of the UN and powerful NGOs on women‘s issues, that 
―one group of women of the Northern hemisphere (…) are helping to exploit 
another, quite as the old colonial subject used to do the dirty work of the 
colonisers‖ (Spivak 2000:123). Critical development theories inspired by post-
colonial theory have criticised the notions of development and 
underdevelopment at stake in the practices and policies of such organisations. 
Modernisation theory, which borrows from the ‗civilising mission‘ of 
colonialism, has had and still has a major impact on development discourse. It 
functions according to the assumption that for nations to be developed they 
have to follow and adopt the Western model with industrialisation as the final 
goal (Kapoor 2008, McEwan 2009). Anderson and Rieff (2004) suggest that 
the work of NGOs should be understood as modern missionary work: an 
attempt to spread a series of values (notably the universal declaration of 
human rights). They maintain that NGOs‘ reluctance to accept that alternative 
label of ‗missionary‘ stems from their refusal to give up the moral hegemony 
they have achieved under the banner of ‗global civil society‘ (Anderson and 
Rieff 2004). Hence, one of the starting points of this research, as suggested by 
post-colonial theory, is to look at NGO practices through a post-colonial lens 
to uncover how post-colonial continuities play out.  
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Academic debate has concerned itself with whether post-colonial critique as a 
critical interrogation of Western dominance (both in the material sense, as 
imperialism and in the discursive sense, as systems of knowledge), can only 
strictly be applied to relations between colonisers and ex-colonies or whether 
it merits wider application (Frankenberg and Mani 1993). Moore-Gilbert 
(1997) draws a comparison between the relevance of the application of 
feminist critiques outside strictly ‗feminist‘ texts and post-colonial critiques. 
He points to the danger of a ―beauty parade‖ as a competition for the prize of 
‗the most colonised‘ (Moore-Gilbert 1997:11). He concludes that it is 
legitimate to apply post-colonial theory to any range of different contexts. In 
this thesis I follow his understanding of post-colonial criticism when he 
argues:  
 
―post-colonial criticism can still be seen as a more or less distinct set of 
reading practices, if it is understood as preoccupied principally with analysis 
of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reflect upon the relation of 
domination and subordination –economic, cultural, political –between (and 
often within) nations, races or cultures, which characteristically have their 
roots in the history of modern European colonialism and imperialism and 
which, equally characteristically, continue to be apparent in the present day of 
neo-colonialism‖ (Moore-Gilbert 1997:11).  
 
Following a range of other studies on Eastern Europe and the Balkans that 
have successfully applied post-colonial theory (Bakic-Hayden et al. 1992, 
Buchowski 2006), I also deploy post-colonial theories about otherness in 
relation to Eastern Europe. Hence rather than interpreting post-colonial theory 
 21 
as narrowly applying to colonised nations, it is broadly applied here (see 
Myers 2006). Many scholars who seek to situate post-colonial theory 
emphasise that the ‗post-‘ in post-colonial should not be read as a simple 
‗after‘ that closes off the current epoch from the colonial era (McLeod 2000, 
Ahmed 2000a, Ahmed 2000b). Rather, ‗post-colonial‘ ―marks a decisive, 
though not definitive shift that stages contemporary encounters‖ (Frankenberg 
and Mani 1993:301 emphasis added). As Sara Ahmed states, post-colonialism 
is about ―the complexity of the relationship between the past and the present, 
between the histories of European colonisation and contemporary forms of 
globalisation‖ (Ahmed 2000b:11); this relationship is complex as it wavers 
between the one extreme notion that the present is a complete break away 
from the past and the other extreme idea that the present is merely a 
continuation of the past (Ahmed 2000b). Examples of how colonial 
continuities play out in a post-colonial era can be found in the notion of 
partnership and the culturalisation of race.  
 
Postcolonial theory and critical development theory have criticised the 
attractive notion of ‗partnership‘ between Northern and Southern NGOs; while 
it implies equality and a break with colonial relations, in reality it masks the 
continuing unequal power relationship (Elliott 1987, Stirrat and Henkel 1997, 
Baaz 2005, Eade 2007). While partnership denotes a relation between equals, 
the fact that Northern NGOs often function as donors for Southern NGOs 
corrupts that relation. Northern NGOs are often in the power position to 
choose their Southern NGO partners, whereas Southern NGOs have to 
compete with one another to be chosen.  
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Differences between nations, or between ‗the West and the rest‘ were in 
colonial times explained with reference to race; however, this is rare in 
contemporary development discourse. As Kothari (2006a) points out, 
nowadays ‗culture‘ has substituted ‗race‘ without replacing the attached 
connotations. Culture is quoted as the reason for radical difference and can 
either lead to a cultural relativist approach of non-intervention or a universalist 
approach in which Western values are promoted as universal (Kapoor 2008). 
Particularly in relation to women‘s rights, culture is often named as the source 
of oppression, with media representations of dowry deaths, or female genital 
mutilation reinforcing this picture (Narayan 1997). Post-colonial theory 
however has also questioned the simplistic binary of (Western) Self versus the 
Other and calls for more nuanced perspectives on Self-Other relationships 
(Minh-ha 1991, Bhabha 2005). Stereotypes of the other do not reflect a 
stabilised fixed image of otherness; rather stereotypes in their constant 
repetitiveness are used to attempt to fix the other, who escapes easy 
classification (Bhabha 2005). In addition, the stereotypes are used to present 
an image of the Self in juxtaposition to the image of the Other.  
 
Critical development theorists who use post-colonial theory to critique 
development practices have also attempted to use it constructively, utilising 
post-colonial concepts and ideas for productive suggestions to improve aid 
practices. McEwan (2009:202-203) and Kapoor (2008:55-56) discuss Spivak‘s 
notions of ―unlearning one‘s privilege as a loss‖ and ―learning to learn from 
below‖ as ways to engage differently with knowledge production in 
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development. This would require making oneself conscious of one‘s 
positionality and our privileges and realising that these privileges can be 
obstacles in learning to know about the Other. It would mean learning to 
create an epistemological space to learn from the Other, be open to the Other, 
and to enable her to be the subject rather than the object of development 
(Kapoor 2008).  
 
Interrogating Gender 
While Western feminist theories have been tremendously important in 
identifying gendered power relations, they have been criticised for their 
relative blindness towards other types of oppression mediated through ‗race‘, 
class or sexuality (Lorde 1984, hooks 1981, 1986, Spelman 1990, Carby 1992, 
Crenshaw 2000, Lazreg 2000). The focus on sex and gender in feminist 
analysis happened at the cost of a more complex analysis in which white 
Western middle class women were not only victims of oppression but also 
complicit in the domination of others. As Kum-Kum Bhavnani and Meg 
Coulson state, ―the desire for universal sisterhood obscured the white, middle 
class reference point at the centre of Western feminism‖ (Bhavnani and 
Coulson 2003:74).  
 
Sojourner Truth‘s speech in 1851 at the Women‘s Rights Convention in Ohio 
was an early challenge to the assumption of the white Western middle-class 
woman as the norm within feminism by pointing to how her identity as an 
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enslaved black woman had positioned her outside this norm.
5
 Truth‘s critique 
has been elaborated by black and post-colonial feminists (Lorde 1984, hooks 
1981, 1986, Carby 1992, Lazreg 2000). They specifically problematise the 
notion of a universal sisterhood on the basis of the assumption of a shared 
oppression prevalent in Western feminism, by stressing that women have 
different experiences and priorities and that all women are positioned 
differently, with some facing multiple forms of oppression, sometimes at the 
hands of other women. Hence, it was at best naïve and at worst harmful to 
assume that women could automatically be allies of each other; rather, 
women‘s solidarity should be based on more than just shared womanhood and 
hence needs hard work and commitment (see hooks 1981:157, Spivak 
1990:137, Caraway 1992:201).  
 
Through the engagement of feminism with development theory, development 
organisations moved from a ‗Women in Development‘ (WID) to a ‗Women 
and Development‘ (WAD) and finally, to a ‗Gender and Development‘ (GAD) 
approach (Desai 2002, Bhavnani and Coulson 2003, Smillie 2000:81-97).
6
 
                                                 
5
 Sojourner Truth famously stated: ―But what is all this talking about? That man over there 
says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best 
place everywhere. Nobody helps me any best place. And ain‘t I a woman? Look at me! Look at 
my arm! I have plowed [sic], I have planted and I have gathered into barns. And no man could 
head me. And ain‘t I a woman? I could work as much, and eat as much as a man –when I could 
get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain‘t I a woman? I have borne children and see most of 
them sold into slavery, and when I cried out with a mother‘s grief, none but Jesus heard me. 
And ain‘t I a woman?‖ (Sojourner Truth quoted in: Brah and Phoenix 2004:77, as recounted in 
1863 by Frances Gage). 
6
 Bhavnani and Coulson describe WID as an approach which merely added women without 
challenging the definition of development, the WAD approach as ―suggest[ing] that women 
and development must be seen synonymously, each drawn to recast the other‖ and GAD as an 
intervention which understands gender (rather than women) to be a more powerful tool in 
capturing power relations between men and women in the context of development (Bhavnani 
and Coulson 2003:83). While the three labels are meant to reflect different historical periods, 
ways of conceptualising sex and gender and related politics, White (2003) argues that in 
practice it is difficult to neatly distinguish the three from one another as they are often 
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Though each subsequent policy change was intended as an improvement of 
the previous policy, many now argue that the GAD approach has depoliticised 
the original feminist intentions (Piálek 2008). Gender mainstreaming
7
, a 
strategy associated with GAD (Squires 2007:44) was originally hailed as a 
radical and all-encompassing approach. Increasingly, however, it is argued 
that gender mainstreaming in development has become a technocratic rather 
than a feminist approach (Piálek 2008:279, see also Verloo 2001:13, Squires 
2007:137). The incorporation of women into development projects was first 
promoted on the basis of instrumentalist efficiency, the belief that if women 
are excluded, a ―valuable resource was being wasted‖ (Crewe and Harrison 
1998:46, Harcourt 2009). Recently more focus has been placed on the 
‗empowerment‘ of women and other marginalised groups. However, many 
have argued that ‗empowerment‘ and its siblings, ‗participation‘, ‗capacity 
building‘, and ‗indigenous knowledges‘, while originating from a more critical 
agenda that seeks to challenge the hierarchies between the organisations and 
the beneficiaries, often remain empty concepts (Petras 1997, Crewe and 
Harrison 1998, Eade 2007).  
 
When gender started to be recognised as an important dimension in 
development work, women started to be incorporated into the NGO world, 
albeit in very different positions; some as the professionals working for NGOs 
on gender projects, some as the proposed beneficiaries of projects (White 
                                                                                                                                 
combined or say more about organisational politics than anything substantial in relation to 
policies. 
7
 The United Nation‘s Conference on Women (Beijing 1995) marked the start of the 
prominence of the concept of gender mainstreaming (Rees 2002). A short definition is 
formulated by Rees: ―Mainstreaming is the systematic integration of gender equality into all 
systems and structures, policies, programmes, processes and projects, into ways of seeing and 
doing, into cultures and their organisations‖ (Rees 2002:1).  
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2003). These women shared experiences of gender oppression in their own 
countries, while at the same time, different race and class positions negated 
this gender unity. As Sarah White states:  
 
―The refraction of gender through other aspects of social identity is tangible 
(…) every time a ‗professional‘ receives a pay slip giving her in a month what 
a ‗village woman‘ would see as more than a fortune; (…) every time she takes 
a mouthful, cooked by a low-paid catering worker at an international 
conference dedicated to the advancement of the ‗poorest of the poor‘‖ (White 
2003:9-10).  
 
Feminist theories can offer tools for understanding this positioning in a 
number of ways. Feminists have attempted to analyse and understand the way 
gender is produced, the way gender shapes people‘s experiences, and the way 
gender is linked to power structures of domination and oppression. Hence, 
feminist theories can contribute to an understanding of how the women who 
worked for NGOs are positioned as women and how their experiences are 
shaped by gender structures. It can also help to understand how the women 
that are supported are portrayed. As Mohanty has pointed out, Western 
feminists have created an image of ―the third world woman‖ as universally 
oppressed, backward, without agency and compare themselves favourably 
with that image (Mohanty 1984:335).  
 
Feminist critiques of the NGO discourse on trafficking stand at the interface of 
feminism, post-colonialism and critical NGO theories and hence can bring out 
the interplay between universalised assumptions of feminism and post-colonial 
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tendencies. According to Doezema (2001), for example, the trafficked Third 
World woman is not entrusted with her own political voice and is presented as 
‗backward‘, in need of rescue by her Western sisters. Doezema‘s analysis is a 
powerful example of how colonial images can be specifically projected on 
women. It also shows how a critical feminist perspective combined with a 
post-colonial approach can provide insight into aid relations between women 
in the global North and women from the global South. Adding to the critiques 
targeting Western feminism for assuming that the experiences of white 
Western women could be taken as the norm of women‘s experiences, some 
theorists have sought to understand this tendency, exploring why white 
Western middle-class women would display blindness to other women‘s 
experiences. Fellows and Razack (1998) coined the term ‗race to innocence‘ 
for white women‘s refusal to acknowledge complicity with other oppressions 
and their belief that gender oppression is of more significance than other forms 
of oppression. Other theorists, who rejected the notion of a global or universal 
sisterhood, have attempted to rethink women‘s solidarity across borders (see 
Lorde 1984, Caraway 1992, Mohanty 2003).  
 
This critique of feminist theory and practice when combined with post-
colonial theory, problematises the relation between women located in the 
global North as ‗aid givers‘ and women in/from the global South as 
‗recipients‘. It stresses how this relationship is mediated through power 
relations. I was interested to see whether processes of self-reflection 
(prompted by the critique against Western feminism) have contributed to a 
rethinking of relations between women across the globe. In addition, since my 
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participants worked across the North/South axis, I wanted to explore whether a 
notion of global sisterhood was rejected, strengthened, reformed, or 
unquestioningly embraced.  
 
Moving Global 
The last decades have seen a mushrooming of international organisations, and 
many authors writing on global civil society refer to the astonishing growth in 
the number of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and 
their increasing interconnectedness and embeddedness in institutions of global 
governance like the UN or the World Bank (see Anheier et al. 2001, Taylor 
2002, Desforges 2004, Baker and Chandler 2005, Duffield 2007) or even the 
conflation of civil society with NGOs (Dagnino 2008). The NGO and 
voluntary sector commonly has strong associations with women. Duffield, for 
example, describes the move from colonialism to the aid industry as the basis 
for a ―move away from the masculinity of colonialism to the more feminine 
subjectivity of aid‖ (Duffield 2007:61). Mindry (2001) points to the 
continuities between the Victorian colonial discourse of feminine virtue and 
current discourses of feminine virtue and benevolence in relations between 
women NGOs from the North and women from the South. Heron (2007) 
describes how bourgeois white women attempted to find a place in the public 
sphere in the Empire through philanthropy and missionary work. In addition, 
there is a legacy of voluntary work for middle- and upper-class women in the 
nineteenth and first part of the twentieth century when it was socially 
unacceptable for women to perform paid work. As Mahood writes about E. 
Jebb, the founder of ‗Save the Children‘, ―like many women of similar 
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background, Jebb understood the importance of finding purposeful work, 
without needing to derive an income from it‖ (Mahood 2008:5 italics added). 
For a long time, women have been associated with peace movements (and 
femininity with peace), with more recent examples including women‘s 
involvement in the post-war NGO sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
dominant donor (essentialist) representations of these women as a-political 
and non-nationalist peace-makers, mothers, and nurturers (York 1998, Helms 
2003, Eyben 2007a, Pupavac 2008).  
 
In relation to the application of the notion of global citizenship to feminist 
practices, Hutchings notes that due to the universalistic language of global 
citizenship and its generic conception of the human individual, it initially 
seems illogical to associate international feminism with global citizenship 
(Hutchings 2002). However, she rejects her initial doubts and concludes that 
feminists are actually a good example of global citizens as they are dedicated 
to transforming the current circumstances women are facing in order to 
achieve a more just situation in the future (Hutchings 2002:53, see also Urry 
2003). Mohanty uses the figure of the ―citizen-consumer‖ to illustrate the 
relation between local and global processes of colonisation and exploitation, 
which she understands to be a crucial element of any comparative feminist 
project (Mohanty 1997:5)  
 
While both citizenship and civil society theory started with a predominantly 
national focus, they have, in the last two decades, become increasingly 
internationally oriented (Falk 1994, Amoore and Langley 2004, Anheier et al. 
2004). The attempts to translate nationally focussed citizenship and civil 
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society theory to the global level has not been without pitfalls. Since both civil 
society and citizenship theory have been conceptualised in relation to the state, 
one of the main barriers to an unproblematic translation to theories at the 
global level is the absence of a global state. Lacking a global state, the 
elements that shape citizenship and civil society, like democratic voting 
procedures, constitutional rights and duties, are similarly absent. In addition, 
moving from a national focus to a global one challenged the assumption of an 
inside and an outside to the territory. Hence, theorists in this field have been 
faced with both the inevitability of considering global dimensions in their 
theory and the fact that the theories cannot unproblematically be transferred to 
the global level. This has prompted a few key issues that served as a point of 
departure for defining the problem of this research. First, the question is 
whether everyone belongs to the ‗global citizenry‘ or whether global 
citizenship is a privilege reserved only to a few. Second, one can wonder how 
citizens in a global world are related in terms of the obligations and 
responsibilities they have towards one another. Third, it remains a question 
whether in the absence of institutionalised democratic procedures there can be 
any form of global representation. These questions about representation and 
responsibility can be accessed through asking how women working for NGOs 
conceptualised their relations with the women they supported.  
 
With NGOs nowadays being highly dependent on external funding, often 
directly or indirectly from governments, it is debatable in how far NGOs are 
truly non-governmental (Petras 1997, Van Rooy and Robinson 1998:201, 
Morris-Suzuki 2000, Nederveen Pieterse 2006). The relation between the state 
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and civil society has in fact always been contested. Theories in the tradition of 
civilis societas describe the state as serving the community‘s interest (the state 
as an instrument of civil society) (Van Rooy 1998). In this Roman tradition of 
thinking (Aquinas, Locke) civil and political society were the same (Van Rooy 
1998). Anheier et al. (2001) recognise three trends in the evolution of the 
concept of civil society. In the first one, associated with the thinkers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, civil society is contrasted to the state of nature; civil 
versus barbaric people. The words ‗state‘, civil society‘ and ‗political society‘ 
were used interchangeably (Van Rooy 1998). Anheier et al. (2001) introduce 
Hegel and Tocqueville as examples of the second trend in which for the first 
time civil society was juxtaposed with the state, and in which civil society was 
envisaged as a check on state power. The third trend is represented by 
Gramsci‘s understanding of civil society as encompassing cultural institutions 
like the church, which places civil society between the state and the market.
8
  
 
The term civil society became en vogue again with the Latin American 
revolutions and the breakdown of the Soviet regime (Van Rooy 1998, Anheier 
et al. 2001). In Western society the term civil society was taken up again as an 
attempt to revitalise democracy and address the apathetic electorate (Van 
Rooy 1998, Anheier et al. 2001). Corry (2006) states that the first time that the 
term ‗global civil society‘ was used in a major newspaper was in 1991 by 
Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, Munck (2002:350) traces 
the birth of the ―myth‖ (!) of global civil society to the Earth Summit in 1992 
                                                 
8
 However, Gramsci‘s notion of civil society cannot easily be categorised as his writing leaves 
some ambiguity concerning its role. On the one hand it is through the institutions of civil 
society that the ruling power ensures its hegemony, on the other hand civil society can provide 
a space for revolting against the hegemonic powers (Anheier et al. 2001, Munck 2006). 
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in Rio de Janeiro as that generated unrivalled media attention. Others relate it 
to Seattle and the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the uprising of the 
Zapatistas in Mexico (Anheier et al. 2001, Corry 2006). While most at least 
seem to agree that some significant development took places in the early 
1990s, there is also the accusation of ‗presentism‘, the exaggerated focus on 
global civil society as a new phenomenon and the lack of recognition of 
continuity with the past (Munck 2002). On the other extreme of this 
‗presentism‘, some ask whether global civil society and the global citizen exist 
at all (Urry 1999, Bowden 2003, Anderson and Rieff 2004). Rather than 
concentrating on the question whether global civil society exists or not, it is 
more important to understand the prominence of the concept ‗global civil 
society‘ in terms of its role ―in ordering global social relations in certain 
terms‖ (Corry 2006:305).  
 
While older (and current) notions of world citizenship and the relation to the 
universe can be traced back to the Stoics (see Dower 2002, Hutchings 2004) 
and the ideals of cooperation and tolerance for diversity to cosmopolitanism 
(e.g. Kant or more recently, Nussbaum) (see Carter 2001, Bowden 2003), the 
addition of the adjective ‗global‘ to civil society and citizenship is certainly 
linked to the (literature about the) phenomenon of globalisation. As John Urry 
states, ―globalisation appears to be changing what it is to be a citizen‖ (Urry 
1999:312). Globalisation here refers to such diverse issues as the 
establishment of an international declaration of human rights (Linklater in: 
Armstrong 2006), the technological developments leading to global 
communication and media (Urry 1999, Anheier et al. 2001), global risks and 
shared environmental problems like pollution that crosses borders (Heins 
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2001), which make us part of a single ―community of fate‖ (Held and McGrew 
in: Armstrong 2006:349), economic global integration and the flow of goods 
and people (Falk 1994).  
 
Following Corry (2006), I interpret the word ‗global‘ of global citizen in a 
social or psychological rather than a physical sense, so being global in scope 
rather than in actual physical contact with people from all over the globe or 
literally crossing national borders (for this physical sense, the word 
‗international‘ might be more apt (see Scholte in: Corry 2006)). In this way ―a 
civil society organisation may be ‗global‘ simply by the way it conceives of its 
constituency [and] the interests it chooses to advance‖ (Corry 2006:319 
emphasis added).  
 
Separate Spheres? 
Application of the lens of public and private spheres complicates the 
understanding civil society further (see Benn and Gauss 1983). While a liberal 
understanding would situate civil society in the private sphere and the state in 
the public sphere, a republican understanding would situate civil society in the 
public sphere as the meeting place for deliberation between citizens 
(Weintraub 1997, Squires 2004). In this liberal view, politics is exercised by 
the administrative state; the public sphere is hence the realm of the public 
interest and the private sphere, civil society (the market) is associated with 
private interests (Weintraub 1997). This is reliant on the classical distinction 
between the polity and civic society (Benn and Gauss 1983). However, a 
republican view understands civil society as the public realm of political 
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community and debate, in which the people voice their interests as citizens in 
contrast to the sphere of both the state and the market (Benn and Gauss 1983). 
Inevitably, the interpretation of politics shifts with the republican 
understanding, namely from the authority of the state in the liberal 
understanding to political debate, discussion and decision-making. An 
example of this approach can be found when the public sphere is defined as 
the ―domain of civil society‖, which ―provides space for the day-to-day 
workings of a deep democracy‖ (Plummer 2003:68).  
 
This traditional republican understanding of the public nature of citizenship 
has been challenged by more recent, alternative interpretations, such as 
‗intimate citizenship‘ (Plummer 2003). Intimate citizenship, as coined by 
Plummer (2003), indicates the interplay between issues deemed private (e.g. 
sexuality, gender, family life) and the public (e.g. legal or media) discourse. 
He argues that the separation between the public and the private sphere is in 
some ways untenable in our current societies. The public and political sphere 
for example, ―are actually constituted through a network of passionate human 
beings engaging with each other, often in highly personalised ways‖ (Plummer 
2003:70).  
 
This assertion is highly significant in the understanding of the experiences of 
the women NGO workers and their reflections on their work. Their 
experiences can be better understood as the actions, thoughts and reflections of 
passionate human beings than as disembodied, neutral citizens. Tully‘s 
discussion of what he calls ‗modern‘ and ‗diverse‘ citizenship (two parallel 
 35 
and sometimes conflicting forms of citizenship practice), offers another way to 
rethink the relation between the public and the private (Tully 2005). ‗Modern 
citizenship‘, as he calls it, is the dominant form of citizenship in the West, 
associated with laws and constitutions while ‗diverse citizenship‘ is based on 
democratic participatory elements and has been exercised on the margins by 
those who were denied modern citizenship (Tully 2005). He thus associates 
diverse citizenship with critical approaches to governance and oppression 
(Tully 2005:3). As diverse citizenship was exercised in the private sphere, 
since this group was initially denied access to the public sphere and as it was 
tied to their identities, this form of citizenship includes the private and the 
personal. Feminism is one example of an articulation of diverse citizenship.  
 
Feminist theory appears to be more appropriate than traditional citizenship 
theory for an analysis of the complex convergence of the public and the 
private, the personal and the political. The public/private divide has been 
central to feminist thought. It has been argued that feminist challenges to the 
conventional way the boundaries between the public and the private have been 
drawn are one of the most important contributions of feminist thought to 
political theory (Elshtain 1981, Pateman 1983).
9
 Pateman‘s work uncovered 
the successful integration of patriarchy in liberalism, which functions through 
the separation of the private and public sphere. She states that while in the first 
                                                 
9
 It is important to note however, as Crenshaw pointed out, that the interest in the separation 
between the private and public sphere as an ―ideological justification for women‘s 
subordination‖ was central to Western feminism, which was constructed around the 
experiences of white women, and ―offers little insight into the domination of Black women‖ 
(Crenshaw 2000:221). In addition, McEwan (2001) states that critiques from the global South 
against Western feminism have emphasised that the private realm is not merely a site of 
oppression, but a political space as well. McEwan quotes the activities of the Argentinean 
Mothers of the Disappeared and some Islamist feminists as instances where women ―have 
sought an empowering ‗private‘ function‖ in contrast to Western feminist conceptualisations of 
motherhood and home as oppressive elements (McEwan 2001:98). 
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instance liberal and patriarchal doctrines might seem opposed, since liberalism 
emphases individualism and egalitarianism and patriarchalism advocates a 
natural hierarchy, the doctrines are reconciled through excluding women from 
citizenship and hence discounting them as free and equal beings (Pateman 
1983). The division between the public and private sphere depends on an even 
more complex (sub-)division. When the state is viewed as public and civil 
society as private, civil society is subdivided again in a public (social, 
political) sphere and a private sphere of personal life (Pateman 1983, Squires 
2004). As Squires puts it, ―civil society is cast as private when opposed to the 
state and public when opposed to the personal‖ (Squires 2004:25). A third way 
to conceptualise the private is as the domestic sphere. Hence ‗private‘ can 
denote civil society, the personal sphere or the domestic sphere (Squires 
2004). Women‘s association with the domestic sphere and their initial 
exclusion from the public sphere of the state, delegated them in multiple ways 
to the private sphere (Weintraub 1997, Squires 2004). The private sphere as 
the domestic sphere has often been imbued with a morality associated with 
love, relations, emotions, and altruism. In contrast, the public sphere (both in 
terms of the state and civil society) has been associated with an ethics of 
rationality, instrumentality, accountability and transparency (Benn and Gauss 
1983).  
 
The questioning of the binary public/private cannot be understood in isolation 
from debates over competing understandings of the ‗political‘. This situates 
the practices of women who work for NGOs on women/gender issues in a 
complex relation to the public/private divide which merits further exploration. 
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One of the main struggles of feminism has been to make public and political 
the situations and experiences in the domestic sphere. Jean Elshtain, for 
example, claims that all different strands of feminism ―share at least one 
overriding imperative: they would redefine the boundaries of the public and 
the private, the personal and the political‖ (Elshtain 1981:202 emphasis 
added). The famous radical feminist slogan ‗the personal is political‘, coined 
in 1968 by civil rights and feminist activist Carol Hanish (Lee 2007:1), 
pointed to the fact that issues that were traditionally understood as ‗personal‘, 
taking place in the private sphere, e.g. domestic abuse, were tightly connected 
to a public sphere in which women were devalued. The slogan encouraged a 
politicisation of these issues. Through interrogating the distinction between the 
private and public sphere feminist theory has redefined the notion of the 
political in liberal democracy (Lee 2007). Judith Squires even states that the 
feminist challenge to the dichotomy if taken to its extreme ―would eliminate 
the boundaries of the political altogether‖ (Squires 2004:23). If politics is 
understood as the circulation of power, politics is not constrained to one 
sphere but is ubiquitous (Squires 2004).  
 
Prokhovik (1998) argues for a citizenship that is more broadly understood than 
solely in terms of its political or socio-economic dimension, and stresses the 
moral dimension of citizenship. While in this claim her conception of the 
political still seems to rely on a narrow understanding of the political, her 
proposal for citizenship similarly challenges the public/private divide. She 
states that the ‗flourishing‘ of citizenship is dependent on the ―interconnexion 
between the public and the private‖; the experience of caring for children for 
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example can and should inform the performance in the public sphere 
(Prokhovnik 1998:97). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified a number of problems prompted by feminist theory, 
post-colonial theory, global civil society/global citizenship theory and critical 
development theory relating to the specific position of women NGO workers. 
In addition, this chapter has outlined the main theoretical perspectives, which 
will underlie the analysis of the empirical data in this thesis. It has also 
clarified the ways in which the theories will be applied in the thesis. I have 
described the critical engagement of post-colonial theory with development 
practices. Post-colonial critique is here understood as meriting wider 
application beyond the ex-coloniser and colonised countries as it can trace the 
complex interplay of continuities and discontinuities between European 
colonisation and current globalisation. Post-colonial and Black feminism have 
problematised the position of white, middle-class women and their relation 
with women from the global South. In addition, it has contributed to an 
understanding of the power structures underlying this relationship and has 
offered suggestions for alternative ways of positioning and relating. Feminists 
who advocated for the inclusion of gender perspectives in development theory 
and NGO practices have remained critical of the ways in which gender has 
been incorporated. The engagement of women with (global) civil society and 
the association of ‗altruistic‘ work with women and femininity are long-
standing.  
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Recently, there has been a strong growth of NGO organisations with a global 
orientation in terms of numbers and influence. Theorists of civil society and 
citizenship have pointed to a range of important dilemmas, which arise when 
translating civil society and citizenship to a global level such as terms of 
inclusion, relations of responsibility and conditions of representation. 
Furthermore, in civil society/citizenship theories civil society and citizenship 
have both ambiguous relations to the public and private sphere. Feminist 
theory has been instrumental in highlighting these ambiguities and in 
investigating the implications of this divide. In addition, feminists have 
stressed the relation of private to the political and thereby problematised 
conventional notions of politics, which is instructive in understanding the 
complex positioning of the women NGO workers. The following chapter will 
elaborate the terminology used in this thesis and present how the problems 
generated by the respective theories have been translated into empirical 
approaches. 
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3 - Methodological Approaches 
Introduction 
As has been outlined in the introduction, this research seeks to bring the 
critiques framed within feminist, postcolonial, global citizenship/civil society 
and critical development theories into dialogue with the lived experiences of 
NGO workers.  This dialogue should enrich those critiques, in particular 
postcolonial theory and global citizenship/civil society theory that are 
normally situated at the abstract, structural and discursive level by inserting 
elements of the embodied, passionate, and every day practice. At the same 
time, for critical development/ NGO studies, which is more practice-oriented 
and theoretically ‗thinner‘ as a body of thought, it emphasises the need for 
theoretical, critical depth. The dialogue reinforces the long-standing tradition 
and ambition of feminist theory to link theory and practice and to create 
spaces for women‘s voices.  
 
Hence, while discourse analytical research has generated enlightening insights 
for the field of aid practices (see for example Biccum 2005), the methodology 
of in-depth interviewing was favoured in this particular research project as it 
provided the possibility for linking structural concerns with individual, 
emotive, moral agency. Alternatively, a combination of interviewing and 
participant observation could have been interesting to explore the tensions 
between ‗narrated‘ and ‗real‘ practice. However, the risk would be to set up 
the researcher as objective observer and ultimate judge of the gaps between 
‗what was done‘ and ‗what was told‘. More importantly, as this research is 
interested in women‘s ethical and political positioning at the nexus of four 
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critiques, and thus focuses on the women‘s process of making sense of one‘s 
practices and situatedness, in-depth interviewing is the single, most relevant 
methodology generating the richest material.  
 
The research‘s focus on the reflections and experiences of women NGO 
workers has a number of methodological implications that I will outline 
below. First, the description of the sample and the process of sampling will be 
discussed. I will then further explain the choice of qualitative interviewing 
methods, the practice of interviewing, and the process of data analysis. The 
third section explains the application of intersectionality for the empirical 
analysis. The final section builds on the two previous sections about the 
practice of interviewing and intersectionality to discuss the engagement 
between the researcher and the research participants. Feminist research 
methodology will appear as a consistent thread throughout this chapter.  
 
Sampling  
In 2007-2008 I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with women located 
in the global North, who worked on gendered issues for NGOs with a global 
orientation.
10
 With ‗global orientation‘ I refer to both organisations that have 
an international presence and ‗target group‘ abroad and to those organisations 
that work on a national level with a target group that (originally) comes from 
the global South. Hence, within my sample there are two different spaces of 
intervention: some organisations engage with migrant groups nationally while 
                                                 
10
 In addition, I conducted 1 pilot interview with Kim, a woman whose work for an NGO fitted 
the same criteria, except the focus on gender/women issues. Hence her interview account will 
not be used at all in Chapter Four, which focuses on the specific challenges related to 
feminisms. Interestingly, since the interview, while she has continued to work for the same 
organisation, she has changed job and now works solely with young women and girls.  
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others engage with women in the global South (see also Harcourt 2009:84 for 
arguments in favour of combining those relations and connections). Following 
common practice in post-colonial and critical development literature (Duffield 
2001, Mohanty 2003, Goudge 2003, Heron 2007, Harcourt 2009) I use the 
terms ‗South‘ and ‗North‘ to indicate different spheres, with the first referring 
to the economically less prosperous and politically marginalised countries and 
the latter to the affluent, dominant nations, rather than referring to mere 
geographical location. Hence, Australia while geographically South becomes 
in this terminology part of the global North while parts of Eastern Europe are 
part of the South (see Harcourt 2009:29).  
 
Most importantly, the terms North and South refer to a relationship involving 
both material and discursive power imbalances, indicating how global politics 
and economic globalisation function with these two poles (Goudge 2003). It 
also needs to be asserted that while this terminology has ―certain political 
value‖ (Mohanty 2003:226), North and South are no fixed identities, and 
hence the terms should not be interpreted rigidly as an absolute binary without 
permeable borders. This permeability is reflected in the fact that the South is 
also present in the North (Heron 2007). Encounters between the ‗global North‘ 
and the ‗global South‘ can take place in multiple arenas as a result of different 
mobilities (see also Mohanty 2003) due to the relation between migration, 
colonialism and the aid industry (Duffield 2006).
11
 As Ahmed expresses it: 
―The assumption of distance also involves a refusal to recognise the 
                                                 
11
 The link between colonialism and processes of migration is captured well in the slogan ―we 
are here because you were there!‖.  
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relationships of proximity between women who are differently located in the 
world‖ (Ahmed 2000b:167). 
 
Globalisation theorists like Appadurai (1990) have suggested that 
globalisation can no longer be understood in terms of simple core-periphery, 
or consumer-producer models. Appadurai (1990) uses the term  ‗ethnoscape‘, 
which he understands to be part of a range of other ‗scapes‘ that define 
globalisation, as ―the landscape of persons who constitute the shifting world in 
which we live‖. These ethnoscapes are thus equally ‗inhabited‘ by asylum 
seekers, economic migrants, sex workers as by NGO workers, and 
development workers. In addition, as Appadurai (1990) stresses, these 
‗landscapes‘ are not just physical but also imagined worlds, ―multiple worlds 
which are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and 
groups spread around the globe‖. This conceptualisation of  ‗landscapes‘ as 
imagined worlds underlines the significance of relations between women from 
the global North and the global South that are based on the images, memories 
of previous visits, and stories in addition to the ‗real‘ physical encounters.  
 
The selection of the interviewees was based on an assumption that this group 
would share a number of commonalities related to the specific intersection of 
post-colonialism, feminism and the helping imperative that is the focus of this 
research. This group of women all work for organisations that seek to improve 
the lives of women in and from the South and they share the privilege of being 
located in the global North. Most of the organisations can be classed as NGOs; 
however, on their websites a few organisations rather self-described as 
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platform, charity, non-profit organisation or network. The ―deceptively short 
acronym‖ NGO itself already actually refers to a diverse sector, as it 
comprises highly professionalised organisations, small-scale volunteer 
organisations, with a broad range of political views (Naples 2002b:274, see 
also Silliman 1999, Smillie 2000). As Smillie points out: ―It is possible that 
more energy has gone into unrequited efforts to name and rename [NGOs] 
than has been invested in understanding them‖ (Smillie 2002:22). Some of the 
organisations that the women I interviewed worked for were 
Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs). These latter organisations were not 
NGOs in the strict sense of the term; however, if one follows Hilhorst‘s 
definition of NGO as ―doing good for the development of others‖, a definition 
which she calls the ―most common use‖ of the term NGO, it is easy to see the 
relevant commonality of the organisations (Hilhorst 2003:7, see also 
Duffield‘s definition of the aid industry 2009:3).  
 
All of the women were located in the ‗global North‘, more specifically the 
UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Belgium (Brussels) and 
Switzerland (Geneva).
12
 Some of these countries have a specific colonial past, 
notably the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium, while the other countries have 
benefited from the colonial past of Europe. Brussels and Geneva specifically 
were selected for their position as centres for the EU and UN, and hence as 
international/global spaces. The organisations based there concentrated much 
of their efforts on lobbying either or both of these institutions. The 
organisations the women worked for, either on a paid or voluntary basis, 
                                                 
12
 The sample consisted of three people in the UK, two in the Netherlands, two in Sweden, two 
in Denmark, and two + one pilot interview in Austria, five in Belgium (Brussels), and four in 
Switzerland (Geneva).  
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ranged from smaller to larger organisations and their work was concentrated in 
different areas, such as health, development, refugees, and trafficking.  
 
Relevant organisations were identified through Internet research, the use of 
Internet databases of global women organisations
13
 and on the basis of 
information from mailings from similar organisations. Research participants 
were found using a combination of purposive sampling and snowball sampling 
when existing research participants suggested new potential other interviewees 
(Marshall 1996, Hesse Biber 2007). In addition, the sample was dependent on 
the women‘s availability and willingness to participate. I never received an 
outright refusal to participate, but around one-third of the organisations I 
contacted (often several times) either never replied or indicated that people 
were too busy or away during the period I was present in the country. The 
women I interviewed were located differently in the power structures of their 
organisation; ‗power structures‘ of course takes on a different meaning within 
small-scale volunteer organisations than in large-scale highly professionalised 
organisations. Their job titles ranged from secretary general, interim director, 
policy director, to advocacy officer, technical officer, network officer, to 
research volunteer, social councillor and project worker, while a few women 
were the original founders of their (small-scale) organisations.  
 
                                                 
13
 The following Internet databases were used: http://www.distel.ca/womlist/womlist.html, 
http://www.wrc.org.uk/ and http://www.womeninlondon.org.uk/wrc.htm. I hereby want to 
express my gratitude to Denise Osted for voluntarily compiling the ‗Global List of Women‘s 
Organisations‘ on http://www.distel.ca/womlist/womlist.html, which proved an invaluable 
source. 
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The Practice of Interviewing and Analysis 
Qualitative interviewing is often recommended as the most effective method 
for research on people‘s attitudes, interpretations, values, understandings, and 
―lived experiences‖ as the complexity of these cannot easily be grasped by 
questionnaires. In addition, interviewing holds specific appeal for feminist 
researchers for its focus on women‘s voices (Hesse-Biber 2007:118, see also 
Reinharz 1992, Mason 1996; Gerson and Horowitz 2002; Silverman 2006). 
Qualitative interviewing is normally characterised by a thematic approach, in 
which topics rather than questions are listed and it includes the assumption 
that data is generated through the interaction between interviewer and 
interviewee. Qualitative and in particular feminist qualitative interview 
approaches most often feature a rather informal conversational interviewing 
style with possible moments of self-disclosure by the researcher (Reinharz 
1992, Mason 1996, Letherby 2003, Hesse-Biber 2007); hence interviewees are 
rather called participants than subjects (Reinharz 1992). The point that data is 
generated in the interaction with the interviewer, and, I would add, bound to 
the time and location, is accentuated by Denzin‘s statement that ―there is no 
inner or deeper self that is accessed by the interview or narrative method. 
There are only different interpretative (…) versions of who the person is‖ 
(Denzin 2003: 68).  
 
The experience as narrated by the research participant is itself an interpretation 
and subsequently needs to be interpreted by the researcher (Scott in: Brah 
1996, Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002, Fonow and Cook 2005). These 
interpretations have to be informed by an account of relevant historical, 
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political and social processes and by how ideologies shape representation and 
signification (Brah 1996).  This means that the researcher has to pay attention 
to how the subject is socially, culturally, and politically constructed and how 
she is giving meaning to and constructing the world around her, using the 
repertoires and discourses available (Brah 1996). The feminist elements in the 
process of interpretation can be recognised in the theoretical framework used 
and in the ethical and political ambition to engage with power relations 
(Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002).  
 
In this research, all interviews were digitally recorded and literally transcribed. 
Then, for the analysis of the data, selections were made from the transcripts 
according to themes suggested by the theoretical framework and subsequently 
these selections were coded by hand according to sub-themes emerging from 
the interviews. For the analysis of the sub-themes I returned to reading new 
literature from the theoretical framework. Hence, the coding was both based 
on the conceptual framework of the theory and at the same time provided 
space for themes emerging from the data itself. With regards to the latter, as 
feminist researchers have observed: 
 
―the everyday world is already extensively organised and categorised in order 
to make the complexity of every day life manageable, and research subjects 
will draw on the categories and meanings familiar to them, even if they are 
unfamiliar to you, diverse and contradictory‖ (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 
2002:160).  
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An example of this was the research participants‘ use of the notions of the 
private/public, professional and political as discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
As Bryman (2001) points out, a semi-structured interview should allow the 
interviewee considerable freedom regarding how to interpret and reply to the 
questions. I adopted this approach as it permitted flexibility regarding the 
number, order and phrasing of the questions. While neither the order nor the 
particular formulation of the questions was fixed, over time I did develop a 
rough order and formulation. The interview guide was finalised after the pilot 
interview (Hesse-Biber 2007) and, based on the engagement with feminist, 
postcolonial, global citizenship and critical development literature, consisted 
of the following topics: a) the relation with clients/beneficiaries/target group; 
b) how they negotiated working at different (organisational) levels; c) what 
was experienced as discouraging in their work; d) how their own identity 
played out in the work; e) where their sense of responsibility came from; and 
f) their personal and professional development. Since the topics chosen were 
directly derived from the structural critiques informing this work, it was 
ensured that structural and institutional factors were strongly rooted in the 
interview guide alongside aspects of individual subjectivity. The interview 
quotes presented in the subsequent chapters intend to convey the richness and 
multiplicity of voices in the interviewees‘ stories (Reinharz 1992).   
 
The focus of the interviews, which typically lasted between an hour and three 
hours, was on how individual women who work on women/gender issues in a 
global context negotiate their roles and their relations with the groups they 
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seek to support. After answering possible questions from the research 
participant about the research, I started every interview by asking the 
interviewees to introduce themselves and say something about their 
organisations, their own background and the role they had in the organisations. 
As is common in feminist research practice (Hesse-Biber 2007) at the end of 
every interview the research participant had the opportunity to ask me 
questions or still add something to the interview; some interviewees took this 
opportunity.  
 
Prior to each interview, I established contact with the research participants by 
email
14
 (sometimes also by telephone and regular mail) and, where possible, 
the interviews were conducted in person. As I was based in the UK during the 
research, I travelled to Brussels, Geneva, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Vienna and 
Amsterdam to meet the research participants. In line with feminist research 
practice, which argues that the participants might feel more comfortable and in 
control in their ‗own‘ spaces (Letherby 2003), the specific location of the 
interview was chosen by the interviewees and varied from cafes, hotel bars, a 
fast food restaurant at a train station, their offices
15
, to their house, or even 
once my room in a youth hostel. On four occasions, interviews were 
conducted over the telephone when contact with the research participant was 
made after I had left the research field or when an interview had to be 
rescheduled due to illness. The interviews were one-off meetings and whilst I 
                                                 
14
 See Appendix 1 for sample email interview request 
15
 The location of the office was interesting in this research, since it functioned in some 
instances as the most private space, when the person had her own office, while in other cases it 
was a semi-public space with colleagues sitting in hearing distance. In some instances I had the 
impression that the choice of location was an early indication of how ‗open‘ the research 
participant had anticipated to be/was prepared to be.  
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prepared for each interview by reading about the specific organisation, I did 
not have insider knowledge of the specific organisations.  
 
All the interviews were conducted in English, which was often not the first 
language of my interviewee (nor is it my own first language). However for 
many of the participants English was (one of the) the main working languages. 
The interviewees were all fluent in English and I did not have the impression 
that the communication between the interviewee and me was hindered by the 
fact that the interview was conducted in English. Another way in which 
language featured in the interviews was in the form of NGO jargon, especially 
with regards to those interviewees that worked closely with the EU and UN. 
These interviewees assumed a familiarity on my side with this jargon that 
initially I did not have, but which I did learn along the way. However, as this 
work focuses on the personal reflections of the women who worked for these 
organisations, this jargon does not feature excessively in this thesis. An 
important point to note is shared education: since members of transnational 
feminist networks are often ―highly educated social scientists‖ (Moghadam 
2005:102) many of the interviewees had university degrees in a social science 
subject. Hence we shared ―a common intellectual language‖  (Puwar 
1997:10.2).  
 
Feminist researchers have generally identified three ways in which the 
researcher could hold more power in the research than the research 
participants; the researcher controls the research process, the researcher 
interprets and presents the data and often occupies a higher social status than 
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the research participants (Wolf 1996, Sprague 2005, Harding and Norberg 
2005). In terms of the first two instances of power of the researcher, I have 
attempted to make myself as the researcher visible in the text using feminist 
stylistic conventions such as the use of the personal pronoun and using active 
rather than passive voice (Sprague 2005). One of the effects of the shared 
academic background between me and some of the research participants was 
that it reversed the way the power relation between researcher and researched 
is usually conceptualised, when interviewees would give me literature 
suggestions. 
 
Before the interview started all research participants received an explanatory 
statement, which again described the research, so that they could sign the 
informed consent form (Hesse-Biber 2007, Thorne 2008).
16
 On the consent 
form it was indicated that the interviewee could stop the interview, refuse to 
answer a specific question or discontinue their participation in the research at 
any time and without providing an explanation (Hesse-Biber 2007). The 
women interviewed, though selected on the basis of their affiliation to a 
certain organisation, indicated that they spoke in their personal capacity and 
not as representatives of their organisations.  
 
I have agreed with all the research participants that the quotes used in the 
thesis will not be connected to their organisation and that their real names will 
not be used.
17
  Inevitably, the need for confidentiality in relation to the 
                                                 
16
 See Appendix 2 for consent form including the explanatory statement 
17
 This is in line with the University of Nottingham ‗Code of Research Conduct and Research 
Ethics and the ESRC Research Ethics Framework‟, which states ―the confidentiality of 
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research participants and their work places implied that compromises had to 
be made in terms of contextualising the women‘s reflections (Letherby 2003). 
While at some points it would have been interesting to delve deeper into the 
exact nature of the organisation, the type of work and the national context of 
the research participant, this was often not possible. The anonymity of the 
research participants was necessary in order to create a space where the 
women could be open about their experiences and their reflections on their 
work practices. For example, one woman told me after the interview that her 
anonymity was of utmost importance for her as she could lose her job if what 
she told me would be linked to her name
18
. This clearly raises issues of harm 
and I am concerned to protect the participants: full anonymity is therefore 
maintained throughout this thesis. Comparable studies with a similar focus on 
individual reflections as data (Heron 2007, Goudge 2003, Cook 2007, 
Hopgood 2006) have taken a similar approach to this issue. In Hopgood‘s 
study of Amnesty International, for example, he states: ―Some readers might 
find the lack of context about the speakers off-putting. I can only sympathise 
and say that this was unavoidable‖ (Hopgood 2006:viii), while Goudge 
similarly refused to provide any details about her research participants‘ lives 
and jobs which could make identification easier (Goudge 2003:6:ftn.1, 43).  
 
Intersectionality 
Like Avtar Brah, I work under the assumption that 
                                                                                                                                 
information supplied by research subjects and the anonymity of the respondents must be 
respected‖ (ESRC p. 1).  
18
 As is common (see for example Letherby 2003), research participants differed in the degree 
of concern for confidentiality. However, as the sample size was very small in this particular 
research, I decided to maintain same level of confidentiality for all participants.  
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―members of dominant groups occupy ‗privileged‘ positions within political 
and material practices that attend these social divisions although the precise 
interplay of this power in specific institutions or in interpersonal relations 
cannot be stipulated in advance, may be contradictory, and can be challenged‖ 
(Brah 1996:112, see also Razack 2001:161 or see Narayan‘s term 
―mainstream Western women‖ 1997:100).  
 
This implies in the particular case of this research, that while I assume a 
certain commonality between the women I also seek to pay attention to the 
internal diversity of this group in terms of nationality, age, ethnicity, and 
career trajectory. Naturally, the nature of the interviewees‘ work meant that 
their experiences were not limited to the country they were based in; many 
were born in and had lived in many other countries and had worked in other 
countries. This meant that a few research participants even ‗covered‘ three to 
four continents in the combination of their migration background and their 
international work experiences. Their experiences, positions and reflections 
thus displayed these commonalities and differences. Hence, an intersectional 
approach is indispensable to gain a deeper understanding of some of the 
complexities regarding their reflections on their work practices and on the 
relation with the women they seek to support.  
 
Black feminists‘ assertion that the experiences of black women could only 
insufficiently be theorised when analyses of ‗race‘ and gender were separated, 
prompted calls for an approach that would be attentive to the interaction 
between different categories of subordination. In addition, black feminists 
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sought to challenge the notion of a unified category of ‗women‘ present in 
Western feminism. Brah and Phoenix (2004) describe Sojourner Truth‘s 
famous exclamation ―ain‘t I a woman?‖ as an early example of a challenge to 
this unified and universalised category of ‗woman‘, by claiming womanhood 
while challenging conventional images of women associated with white 
middle class women. They claim that her speech signalled how identities are 
relational, and ―processes constituted in and through power relations‖ rather 
than objects (Brah and Phoenix 2004:77). By the 1980s some feminists started 
to attempt to integrate other categories of class and ethnicity in gender analysis 
and vice versa, in response to these criticisms (Denis 2008).  
 
Kimberley Crenshaw (2000) coined the term ‗intersectionality‘ in 1989 in her 
article ‗Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex‘ where she 
introduced her famous analogy with a black woman on a traffic intersection 
with discrimination flowing to and from the different lanes. If an accident 
happens to the woman standing on the cross roads, it could have been caused 
by one car, from any of the directions or from several cars at the same time 
coming from anywhere, which is similar to the situation of harm through 
discrimination where the source of the specific discrimination (racism or 
sexism) cannot always easily be identified and separated (Crenshaw 2000). 
Brah and Phoenix define ‗intersectionality‘ as denoting  
 
―the complex, irreducible, varied, and variable effects which ensue when 
multiple axes of differentiation –economic, political, cultural, psychic, 
subjective and experiential –intersect in historically specific contexts‖ (Brah 
and Phoenix 2004:76).  
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While Brah and Phoenix are careful to use the term ‗differentiation‘ rather 
than ‗discrimination‘, intersectional approaches have mostly been applied to 
study and describe the experiences of those that are facing an array of different 
types of oppression, like working-class black women. However, intersectional 
approaches can also be applied to groups that do not face multiple axes of 
discrimination, but rather occupy ‗mixed‘ or advantaged positions (AWID 
2004, Yuval-Davis 2006a, Verloo 2009a).  
 
While intersectionality has been lauded as a very significant contribution by 
women‘s studies, (McCall 2005, Davis 2008), intersectionality is also 
notoriously difficult to operationalise in empirical research. As Ludvig states: 
―Its implications for empirical analysis are, on the one hand, a seemingly 
insurmountable complexity and, on the other, a fixed notion of difference‖ 
(Ludvig 2006:246). The main difficulty in the operationalisation of 
intersectionality lies, as Ludvig hinted at, in the variety of interpretations of 
the idea of ‗categories‘. McCall (2005) distinguishes between three kinds of 
intersectional approaches, which differ in their treatment of categories as 
fixed, constructed or structural and either reject or embrace categories (see 
also Prins 2006). The approach of intracategorical complexity, (which McCall 
situates between the two other approaches as it neither completely rejects nor 
strategically uses the categories), is most relevant for the current analysis. The 
main distinguishing feature of this approach is the focus on one specific social 
group (hence intracategorical) to get insight into the group members‘ lived 
experiences and its complexities.  
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I will ‗perform‘ an intersectional approach in two ways. Firstly, throughout the 
chapters I will be attentive to how different categories (such as gender and 
age) intersect in the lived experience of the women. I will discuss how identity 
categories are attributed different meanings (depending on the location and 
situation) and I will look at intersectionality in terms of the relational aspect of 
identity with reference to the relation of the women with those they seek to 
support. Secondly, the order and structure of the chapters, with each taking a 
different theoretical angle, should facilitate a reading that highlights the 
complexity of the positioning of the women. In this way I use intersectionality 
to combine the macrostructures of social division with the microstructure of 
subjective experiences and relationships and to explore the specific ways 
categories interact without reifying or disavowing them. Furthermore, through 
an intersectional approach the narratives will be situated in their historical 
context and location while moving away from a determinist additive model of 
oppression or domination. 
 
Self and Other in Research 
The choice for the subject of the research follows Jenny Sharpe‘s suggestion 
that ―the problematic needs to be reversed so that we can explain not how 
European women transformed colonialism but how colonialism left its 
indelible mark on European women‖ (Sharpe 1993:94, see also Wolf 1996:36, 
Stoler and Cooper 1997, McEwan 2009). Kapoor (2008) states that 
representations of the Other tell us much more about the Self than about the 
Other. This research deliberately moves away from studying the Other to 
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understand global relations mediated through post-colonialism, feminism and 
the helping imperative. Hence, I have chosen not to interview those that would 
be labelled ‗the recipients‘ of aid; this decision was made because I was 
particularly interested in (negotiations of) privilege, because interviewing the 
recipients would open up issues about the more obvious power differential 
between researcher and researched (Wolf 1996) and because I did not deem it 
constructive to use their judgements of the services and treatment received as 
some ultimate arbiter (see for this last point also Heron 2007:20).  
 
Instead, this research turns the research ‗gaze‘ back at those that could be 
considered to be in a more dominant and privileged position, one more similar 
to the researcher. Or, as Bridget Byrne puts it: ―I have not chosen to research 
myself, but have chosen to research those who are quite like myself‖ (Byrne 
2006:40, see also Chaudhuri and Strobel 1992:3). This has a few implications 
in line with an intersectional approach that understands identity as relational. 
Just like Frankenberg, who noticed in her interviews with white women about 
whiteness and race that her ―ability to conduct interviews successfully 
involved a complex set of adjustments in self-presentation, but never a 
presentation of [her]self as neutral‖ (Frankenberg 1993:32), in each interview 
different parts of my own identity were fore-grounded to establish 
commonalities; I was ‗mainly‘ someone who had also lived in different 
countries, ‗mainly‘ someone with a similar academic background, ‗mainly‘ 
Dutch, ‗mainly‘ a friend of a friend, ‗mainly‘ young, ‗mainly‘ a woman, 
depending on who I was speaking to.  
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Feminist writing from the 1980s often emphasised that in contrast to 
mainstream research where the power differential between researcher and 
research participant was large, in feminist research with female researchers 
interviewing female participants, the setting was more relaxed, with less of a 
power gap. More recently, it has been acknowledged that it is too simplistic to 
attribute this ‗cosiness‘ to shared gender and that rather this was the result of 
other shared positions, such as class and ‗race‘ (Phoenix 1994, see also Puwar 
1997, Byrne 2006). In addition, the notion that women interviewers and 
interviewees immediately established rapport also assumed that both had the 
same agendas, and that the interviewee would agree with the analysis of the 
interviewer (Byrne 2006). As one of the interview questions specifically 
addressed how identity played out in the women‘s work and as most of my 
interviewees can be categorised as ‗white‘, some interviewees might have 
been more comfortable sharing with me how their identity as a white, Western 
women impacted on their work since I am also white, Western and a woman. I 
do not seek to imply here that this openness was necessarily better; rather it 
underlined my own complicity and the fact that data is produced in the 
interaction of the specific interview setting (Letherby 2003:109).  
 
The reply of one of the interviewees to my question whether she thinks racism 
will be overcome soon as she seems to put quite a lot of faith in the younger 
generation, illustrates this: “I don‟t know [silence]. I would hope that, you 
would hope that a better education and a greater understanding would breed 
a greater tolerance, but, when you look at incidents of racism in this country 
in Bradford, Leicester, Bristol, you get it in London, even in Suffolk, (…) 
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racism is rife there. So I would like the answer to be yes, but the answer is 
probably no, that we have got a long way to go before we are a really 
integrated society where skin colour does not matter. (…) I think it is really 
sad. But you get it all over Europe don‟t you? Because in Holland, 20 years 
ago, was it with the Indonesian population that there were race riots?”. Grace 
mitigates the pessimistic account of racism in her own country with a 
reference to the fact that racism is widespread across Europe. Subsequently, 
she draws me into her musings by asking me about race riots in the 
Netherlands.  
 
At the same time, inevitably, some of my identity markers were perceived as a 
barrier between the research participant and me. Interestingly, age or seniority 
was an issue that surfaced in the content of almost every interview despite the 
fact that none of my questions directly addressed this topic. Unsurprisingly, I 
had the impression that this concern with age and seniority was also mirrored 
in how the research participants related to me especially in relation to how 
open they chose to be about their own reflections on their work practice. The 
younger interviewees seemed to more closely identify with me which seemed 
to foster openness in relation to their doubts and hesitations, while many older 
interviewees tended to ‗explain‘ to me how their work functioned, sometimes 
reversing the way the power relations between the feminist researcher and 
research participant are commonly conceived (see also Sprague 2005:59, 
Letherby 2003:115).  
 
Another way in which the interviewees and myself were quite clearly set apart 
was in relation to the difference between our professions. While these women 
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had used their experience and their degrees to work for NGOs and IGOs, I had 
decided to build on my academic knowledge by ‗studying them‘.  
 
This tension is illustrated by the following exclamation by one of the 
interviewees: “I think it is very easy to stand back and to research or look at 
issues second-hand from papers and from people who have done the research 
and from studies and figures and I think what is really difficult is trying to 
empathise with those issues. I mean, when I first came back [from 
volunteering abroad] I could not understand how people who perhaps say 
they are…, I mean your department is called „the Centre for the Study of 
Social and Global Justice‟ and to be quite frank I don‟t see, having met a few 
people who are researching there, professors and students, I don‟t see the 
practice, I see the talking and the debates and the discussions, which are all 
important, but they are all generally held by academics, I don‟t see the 
connection between the people that are doing that work and the things that are 
going on”.  
McEwan (2009) has identified a tension along quite similar lines between 
post-colonial theory and development studies. While post-colonial theory 
takes a critical deconstructive approach to development, it has been criticised 
by development studies for ―being too abstract and of little relevance‖ and for 
―its alleged failure to connect critiques of discourse and representation to the 
realities of people‘s lives‖ (McEwan 2009:1). In addition, Eyben mentions a 
range of critical literature on power in development, and states ―its largely 
post-modernist perspective offered little help for those (…) seeking to improve 
development aid‖ (Eyben 2006:5). However, just as McEwan‘s book relies on 
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the idea that post-colonial theory and development studies would develop 
through their mutual critical engagement (McEwan 2009:1, see also Eyben 
2006, Duffield 2007), I have the hope that there would be a shared benefit in 
the dialogue between the NGO practitioners and academics. This hope is 
supported by the fact that many of the research participants (including those 
who showed some scepticism about academia) often expressed the view that 
academia and NGO work should work together more closely and had thus 
decided to participate in this project. Many asked to receive a copy of the final 
results.  
Also, some critical research has been financed by NGOs themselves (see 
Eyben 2006:15, Koster 2008a). In addition, Eade‘s observation that ―the 
danger of working in any kind of aid agency is that one begins to see the world 
through its eyes; [and that] it is increasingly difficult (…) to see ourselves as 
other see us‖ justifies the potential contribution of the relative outsider (Eade 
2007:630). It is important to stress here that the intention of this work is 
neither to blame specific individuals nor to situate myself outside the unequal 
power structures referred to in this work. Rather my intention is first to 
contribute to our understanding of the complexities and contradictions in the 
positioning of women who engage in justice seeking practices related to 
gendered issues in a global context. Second, the intention of this work is to 
advance and enhance the reflexive and analytic practices of NGOs and their 
employees.  
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4 - Travelling through Feminism, ‘Racing to 
Innocence’ 
 
Introduction 
Since this study is concerned with women who work or volunteer for 
organisations to support women in and from the global South and as this 
research takes the critique against Western feminism as one of its points of 
departure, it is important to situate the women NGO workers and their 
organisations in relation to feminism. The first section of this chapter will take 
a journey through different aspects of the women‘s understandings of and 
approaches to feminism and the discussion subsequently puts this in relation to  
(the approaches of) their organisations. Western feminism has traditionally 
been subdivided into three different strands; liberal, radical and socialist 
feminism (Bulbeck 1998). Since the women‘s narratives did not neatly follow 
the fault lines of these three types, I will focus on and highlight the diversity 
and contingencies present among the women as indicative of the eclecticism 
of feminism. I will argue that some of the major debates within feminism are 
reflected in the narratives of the women; namely the institutionalisation of the 
women‘s movement in the academy, generational differences between second 
wave and ‗third wave‘ feminists, (responses to) different backlashes against 
feminisms, essentialism and anti-essentialism, and separatism versus 
inclusion.  
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As has been outlined in Chapter Two, second wave Western feminism has 
been under severe criticism by black women who problematise the 
universalisation of a homogenous category of ‗woman‘ (Lorde 1984, hooks 
1981, 1986, Carby 1992, Lazreg 2000, Bhavnani and Coulson 2003). The 
Western feminist movement had to respond, for example, to black feminist 
activist Audre Lorde: ―Today, there is a pretence to a homogeneity of 
experience covered by the word SISTERHOOD in the white women‘s 
movement‖ (Lorde 1984:116). Black feminists have pointed to the importance 
of looking at how the categories of gender, race, class and sexuality intersect 
in the creation and maintenance of power relations (see hooks 1981, Crenshaw 
2000). Furthermore, black feminists have challenged white feminists to 
confront their own privileges and to understand their complicity in 
maintaining racism and systems of oppression (hooks 1981, 2000, Amos and 
Parmar 1984, Carby 1992). Carby, in a contribution tellingly called ‗White 
Woman, Listen!‘ calls white women ―extraordinarily reluctant to see 
themselves in the situations of being oppressors‖ and attributes this to a fear 
that acknowledgement of their role as oppressors will distract from their 
oppressed position in terms of gender (Carby 1992:221). Frankenberg 
concluded from interviews with white women about race: 
 
―one experience of marginality [did not lead] white women automatically 
towards empathy with other oppressed communities, nor [did] participation in 
one kind of liberatory movement –feminism, the ‗Left‘- le[a]d automatically 
to anti-racism‖ (Frankenberg 1993:20).  
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As was mentioned in Chapter One, one response to the need to interrogate 
engagements with Others in a context of unequal power structures has been 
the introduction of the notion of ‗reflexivity‘ (Harding 1991, Haraway 1991). 
Advocating the ‗situating of knowledges‘ meant that the researcher had to 
reflect on his or her own background, cultural baggage, and, importantly, the 
relation to the research subject studied. This required an interrogation of Self 
and Other that both paid attention to the power structures that influenced the 
research (e.g. sexist, racist, class structures) and to the relational aspects of 
(research) identity (e.g. the position of the researcher versus the researched 
might change depending on the research subject and context). Despite the fact 
that the notion of reflexivity in feminism is most used within the context of 
academic knowledge production (Adkins 2002; Harding 1991; Rose 1997), I 
would argue that it is equally relevant within justice seeking practices of 
NGOs as knowledge production plays an equally central role there. Harding‘s 
standpoint theory is on the one hand a response to the criticism of black 
feminists that their experiences are not sufficiently taken into account and that 
more attention should be paid to the multiplicity and diversity of the category 
‗woman‘ and on the other hand a response to the demands of conventional 
science in terms of truth and objectivity (Harding 1991).  
 
Lorde (1984) made a significant contribution to the struggle within feminist 
theory and activism about differences among women by showing how 
difference is institutionalised as otherness. When ‗different‘ people, for 
example black people, are made Others, it justifies exploitation and 
unwillingness to reach out across difference, as the ‗radically other‘ cannot be 
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understood anyways (Lorde 1984). Hence she argues that differences itself do 
not divide women, ―but our reluctance to recognise those differences and deal 
effectively with the distortions which have resulted from the ignoring and 
misnaming of those differences‖ (Lorde 1984:122). Davis (2008), in her 
article ‗Intersectionality as a Buzzword‘ relates part of the popularity of the 
concept in contemporary feminist studies to the fact that it appeals to the most 
pressing theoretical and normative concern of recognising difference between 
women. In addition, she holds that ―it promises to address (and redress) the 
exclusions which have played such a distressing role in feminist scholarship‖ 
(Davis 2008:70) pointing again to the almost ‗traumatic‘ experience of the 
challenge against white Western feminism.  
 
To complement the journey through the feminisms of the women NGO 
workers, I will explore the currency of the term ‗sisterhood‘ among the 
women. I will investigate how these women implicitly and explicitly respond 
to the criticism of black feminists regarding the assumption of universality of 
the experiences of white Western women. I will specifically refer to the shift 
from sisterhood to solidarity. In addition, the so-called ‗race to innocence‘ as 
coined by Fellows and Razack (1998) will be traced in the narratives of the 
women in terms of the privileging of gender oppression over other types of 
subordination. In relation to the critique of black feminists I will look at two 
ways in which this ‗race to innocence‘ can be challenged. Firstly, I will 
investigate how the theoretical notion of reflexivity as a way of recognising 
and making explicit one‘s positionality plays out in the practice of women‘s 
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NGO work. Secondly, I will explore the ways the role of gender is 
problematised by cross-cutting factors such as age, ethnicity and class.  
 
Understandings of Feminism 
As Dean argues:  
 
―While empirically it is undoubtedly the case that there have been divisive 
conflicts between different strands of feminism, the continued grip of this 
tripartite distinction has deleterious effects on the possibilities for critical and 
evaluative analysis of feminist practices‖ (Dean 2008:286).  
 
Following Dean‘s suggestion, I would also maintain here that it is not 
productive to ‗force‘ the women NGO workers‘ personal understandings of 
feminism exactly in one of the three categories. I did not ask the research 
participants whether or not they identified as feminists, but nonetheless most 
(3/4) did mention feminism and readily identified themselves as ‗feminist‘. Of 
course, they did not all understand this term in the same way, but one recurrent 
theme that emerged from their accounts was a reference to the idea that ‗the 
personal is political‘. One of the major contributions of feminism has been the 
realisation that experiences of women, e.g. of domestic violence, were not 
mere individual experiences, but that these reflected gender relations on a 
wider scale. Hence, personal experiences should not be addressed as 
individual problems but should form the basis for political organising as 
summarised in the slogan ‗the personal is political‘. The influence of this 
notion that the personal is also political was clearly noticeable in some of the 
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accounts of the women NGO workers who described their route to feminism 
by reference to experiences they had had as a woman or that other women had 
gone through because they were women.  
 
Stacey for example says the following: “[My interest in inequalities] with 
respect to women, that came as I grew older and had my own experiences 
based on gender based violence and abuse and seeing things around myself, 
there was a shooting (…) where somebody killed only women, only women, 
just because they were women trying to be engineers. (…) And so as a woman 
and having gone through things that I only experienced as a woman, that 
definitely influenced things”.  
 
When Stacey continues, she touches upon one other major development of 
feminism: the institutionalisation of the women‘s movement through the 
establishment of women‘s studies departments in universities: “But I‟m not 
sure that I can say from the beginning that I was concerned with inequalities 
only with women, because that was really something that evolved throughout, 
probably I would say it sort of all came together when I was at university 
doing my undergraduate degree”. Stacey‘s expression ‗it sort of all came 
together‘ describes how her university studies helped her to synthesise her 
experiences with theories about gender oppression. From Stacey‘s narrative 
here it is not clear whether she experienced ‗gender based violence‘ before she 
learned to put that label on it during her university degree or whether it came 
after when she was able to recognise it as such. Others also described how 
they had experienced some kind of feminist ‗awakening‘, often during their 
late teens or early twenties. This awakening is often linked both to their 
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personal experiences as a woman and the formative time of university studies, 
the latter particularly for the younger women who went to university at a time 
when women studies and gender studies were first institutionalised. 
 
Anna: “During my university years when I was engaged with academic study 
of gender issues, I was very, very engaged with women and that being part of 
my identity, it was very much the Ani DiFranco
19
 stage of my life as well and 
this was very much like „this is who I am‟, and a lot of how I responded to life 
was filtered through my own perceptions of whether they were responding to 
me as a woman‟.  
Sylvia says: „I was very involved in women‟s issues when I was in university 
and in high school, mostly because reproductive rights was a very hot topic 
and it was something that at that point as a young woman it was an incredibly 
important issue for me in terms of being a politically active person in my 
youth”.  
 
At the same time Sylvia stresses that her experience of being a woman does 
not, for her, mean that a gender perspective comes naturally: “Because you 
are a woman does not mean that you are constantly thinking about how to 
integrate gender into your programming or your project. Just like a man 
working on an issue, I need to have the same kind of „don‟t forget the women!‟ 
reminder”. Sylvia differs from Stacey and Anna in the fact that rather than 
connecting her own experiences with the feminist theories she became familiar 
with at university, she considers herself part of the “kind of the post-feminist 
                                                 
19
 Ani diFranco is a singer, guitarist and songwriter who is known for her political songs, 
which address sexism, racism and homophobia.  
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generation where it is not quite as important to us anymore, (…) as far as 
gender parity in our own countries, that we have come so far that it is not 
quite as passionate an issue for us‖. She hastens to add though that this 
speculation ―might be a gross generalisation not applicable to anyone else”. 
 
In contrast to Sylvia, who considers herself part of the post-feminist 
generation and for those women for whom their university experience was 
significant in their process of identification as a feminist, some of the older 
interviewees had a different narrative. Casey says: “The gender orientation is 
something from my childhood and family upbringing”, while Elisa says that “I 
do think that for me my feminist identity was always out of the question, it was 
always something which was a part of me, in how I am and how I want a 
better world”.  
 
Casey‘s and Elisa‘s narratives which both stress how they have been oriented 
towards gender justice since they were young, is in marked contrast with the 
‗feminist awakening‘ accounts of those who came into contact with feminism 
at university. From the above accounts a picture emerges of the different 
generations of feminism linked to different experiences of women; the first 
group became conscious that their personal experiences were political through 
engaging with the women‘s movement, the second makes sense of their earlier 
experiences through the theories acquired at university, and the third, 
sometimes labelled the ‗post-feminist‘ generation, sees the merit of the 
theories but cannot immediately synthesise these with personal experiences.  
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It has been asserted that while many young women refuse to call themselves 
feminists, they do support feminist issues (Aronson 2003, Valenti 2007:5-6). 
Aronson found that ―young women‘s development of a feminist perspective 
and identity is tied closely with institutions that support and nurture such a 
perspective –particularly women‘s studies programs‖ (Aronson 2003:919). 
This resonates with the ‗awakening‘ accounts above, in which many 
associated their ‗feminist awakening‘ with their university years. Aronson 
(2003) notes that at the same time as feminism became institutionalised, other 
organisations and the media have communicated negative stereotypes of 
feminism, which have been internalised by some women.  
 
When Catherine talks about a project her organisation had with young women, 
she supports the idea that young women simultaneously resist calling 
themselves feminist and support feminist issues. While noting that there are 
times when it seems easy to ‗win‘ members for the feminist ‗camp‘, she also 
identifies the strength of anti-feminist lobbyists. Catherine: “We had a project 
about young women and it was 20 young women and none of them or maybe 
only 2 would call themselves feminists on the first day and all of them would 
call themselves feminists on the last day, so it is all a question of perception, 
and it is not, it does not seem so difficult to change but there is ongoing 
undermining work being done by (…) the enemies of feminism are getting 
more powerful, I think in the last years so that does not make the work easier, 
the conservative forces, the pro-life movement”.  
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As mentioned above, the fact that many identified as feminists does not mean 
that they shared the same understanding of feminism. To gain an 
understanding of the type of feminism the women were advocating, it is 
instructive to have a closer look at how they described ‗what they were not‘. 
This sheds light on some of the ambivalences within feminism and on the 
backlashes experienced by feminism. While Sonia identifies as a feminist, she 
immediately hastens to add:  “But I am not a sort of feminist that „oh I hope 
all men die‟, no, I am not that extremist. I believe we can improve the 
situations of women which at the same time will probably improve the 
situation for men, and that‟s great, but I am not any extremist, not at all”.  
 
Sonia‘s use of the word ‗extremist‘ probably refers here to so-called radical 
feminism, which suggests that Sonia has a more liberal or socialist 
understanding of feminism linked to equal opportunities. Sonia‘s 
interpretation of feminism, which reveals a stereotype reminiscent of the idea 
of feminists as angry ‗bra–burners‘, would not be shared by many of the other 
research participants.  
 
Stacey and others, in contrast, qualify their feminism by stressing that their 
interest in gender inequality does not mean they are blind to other oppressions. 
Stacey is anticipating one other significant critique of feminism, namely as not 
sufficiently taking into account other categories than gender: “So of course 
being a woman affects things, does that mean that I don‟t feel for the 
discrimination and the inequality and injustices that my cousin is faced in 
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fighting to marry his partner who is HIV positive? Of course not! Does it 
mean that I am not sensitive to other forms of inequalities? Of course not!”.  
 
This account reflects the influence of intersectional approaches coming out of 
Black feminism, which pay attention to the interplay of different axes of 
oppression. As Davis notes, in relation to gender and women‘s studies, any 
scholar who nowadays does not pay sufficient attention to the intersection of 
multiple identities and oppressions, ―runs the risk of having her work viewed 
as theoretically misguided, politically irrelevant, or simply fantastical‖ (Davis 
2008:68). This critique by black feminists will be further explored in later 
sections in this chapter.  
 
Sophie, whose work is in the field of reproductive rights, also partly defines 
her feminism negatively by acknowledging that she does not think of her 
feminist work as representing the opinions of all women: “I have no 
imagination that I represent the will of all the women in the world, absolutely 
not. I represent a political idea and an ideology that some women share and 
some women don‟t and that might be in Zambia or in Tanzania or in Sweden 
(…) but I think my role is also then to stand up for these rights irrespective of 
where I am in the world”. Since sexuality is a highly contested topic, Sophie 
recognises the specific sensitivity of the issues she deals with. Nevertheless 
she indicates here that she believes in a set of universal values with regards to 
sexual rights that despite not being shared by all women, are worth advocating 
as these will eventually ‗objectively benefit‘ people. This notion of universal 
rights, or a rights based approach, is indicative of a liberal approach to 
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feminism. Sophie also acknowledges the specific nature of her feminism when 
she states that she represents ‗a political idea and an ideology‘.  
 
Anna who was at some point in the ‗Ani DiFranco stage‘ of her life where she 
analysed her experiences in life through a gender lens, explains how this has 
changed: “So now I feel that yes, [gender] is an important part of my identity 
but no more or less so than it should be for anybody else, or for a man for that 
matter or for someone of both genders. For me it comes back again to choice, 
that who I am, I get to decide who I am. And my opportunities in life, my „what 
I do‟ should never be determined by the sex that I am. But I have also grown a 
lot more flexible about that, from being the arch-feminist of women power is 
emancipation and the only way of emancipation is through getting women out 
of the house, out of the hearth and into the work force, more to settling down 
with choice and opportunities”.  
 
Anna says she has moved from a more ‗prescriptive‘ idea of emancipation, 
which could only consist of women entering the work force to a more open 
approach of emancipation as choice, which means that emancipation could 
also lie in the choice to stay at home. Anna‘s narrative of choice stands to 
some extent in direct contrast to Sophie‘s universalist approach which is 
necessarily prescriptive as she chooses to advocate one ideology about 
sexuality. At the same time, liberal elements can easily be identified in Anna‘s 
description as well. First, the idea that sex should never determine what one 
does is a liberal idea. This stands in contrast to the more radical feminist idea 
that women can also choose to be at home, as Anna also indirectly recognises 
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when she connects the liberal with the more radical assertion by saying ‗I have 
also grown a lot more flexible about that‘. Secondly, the emphasis on 
choice/opportunities and the individual are normally indicative of a liberal 
ideology as well.  
 
In addition, it is significant to note that there is another shift in Anna‘s 
account, as she herself already indicates. Her first narrative, quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, focussed on her experiences as a woman (‗a lot of 
how I responded to life was filtered through my own perceptions of whether 
they were responding to me as a woman‘), while this narrative stresses gender 
experience as being equally relevant for men or for people of both genders. 
Anna‘s shift echoes other important developments in feminist theory and 
practice, which are linked to the move from sex to gender or even 
performativity (Butler 1990). Similarly, in development policies a shift has 
been made from ‗women‘s rights‘ to gender mainstreaming and in academia 
from Women‘s Studies to Gender Studies. Advocating the latter in favour of 
the former is associated with the depoliticisation of academic feminism, with 
―an endorsement of (…) post-structuralism [and against] material accounts of 
womanhood‖, and finally, as a political and theoretical move towards building 
coalitions with the discipline of transgender and queer studies (Hemming 
2008:272-274).   
 
Catherine identifies an additional challenge to feminism and more specifically 
to how it defines itself, and who it includes: “We have a big debate, for 
example with the International Lesbian and Gay Association because for 
 75 
reasons that I understand from a political, moral and theoretical reason, they 
want more or less to get rid of the categories women and men for obvious 
reasons and we don‟t quite agree”.  
 
This resonates with the academic debate mentioned earlier concerning the use 
of gender (studies) over the use of women (‘s studies), in the light of a desire 
to build alliances with queer and trans-groups. Catherine alludes to a 
discussion in feminism about essentialist versus constructivist approaches to 
the category women; while on the one hand, feminism could be said to strive 
towards the transcending of gender categories, feminist politics ‗needs‘ the 
category of women to make political claims. The debate over essentialism 
versus anti-essentialism mirrors a commonly made division between different 
feminist approaches, with radical and cultural feminism being associated with 
a pro-essentialist stance and post-modern, post-structuralist, post-colonial and 
Black feminism being associated with challenging essentialism (Alcoff 1988, 
Harris 1990, Spelman 1990, Jaggar 2005). 
 
Fay‘s organisation had to negotiate whether, as a women‘s organisation, they 
would allow transgender employees: “We are a women‟s organisation so it is 
clear we employ women, what about transgender women? (…) It was 
something you could start think about, so we are a women‟s organisation, that 
means we also define who is a woman”. While her organisation did decide to 
employ transgender women, Fay‘s comment serves as a reminder that defining 
the category of ‗woman‘ has implications and can be open for negotiation. 
Similar tensions can be identified when Sophie criticises other feminists for 
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denying transgender people a role in the movement when they claim that since 
gender as a category is constructed, it is not possible for someone to identify 
with another sex as if that is ‗natural‘. As early as 1990, Elizabeth Spelman 
identified the issue of defining women without excluding difference as ―the 
paradox at the heart of feminism‖ (Spelman 1990:3). Spelman‘s observation 
was a response to the critique by black and lesbian feminists that they felt 
excluded from the category ‗woman‘. The challenge of transgender women 
follows the same line.  
 
In a comparable manner, in Sarah‘s organisation there is a striking negotiation 
over the meaning of the category ‗woman‘, which has ambivalent political 
implications. As her organisation works on peace and women, I ask her 
whether she (and her organisation) speak to the discourse that associates 
women with peacefulness. Sarah responds: “You know, I hear it a lot, I don‟t 
subscribe to it. You know Roman mothers sent their sons to war and told their 
sons „come back with your shield or on it‟. I think it is a misperception, I think 
it is a perpetuation of misogyny! But it is something that initially some women 
are attracted to this organisation, „I am a woman so I am more peaceful‟ (…) 
but on a personal basis I think it is a load of crap but it can be exploited for 
particular issues. For example the mother‟s day declaration is an anti-war 
declaration and in some places our members do mother‟s day anti-war events 
and are successful, it is attractive to media it plays into an understood role 
and so society understands things, so people are more likely to connect and 
not feel threatened by it (…) So it has its advantages and again, opening a 
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dialogue but it also has a disadvantage in pigeonholing and not being fully 
accurate”.  
 
While Sarah considers the link made between women and peace not only 
historically inaccurate but also misogynistic, at the same time she recognises 
the power of the stereotype both in terms of boosting membership and in 
attracting media attention. According to Pupavac, the connection between 
women and peace has existed since the Ancient times (Aristophanes‘ 
Lysistrata), featured also in the Old Testament (Ester and Ruth) and can be 
said to continue in current representations in international politics where 
―women are deemed peace promoters and men peace spoilers‖ (Pupavac 
2008:1, see also Helms 2003). Eyben in her analysis of images of women in 
the information booklets produced by the British Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA), which later became DFID, finds that while the later 
booklets display fewer ‗myths‘, at the same time ―new ones [are] introduced, 
including women as peacemakers‖ (Eyben 2007a:74). Feminists as well have 
promoted the notion of women as peaceful. Robin Morgan for example, in her 
much lauded and criticised book ‗Sisterhood is Global‟, speaks about ―the 
historical, cross-cultural opposition women express to war‖ (Morgan 1996:4).  
 
While Sarah is very conscious about the ambivalence of perpetuating a 
stereotypical image of women, Elisa‘s account, which evokes a similar 
stereotype, displays less reflexivity. Elisa speaks about women‘s reliability in 
micro credit programmes: “Because women involved in, especially on the 
grassroots level, micro credit, they are so incredibly reliable. They love to 
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give it to women because the repayment is almost 100%, if you give the loans 
to men you know what happens, alcohol, all kind of abuses involved but 
women are reliable and somehow on this level are the heart of the community 
and they are very concerned about their children. And even now in the credit 
[crunch] the issue emerged that there would have been fewer kind of 
[problems], if more women would have been involved; they even raised this 
concern at the World Forum”.  
 
Elisa presents a polarised picture in which men are necessarily unreliable 
because of, for example, alcohol abuse and women are naturally reliable as 
mothers and as the ‗heart of the community‘. The image of men as selfish and 
competitive and of women as giving and caring has, as Elisa explains, been 
reinvigorated during the credit crisis (see for example Sunderland in: The 
Guardian, ‗After the crash, Icelandic women lead the rescue‘, 22 February 
2009).  
 
Again, Eyben (2007) has found a comparable image of women in the 
publication material of the British ODA in the later 1980s when the message 
of the booklet was that the inclusion of women in development projects 
increased efficiency and effectiveness, making a specific reference to women 
accessing credit (see also Crewe and Harrison 1998:46, Smillie 2000:85). The 
images of women in gender and development policy as ―productive bodies‖ 
show how these development policies are co-opted into a capitalist logic 
(Harcourt 2009:69, see also Spivak 1999, Eade 2007). While this efficiency 
argument is reminiscent of liberal feminism, the image of women as having 
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core characteristics, like being more reliable, more caring, less focussed on 
profit at all costs, relies on an essentialised picture of women that one could 
find in radical feminism. Gender and Development (GAD) programmes which 
aim to tackle women‘s subordination, work on the one hand under the 
assumption that ideas about gender are socially constructed, while on the other 
hand their policy proposals rely often on essentialised ideas of women, leading 
to a paradoxical situation (White 2003). Hence, these programmes run the risk 
of homogenising situations that are in fact very diverse, for example in 
assuming that ―be it credit in Bangladesh, rural household food provision in 
Africa, (…) women are less selfish, [and] more responsible (…) than men‖ 
(White 2003:11).  
 
In one of the most contested fields within feminism, sex work or prostitution 
and trafficking, some of the discussions have focussed on the use of 
stereotypes. When one reads both Sarah‘s example of the ‗peaceful women‘ 
and Elisa‘s example of the ‗reliable women‘ through the critical lens of the sex 
work approach to trafficking, one can more clearly see the inherent dangers in 
the reliance on stereotypes. As Doezema observes, some feminist 
organisations, despite their recognition of the ―inaccuracy and damaging 
effects of the stereotype‖ of the term ‗trafficking in women‘, continue to use 
this term as a strategy to obtain funding and publicity (Doezema 2000, see also 
Koster 2008b). However, she claims that  
 
―attempts to combat the myth while using the terminology (…) are doomed by 
the limits to the discursive space imposed by the myth; [e]ach repetition (…) 
serves merely to reinforce the myth that campaigners are also attempting to 
 80 
break down, thus turning this into a futile effort‖ (Doezema 2000, see also 
Kapur 2005:98 on the ‗victim subject‘).  
 
Hence the strategic use of the image of peaceful women might always lead to 
a backlash due to the power of the discourse that links peace and women 
together. This is  exemplified when Sarah relates a story where in the context 
of a professional encounter with a high security specialist he immediately 
assumed that she has only come to talk to him about ‗soft security issues‘. In 
her analysis of the myth around sex work and trafficking, Doezema points to 
the traditional perception of ―women‘s role as bearers of their families‘ and 
the nation‘s honour‖, which in a different context can be easily recovered from 
Elisa‘s description of the reliable women (Doezema 2000). The perceived 
‗morality‘ of women that might serve to obtain micro credits is at the same 
time a straight-jacket. Is it emancipatory when women‘s ‗morality‘ always 
serves the interest of the community and only men are ‗allowed‘ to be 
immoral?  
 
It is important to note that the feminism of the research participants should not 
be understood in isolation from the orientation of their organisations. In some 
cases the ideology of their organisations shaped the way the research 
participants could ‗act out‘ their feminist convictions in their work. The work 
experiences in relation to feminism were different for those women who 
worked for specifically feminist organisations compared to those who worked 
for organisations with a wider remit with a dedicated gender unit/gender 
officer.  
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Kate compares her previous work with her current workplace: “I presume for 
me working on gender is not so easy within…, I have been working in [a 
feminist network] before, so that is different when you are working within the 
women‟s movement, women‟s organisations, when you are working on gender 
in mainstream organisations you have the whole debates there and basically 
you have the same difficulties, debates, constraints as you have with  doing 
your advocacy work in EU institutions, you have them also within your own 
organisation”.  
 
For Kate, in contrast to those who work for explicitly feminist organisations, 
there is not much difference between the politics in her organisation and the 
world of politics outside in terms of gender awareness. As she says, the 
struggles she experiences are very similar inside the organisation and within 
the EU. The contrast between her appointment as a gender officer and the 
hostility she perceives in relation to gender issues could be related to the fact 
that it is almost impossible nowadays for NGOs not to be committed to gender 
equality, at least on paper, while the political will to critically evaluate the 
workings of the organisation and to offer financial and social support is often 
absent (White 2003, Harcourt 2009). Smillie (2000:90) quotes a staff member 
of Oxfam‘s Gender and Development Unit  (GADU) remarking: ―When 
GADU started, many people laughed; one or two called us lesbians, dikes; that 
is no longer acceptable. Now the most difficult problem is one of people 
pretending they agree‖ (see also Piálek 2008 about gender mainstreaming in 
Oxfam, Harcourt 2009). Dedicated gender experts in organisations with a 
wider remit experience often not only hostility and a lack of support in their 
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organisation, but also criticism from activists outside the mainstream 
institutions (Harcourt 2009).  
 
‗Gender trainings‘ often appear to be merely technical rather than feminist 
political interventions (White 2003). With the adoption of GAD policies, often 
female employees who had raised gender issues in their work before, were 
endowed the status of ‗women officers‘; sometimes even wives of staff 
members were employed to become women or gender officers (White 2003). 
GAD work sometimes became known as ―women‘s work‖ with all the 
accompanying ―negative associations for status this carried‖ (White 2003:4). 
Moreover, while ‗gender mainstreaming‘ was originally developed from 
feminist ideas, many organisations that ‗do‘ gender mainstreaming do not 
make any reference to feminism (Piálek 2008, see also Kothari 2005:440).  
Piálek‘s analysis of Oxfam supports this idea that not only on the institutional 
level there is no direct mention of feminism (despite the adoption of gender 
mainstreaming and GAD approaches), but also on the staff levels. One of the 
employees he interviewed mentioned that he liked working for Oxfam as it 
addressed gender issues but was at the same time ―not ‗one of those feminist 
organisations‘‖ (Piálek 2008:289-290). Similarly Pupavac (2009) suggests that 
while gender approaches were initially introduced as more radical than 
women‘s rights approaches, now gender policies are rather technocratic 
interventions, which can be implemented by both male and female staff 
without subscribing to a feminist ideology, in contrast to the political feminist 
approach associated with women‘s rights. Menon, writing about the Indian 
context, argues that the increased availability of funding for gender issues 
means that more people are prepared to work on gender issues, also those that 
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lack the political conviction and ―for whom feminism is often a temporary 
profession‖ (Menon 2004:220).        
      
In Laura‘s organisation working on gender issues is only a subsection of her 
wider remit. While she does specifically work on gender for her organisation, 
she identifies her feminism as almost an obstacle to her job: “I mean for one 
thing being feminist, an outspoken feminist that is not a requirement for my 
job and I think that sometimes it is also a hindrance because I am less, I am 
not that very diplomatic lots of times, like I was telling you before about this 
situation where I had this man who was making comparisons to the animal 
world when I talked about men and women. For example in that particular 
situation I should have chosen to sort of not let myself be provoked by it [but] 
I did and I think if I had not been such a convinced feminist myself, if I would 
be more professional, or both I could just let it slide and I did not, I got really 
pissed and I yelled at him. This was not very strategic and it did not make his 
organisation change in any way and it did not make him change either”.  
 
Interestingly while Laura needs an understanding of gender (in)justice in order 
to be able to do her work (because gender is one of her focus areas in the job 
she was hired for) her feminism here is identified as a ‗hindrance‘. Laura 
claims that if she were ‗less feminist‘ or ‗more professional‘, this situation 
with the man would not have escalated, as she would have been able to be 
more diplomatic. This implies that responding to sexism with feminist outrage 
is associated with being less professional. Here ‗professionalism as being 
strategic‘ is juxtaposed ‗with ‗feminism as being emotional or out of 
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control‘.20 While Laura‘s understanding of gender power structures is key to 
her ability to do her work, she appears to think at the same time that the 
demands of professionalism force her to curtail her feminism. Piálek (2008) 
blames the failing of gender mainstreaming policies in Oxfam on the fact that 
the essentially political nature of the gender mainstreaming process is not 
sufficiently taken into account but only the technocratic elements. Quoting the 
words of a friend who worked for a development organisation, Piálek writes: 
―As it came to be that the personal is political, it must now be recognised that 
the professional is political‖ (Piálek 2008:295).  
 
Catherine on the other hand explains that for those who work for her 
organisation there are some basic expectations with regards to their political 
convictions, “it would be difficult to somebody who is against abortion (…) to 
work here, that would be impossible, the person would not even be employed I 
guess”. However, while it might be easier to find a consensus within a diverse 
group of feminists regarding abortion, other issues are still much more 
contentious.  
 
Fay is disconcerted by the conflict among feminist organisations regarding the 
issue of sex work: “Then you have these discussions with other women and 
feminist women and often you would agree with them on other issues and on 
this issue it is just such a terrible fight, really”. The phenomenon of the sale of 
sex has led to a split between feminists. On one side of the discussion are 
‗abolitionist‘ feminists, represented by the Coalition Against Trafficking in 
                                                 
20
 In Chapter Six there will be a more extensive discussion on professionalism and the 
public/private divide in relation to NGO work 
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Women (CATW) who consider women who sell sex to be victims and who 
want to abolish prostitution. These people use the descriptor ‗prostitute‘. On 
the other side of the debate are feminists, who recognise the agency in this 
activity, and who emphasise that sex work is ―legitimate labour‘ (Doezema 
2001) and therefore seek alliances with trade unions; they tend to use the 
descriptor ‗sex workers‘ (Augustín 2005). As Augustín points out, the choice 
of side is read as determining your identity ―as good feminists or caring 
persons‖ (Augustín 2005). These examples demonstrate that the negotiation of 
the meaning of feminism(s) in relation to the organisations‘ work does not 
come without friction.  
 
In a different way this is also observed by Catherine who recognises that the 
member organisations of her network would not all identify as feminist: 
“Some of them would not call themselves feminist which is quite funny”. 
While Catherine here uses the word ‗funny‘ to describe the refusal of women 
to identity as feminists, despite clearly advocating feminist ideals, the 
politicisation of the term feminism is again linked to the specific history of 
feminism as being associated with white Western middle class women, with 
colonialism and with capitalism. Women in post-socialist Eastern Europe, who 
are actively pursuing a politics of challenging gender relations prefer not to 
call themselves feminists as this is associated with ―a specific western 
European version of women‘s emancipation‖ (Sperling et al. 2001:1168). 
Similarly, Alice Walker coined the term ‗womanism‘ instead of Black 
feminism to mark it as an alternative approach to what was perceived as 
ethnocentric feminism (Walker 1984, see also hooks 2000). hooks (2000) 
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argues for an avoidance of the phrase ―I am a feminist‖ in favour of ―I 
advocate feminism‖, claiming that this would stress feminism as a political 
struggle rather than a life style choice or identity. This would distract from the 
usual stereotypes associated with being a feminist and leaves open the 
possibility of supporting other political movements in addition to feminism 
(hooks 2000:31).   
 
In sharp contrast with those organisations that had just one dedicated gender 
unit or officer without adopting a feminist framework, there are organisations, 
like Naomi‘s, which chose to only have female staff as an explicit political 
choice. As Naomi says: “I am still a big proponent of having also some spaces 
that are women‟s spaces, not being in a mixed organisation and it is 
something that we are continually questioned about and have to justify but I 
do believe that no matter where you are in the world when you look in at the 
levels of violence in even what is considered the most developed of countries, 
the shocking levels of violence against women, that there is still need for 
supporting women to be empowered to you know, to be independent women, to 
be able to live a life in dignity and free of violence”.  
 
The deliberate decision for a women-only organisation has a radical feminist 
edge of separatism. NGO workers of other organisations indicated that they 
‗involuntarily‘ only employ women; all suitable job candidates had always 
been female. Some women working for these kinds of organisations still 
experience the fact that staff are all female as pleasant. Stacey however called 
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upon men to apply to their organisation as a rebuttal against the criticism they 
were facing as a women-only department.  
 
Stacey: “And you know, we hear it all the time, [our department] is like, the 
„girls club‟ and we had to respond very strongly as to why that is and that we 
would be very happy to hire men if they were qualified. (…) And we don‟t also 
do [this job] simply because we are women, it is not because I have a uterus 
that I am allowed to do this work, it is also because I have formal training in it 
and the assumption that people give when they say „it is just a group of girls 
that are doing something‟ and literally that has been said, is a way of 
discrediting also what we do”.  
 
While Naomi is not prepared to give up the fact that her organisation 
exclusively employs women, her words similarly show the contentious 
position of women-only organisation when she points out that they ‗are 
continually questioned‘. Stacey here uses the discourse of professionalisation, 
‗I have a formal training in it‘, with its associated value of neutrality, to 
counter accusations that they are just a (biased) ‗girls club‘.  
 
The above accounts have shown that the understandings and practices of 
feminism are shaped in the interaction between the NGO workers and their 
organisations. While it has been observed that individual organisations‘ 
approaches to feminism impacted on the way the women NGO workers felt 
they could ‗act out‘ their feminism, at the same time it could be argued that in 
some cases the women NGO workers shaped their organisations. Catherine‘s 
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narrative is a good example of how different understandings of feminism 
circulate and are negotiated in a complex interplay between the employees of 
the organisation, the partner organisations, and the outside world. As 
Catherine works for an organisation formed by and for women, which 
specifically addresses gender equality, she always thought of it as feminist. 
However, some academic studies made her aware of the fact that her 
organisation‘s publicity material and website did not mention ‗feminism‘ very 
often, which led her to “push to introduce for example, together with 
colleagues the word „feminism‟ more in the last years because it is true that it 
was not there very much”.  
 
Earlier in the interview, when I asked her whether she would call the 
organisation specifically feminist, she says: “For me yes. Now it is quite funny 
for some we are too feminist, some call us communists, or socialists or 
whatever, and some others say that we are conservative. But in terms of the 
positioning that we have I think they are quite feminist, for me, but of course 
that is a very subjective point of view of „what is feminism‟ and it is 
generational differences etc.”. Here Catherine points to the different 
‗readings‘ of the work of her organisation, with some finding the organisation 
‗too feminist‘ and others ‗too little feminist‘.  
 
When I ask her why she calls the organisation feminist, she answers by 
reference to the goals of her organisation: “[I would call the organisation 
feminist] because of the positions that it defends in relation to sexual rights, 
parity democracy, economic rights, pensions etc. For me what counts are the 
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ideas that we defend and not necessarily the methods. It is true that we are not 
an activist organisation going on the street and doing these kinds of very 
visible actions, which maybe we should do more often but that does not 
prevent us from being a committed organisation, I think”.  
 
So she notes that for some commentators, feminism is necessarily tied up with 
the ‗method‘ of activism rather than lobbying mainstream institutions for 
change, which can be bureaucratic in nature. In addition, her defence that her 
organisation is committed despite their more bureaucratic methods shows that 
she recognises a discourse in which feminism must mean political activism 
against mainstream political institutions so that a ‗mainstream‘ feminist NGO 
is an oxymoron (see Harcourt 2009).  In the Australian context, feminists that 
are employed by the state to improve women‘s position have been called 
‗femocrats‘ (Bulbeck 1998). Though Catherine is not employed by the state, 
she calls herself a ‗femocrat‘ (in her case a mix of feminist and eurocrat) at 
some point as well acknowledging the fact that she advances a feminist agenda 
using bureaucratic, procedural methods. Bulbeck states that while femocrats 
are normally associated with advancing liberal feminist politics, their 
proposals for equality necessarily raise issues of sexual difference and hence 
their ―liberal feminism has its radical edge‖ (Bulbeck 1998:6). 
 
Sisterhood 
The history of (white) feminism is a history of the exclusion of the concerns of 
those women who did not fit the picture of a white middle-class, heterosexual 
woman. First wave feminism has been challenged (Caraway 1992) for 
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presenting Black feminism as marginal, just represented by a few exceptional 
figures like Sojourner Truth. In addition, first wave feminism has been 
criticised for the fact that white suffragists‘ fight for the vote only extended to 
white women and for using racist arguments to pursue the suffragist cause by 
claiming that white women should rather have the right to vote than black 
men. The critique of second wave feminism is levelled against the 
ethnocentric bias of feminism, which found expression in the notion of 
‗sisterhood‘ as based on a common experience of oppression.  
 
According to hooks (2000), as sexism conceptualises femininity in terms of 
helplessness and victimhood, it is unwise for feminists to perpetuate this sexist 
idea of women by basing sisterhood on a notion of commonality in 
victimhood. There is an irony according to hooks, both in the fact that those 
who emphasised women‘s victimhood were often relatively privileged and in 
the fact that those who suffer substantial oppression and violence could 
psychologically not afford thinking of themselves as victims as they had to 
focus on survival (hooks 2000). This notion of victimhood allowed white 
women not to challenge and confront their own privilege and complicity in 
oppressing others: ―they could abdicate responsibility for their role in the 
maintenance of sexism, racism, and classism‖ (hooks 2000:46). The term 
‗women‘ as used by white feminists served both to differentiate white women 
from the ‗male oppressors‘ and to stress the alliance with black women 
masking the racism and classicism of white women (hooks 1981). Caraway 
(1992) uses the alternative term ‗segregated sisterhood‘ to suggest the paradox 
entailed in the history of sisterhood and to stress its incoherence. ―In the logic 
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of combining these two terms, each invalidates and cancels the other, 
rendering suspect the animating symbol –‗sisterhood‘- of a profoundly 
transforming social movement‖ (Caraway 1992:3).  
 
Given the significance of the term ‗sisterhood‘ for Western feminism 
(especially radical feminism) and its contentiousness in the light of the 
criticism by black feminists, it is important to investigate how the women 
NGO workers relate to the notion of ‗sisterhood‘ when situating their 
feminisms. In particular because the nature of their work on gender and 
women issues for women from elsewhere presupposed some relation between 
them and those other women. Casey‘s narrative, without using the word, has a 
hint of sisterhood as common oppression. When asked where her feeling of 
responsibility comes from that prompts her to engage with the lives of women 
geographically far away from her, she says: “Because it is part of my own 
upbringing to have a gender point of view, or gender experience to relate to. 
For me it is not so, it is the same kind of struggle just different environment”.  
 
As her work has a strong international dimension, which she has not touched 
upon when she emphasises her orientation on gender issues here, I enquired 
about the international orientation that is now present in her work. The idea of 
sisterhood based on common oppression is repeated when Casey says: “The 
gender orientation is something from my childhood and family upbringing, I 
would have taken that anywhere. And you may also say that I am carrying out 
the same struggle just in another part of the world. The struggle that I have 
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with me from home here and I just recognise it everywhere else and act upon 
it. The international [dimension] would not [necessarily] have been there”.  
 
In a very similar vein, Sonia in response to my question whether it matters to 
her who she supports in her work, says “No, I think I would say a woman in 
need is a woman in need, here in Switzerland, in Argentina, in Africa or 
whatever. I wanted to work with something that had to do with gender and 
that is probably because of where I come from, because of a very macho 
culture that we have”.  
 
Both Casey and Sonia emphasise the sameness of women‘s struggles 
worldwide. While one of them has a European and the other a Latin-American 
background, both also implicitly compare their own experience of being a 
woman to the experiences of women around the globe. Spelman is highly 
critical of such notion of universal sisterhood and calls the phrase ‗as a 
woman‘, ―the Trojan horse of feminist ethnocentrism‖ (Spelman 1990:185). 
At the same time, similar to the discussion of the dilemma of essentialism in 
the previous section, Caraway notes that feminist thought needs generalising; 
―so, yes, all feminists are essentialists in this basic sense‖ (Caraway 1992:173, 
see also Mohanty 1992:76). The problem then does not necessarily lie in 
generalisation per se but in its ―obstreperous cousin ethnocentrism‖ (Caraway 
1992:173). When Casey and Sonia compare their experiences growing up as a 
woman in their own countries with the experiences of women worldwide, they 
make a similar move as Robin Morgan makes in her famous book ‗Sisterhood 
is Global‘ which first appeared in 1984. Morgan compiled gender statistics 
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and women‘s stories of 70 countries about the situation for women in their 
countries and on that basis concluded that sisterhood is global (Morgan 1996). 
Chandra Mohanty in her sympathetic critique of ‗Sisterhood is Global‘ claims 
that while the homogeneity arrived at in Morgan‘s book is not based on 
biology, but on ―the psychologisation of complex and contradictory historical 
and cultural realities‖, in the end the bond between women as conceived in the 
book derives from an assumption of sameness in oppression and struggle that 
is ahistorical (Mohanty 1992:80).  
 
One of the women NGO workers I interviewed is one of the original 
contributors to ‗Sisterhood is Global‟ and, perhaps unsurprisingly, she talked 
with me about ‗reviving sisterhood‘. Speaking about the idea behind one of 
the projects initiated by her organisation, she says
21
: “I wanted to (…) revive 
this concept of sisterhood, this kind of connection beyond borders you know, 
that we have something in common with (…) women all over the world (…) I 
think that this idea is somehow engrained in us, we feel it emotionally, (…) but 
it is something that we have to rediscover, it somehow got lost in transition, 
and this old concept of consciousness raising groups you know, (…) somehow 
it got lost, it is not there anymore and actually it was our strongest tool in the 
70s, and it is a very good tool, as women are very curious and I wonder why 
we stopped asking questions, why we kind of were quite complacent”.  
 
The call here is for ‗reviving sisterhood‘ rather than for reforming or 
revolutionising sisterhood, which could suggest that for her the much-
                                                 
21
 To ensure anonymity for this interviewee in the specific context of her contribution to the 
book ‗Sisterhood is Global‘, I have here also not mentioned the name I have used for this 
interviewee in the other sections and chapters.  
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criticised notion of sisterhood is still left unblemished. The tension between a 
natural or biological notion of sisterhood and a political notion of sisterhood is 
interesting here as well. On the one hand, sisterhood is presented as something 
we feel and that is engrained while on the other hand it is something that has 
been lost and needs to be actively retrieved through participation in 
consciousness-raising groups. In addition, the interviewee uses the ‗as women‘ 
phrase that Spelman called the ‗Trojan horse of ethnocentrism‘. hooks (2000) 
warns that the process of consciousness-raising, when women were 
encouraged to see their own experiences in the light of structures of sexism is 
just one step, and should not be the last step for feminism as a political 
movement. In the light of the beginning of the second feminist wave, when 
women were encouraged to take the personal as the starting point for thinking 
about women‘s rights, it is perhaps not surprising that middle-class white 
privileged women developed some blind spots with regards to the situation of 
other women (Verloo 2009b). hooks however, cautions against the tendency to 
see this ability to describe ―their own woe [as] synonymous with developing a 
critical political consciousness‖ as a hindrance to the development of 
feminism as this means feminism would be based only on ―incomplete 
perspectives‖ (hooks 2000:26). Hence, for hooks, the ‗success‘ of the kind of 
consciousness-raising groups that the contributor to ‗Sisterhood is Global‘ 
wants to recover, would depend on the kinds of questions women would ask 
both themselves and each other.  
 
Other women NGO workers interviewed qualified their belief in sisterhood 
more clearly. Naomi, for example, when asked whether she believes in global 
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sisterhood, replies: “The whole thing has been pretty problematic but I believe 
we do share common sisterhood in, in many different ways, but in a general 
common struggle in being taken just as seriously as a man, wherever we are, 
we still a long way to go, no matter where we are in the world. I mean 
obviously many of us have huge privileges that most of the other women in the 
rest of the world don‟t have, [don‟t] enjoy”.  
 
Naomi‘s awareness of a critique of sisterhood is shown when she says that 
‗the whole thing has been pretty problematic‘. By recognising the difference in 
privilege, Naomi acknowledges not only difference but also inequality, where 
―some women are better off in the economy and more securely placed in the 
dominant culture than others‖ (Bulbeck 1998:205). Mohanty (1992) extends 
her critique of Morgan‘s book by indicating that the assumption of shared 
struggle against patriarchy and her proposal for ‗political transcendence‘ of 
that male world masks the implication of women in practices of power like 
imperialism and ignores the real differences, material and ideological, between 
women. Following on Mohanty‘s reading of Morgan, Naomi‘s (at first sight 
qualified) account of sisterhood collapses again into the same idea of 
patriarchy as the most significant enemy of women worldwide ignoring the 
racism or classism that divides women (see also hooks 2000:27). In a similar 
vein, Spelman argues that ethnocentrism and class privilege can still remain 
intact despite on the surface taking difference into account, when we assume 
the woman part we have in common ―is what we know from looking at the 
case of white middle-class women‖ (Spelman 1990:166).  
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Naomi‘s narrative featured another interesting theme in relation to sisterhood, 
which was evident in some other interview accounts, namely the idea that 
sisterhood or linkages are established through motherhood. Naomi: “I think 
that the common bond of motherhood is also something that is very strong that 
I feel since having had children. Yeah, so I do feel that there is something that 
as women we have in common, we have a lot of common linkages, but I don‟t 
feel that we are a homogeneous group by any means. (…) Well, it is all part of 
patriarchy of trying to somehow insist that women agree on everything in 
order for us to move forward and of course that is impossible. So while I think 
that there are lots of things that bring us together, we are still individuals and 
have different needs and realities and we need to respect that, that there is no 
particular group of women who have al the answers on behalf of women”.  
The second part of this quote is consistent with the earlier statement in which 
she recognises differences, ‗different realities and needs‘ and the force of 
patriarchy without too much explicit mention of the complicity of women in 
some of these inequalities. While the notion of sisterhood through motherhood 
could potentially be effective in bridging other, for example ethnic divides, it 
also potentially contains an element of exclusion as not all women can or want 
to be mothers.  
 
Laura expresses an ambivalent relation with sisterhood, which is worth 
quoting in more detail: “For me [the whole notion of sisterhood] has been a 
journey, it has been complicated for me, I was never part of sort of female 
groups or gatherings where you could feel that solidarity because we are 
women and for me it has more often than not been a question of competition 
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with other women. And I think that for me to feel this, it is one thing to want it 
in your head, like I want sisterhood so much, but then the other is to feel it 
immediately and I have worked a lot with that sort of try to feel… I felt it a lot 
in Colombia when it related to security, that became very obvious, that I felt 
more secure in any environment where there were women present. (…) I was 
in a really, really ugly robbery, an armed robbery with 5 guys and after that I 
got really scared and I almost could not continue working because I got really 
paranoid when I went out and it was really scary (…), but all the time in 
Colombia [I would] walk where women were walking, (…) that became a 
strategy of security, which has nothing to do with it really, except for the fact 
that most violence is conducted by men, also in Colombia but it was not really 
less likely that I was going to get mugged”. 
 
 Laura talks here about her desire to ‗feel sisterhood‘; a desire that arose from 
her feminism, but that was challenged in situations of competition rather than 
cooperation between women. The idea of patriarchy hindering the bonding of 
women or their mutual recognition as being part of the same ‗class‘ is a well-
known feminist argument (see Morgan 1996). Laura eventually finds some 
alternative form of sisterhood, one that is based on a (as she says herself 
‗false‘) feeling of safety. In this particular situation of fear of being a target of 
robbery, it is imaginable that Laura‘s usual privilege in relation to other 
women in Colombia is reversed, as her whiteness and visible Western identity, 
signalling affluence, makes her a more likely target.  
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When I asked her to describe a situation when she would have wanted 
sisterhood but where it did not work out easily, Laura talks about another 
project she worked on in the Balkans where she worked directly together with 
women‘s organisations. Laura: “I mean working in this [field] has to do with 
my values and I want to achieve but it is also important for me that I do it in a 
professional way meaning that if I would have to choose between solidarity 
and professionalism, (…) I would choose professionalism and I could feel that 
I had older colleagues in [my organisation] who had been there when it all 
started during the war that were driven totally by solidarity (…) and they 
could compromise a lot, almost anything just based on that solidarity and I 
found that very problematic because that also meant that you accepted things 
from all the female friends that you had been together with in the struggle, you 
accepted failures and flaws and lack of transparency, there where you would 
not do it with a newer partner organisation”. 
 
 Laura‘s understanding of professionalism here relates to being impartial, clear 
and transparent, which conflicted with the attitude she encounters which she 
relates to sisterhood. hooks recognises this version of sisterhood which 
―dictated that sisters were to ‗unconditionally‘ love one another, that they were 
to avoid conflict and minimise disagreement; that they were not to criticise 
each other, especially in public‖ (hooks 2000:46-47); needless to say this is 
not a sisterhood hooks evaluated positively. However, Laura‘s equation of 
professionalism with neutrality in contrast to the sisterhood she encountered 
incorporates risks as well. As Iris Marion Young (1985) has noted, the 
dominant assumption in modern ethics is that moral reason should be impartial 
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and that reason and desire are opposite values. A consequence of this 
assumption, as she argues, is that moral decisions based on caring, empathy, 
and the realisation of the different needs of different people are labelled non-
rational, subjective and sentimental (Young 1985). Since women are often 
associated with those values, they are consequently ―excluded from moral 
rationality‖ (Young 1985:386).  Hence Laura‘s understanding of 
professionalism in relation to moral issues potentially underlines this modern 
morality, which rules out those seen as ‗deviant‘ from the norm of the rational 
man and undermines feminist suggestions to include care and sympathy in 
moral decisions.
22
  
 
In both narratives Laura slips from ‗sisterhood‘ to ‗solidarity‘ without 
differentiating between these concepts as stemming from different ideological 
views. Caraway proposes solidarity among feminists as an alternative to 
sisterhood as a ―sign of our political maturity‖ (Caraway 1992:201). 
Solidarity, in contrast to sisterhood, ―allow[s] for greater differentiations [of] 
the roots of oppression‖ and should be created through the practice of political 
struggles rather than being taken as natural and pre-given (Wieringa 2009). 
According to Saskia Wieringa (2009), after sisterhood and solidarity, now 
proposals are voiced that want to base feminist politics on affinity. The 
politics of affinity is based on Haraway‘s suggestion to consider the 
possibilities of building coalitions based on affinity concerning one specific 
issue or project. As Wieringa defines it: ―It is thus not the commonality of the 
                                                 
22
 Notions of professionalism linked to assumptions about types of morality will be discussed 
in much more detail in Chapter Six.  
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‗us‘ that binds the affinity group, but rather the fight against a common, or at 
least a commonly defined enemy‖ (Wieringa 2009:32).  
 
While none of the research participants explicitly mentioned the term affinity 
politics, some of their organisations arguably work in international coalitions 
on the basis of affinity rather than shared identity. Ruth‘s organisation for 
example often works with other women‘s organisations but also sometimes 
finds allies in for example young people‘s organisations. It is clear from her 
account that she does not take a shared approach among women immediately 
for granted, when she says: “It‟s a tremendous fight for everybody, so 
everybody does it in their own way and sometimes you can find a common 
ground on which you want to work together and it is really nice”.  
 
In Caraway‘s reading of Lorde, it is possible for women to find and share 
common experiences; however, we need to be constantly aware that we cannot 
take for granted commonality or consensus, but rather that we need to 
negotiate these experiences with each other (Caraway 1992). Sarah‘s account 
of how the international unit of her organisation works together with the 
national sections is a powerful example of such negotiated sisterhood, or 
solidarity.  
 
Sarah: “I think, yes, it is challenging, the challenges though are also 
opportunities and strengths because while it is challenging that we have 
varying opinions, it also means that we pick critical looks at what it is that we 
are doing. And when we do come to consensus, that consensus includes so 
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many different perspectives, that we know it is a well-thought impressive 
consensus. (…) A lot of times we don‟t get there, and we continue debates and 
discussions for years before we can achieve a consensus. And that too, 
because we are exposed to all these different opinions, it informs the work that 
we are doing and makes that work more holistic. [W]hen we issue statements 
from the international level, we are very clear that it is, that we have consulted 
quite broadly and we have consensus on those decisions. So it makes them, I 
think as opposed to the UN where you get the lowest common denominator, 
because of the challenges we put to one another, we are more often 
challenging each other to make a stronger and more powerful statement”.  
 
In Sarah‘s narrative, sisterhood has become intensive, challenging, time-
consuming, but ultimately rewarding. Even when no consensus is found in the 
short-term, the mere exposure to alternative viewpoints becomes (self-) 
transformative. Spelman aptly calls a shared viewpoint, ―a difficult political 
achievement‖ (Spelman 1990:13) in contrast to what is often assumed, it being 
an automatic given. hooks (1986) claims that a real commitment to feminism 
as a political struggle entails a preparedness to productively engage with 
conflict in order to develop our understanding of each other.  
 
The notion of sisterhood was present in many of the narratives of the women I 
interviewed; while sometimes I prompted the women to talk about sisterhood, 
other times it was introduced spontaneously by the interviewee and I was 
surprised to notice that ‗sisterhood‘ still had such currency. It was equally 
striking to notice the frequency with which the interviewed women referred 
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with admiration and pleasure to their contact with women from all over the 
world. While these comments were often made in relation to the question what 
motivated them in their work, rather than in relation to sisterhood, glimpses of 
an alternative form of sisterhood, one based on inspiring one another, could 
possibly be found here. Ruth for example says “I must say that I am thrilled 
with all the wonderful and the remarkable women that I met through the last 
10 years”.  
Catherine finds is motivating to meet the members of her organisation, 
“because it is great to have feminists, for most part, from all over Europe, 
from all ages, meeting and sharing and that is quite motivating”.  
Sophie, finds her motivation for her work in that “you meet wonderful persons 
in this work, people that struggle and that have political fights and do service 
delivery in countries where it is really impossible and they sacrifice a lot in 
their work, so I guess the motivation comes from the people that work in 
countries that are so much more difficult than Sweden”.  
Naomi says: “Working with women from all over the world is just a really 
fantastic and really enriching experience”.  
 
hooks as well, despite her critique of a specific shallow form of sisterhood 
does not reject sisterhood altogether and emphasises the importance of 
sisterhood: ―We are mistaken if we allow these distortions or the women who 
created them (…) to lead us to devalue sisterhood‖ (hooks 2000:45).  
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Race to Innocence 
As discussed above, hooks (2000) identified a link between sisterhood as 
victimhood and the refusal of white middle-class women to take responsibility 
for their implication in racism, imperialism and classism. The idea of a 
universal, shared identity neatly separated white women from the oppressions 
by men and masked the divisions between black and white women (hooks 
2000). Fellows and Razack call the phenomenon where women believe that 
their sexist oppression is the most significant and where they deny their 
complicity in other oppressions ―the race to innocence‖ (Fellows and Razack 
1998:335). Noticing the frequent occurrence of the ‗race to innocence‘ among 
feminists, they attempted to trace the reasons of why we are led into the ―trap 
of competing marginalities‖ (Fellows and Razack 1998:339), where we 
compare oppressions and privilege ‗our‘ oppressed position. Furthermore, they 
wanted to know why, despite the intellectual theoretical understanding of 
multiple oppressions, it proves so hard to acknowledge our complicity.  
 
Fellows and Razack identify three reasons; 1) if not privileging the oppression 
we experience we feel we ―risk erasure‖, 2) focussing on the oppression we 
experience is the first liberating step, ―a productive defensive response to 
oppression‖, 3) when we are in a dominant position, we tend to belittle the 
narratives of those who are oppressed as our own oppression does not make us 
immune to Othering (Fellows and Razack 1998:339-340). Carby‘s observation 
(1992) that white women were reluctant to admit their complicity (fearing it 
would divert attention from gender oppression) supports the first reason 
suggested by Fellows and Razack. Frankenberg‘s (1993) interviews with white 
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women about race also led her to conclude, in line with the third reason 
suggested, that white women‘s experience of discrimination did not lead them 
to compassion with other subordinated groups.  
 
In the interviews, I asked all women how they thought their identity played out 
in their work. While some interviewees included both dominant and 
subordinate elements of their identity in their answers, the ‗race to innocence‘ 
can be traced in some of the silences concerning whiteness, nationality, class 
etc. When I asked Casey about how her identity played out in her work and 
specifically mentioned her nationality, her whiteness and her gender, she 
replies: “The gender part of it is strong. The academic training I have 
undertaken, my education has played a strong role, it is very, it has been a 
contributing factor that, or rather maybe I should say, the difficulties I have 
faced have been related to my gender but also to my profession, having a non-
technical education. This field in development has always been dominated by 
men in mainly technical positions, and very little respect has been paid to the 
work of sociologists, and it is still a very difficult position I think”.  
 
Casey chooses to focus in her answer on her gender and her education leaving 
out her nationality and her whiteness despite specific prompting from my side. 
Interestingly, she mentions her specific academic education as an obstacle, due 
to the bias in her field towards technical studies without reflecting on the 
privilege of academic education. Frankenberg (1993) experienced difficulties 
at the start of research in finding white women who were prepared to talk 
about race. She relates the resistance she encountered when introducing her 
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research to the fact that for white women the only apparent options concerning 
their attitude towards race was ―either one does not have anything to say about 
race, or one is apt to be deemed ‗racist‘ simply by virtue of having something 
to say‖ (Frankenberg 1993:33). Casey‘s experiences with gender 
discrimination in her work, lead her to refer to a form of sisterhood again.  
 
Casey: “In general it is not an advantage to be a woman, because most of the 
management positions are being held by men (…). And they have only 
[recently] grown to realise that sometimes you send out women here with 
influence and resources which they need to take seriously. So it is only 
because you have the power that you are recognised. But no, over the years it 
has not become easier being a woman, only if you have other women to relate 
to”.  
 
When I asked Elisa the same question about the impact of her identity on her 
work she focuses firstly on her identity as a feminist. After I ask a second 
question related to whether her identity could sometimes be a barrier in terms 
of relating to others, she continues to talk about her feminist identity. To my 
next question which specifically asks her whether she thinks her nationality, 
coming from the West, her whiteness, and her age, also impact her work, she 
replies: “Oh, that is very beneficial, Vienna is a destination, especially for the 
women from the Middle East to reach without problems, visa problems we can 
take care of, it is not an issue for them to come here” and then jumps to the 
impact of her feminist identity again.  
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Fellows and Razack (1998), drawing on Lugones‘s work, point out that those 
of the dominant identity category, white people, heterosexual people, men, 
middle-class people, do not need to define themselves in terms of the category, 
do not need to label themselves as ‗white‘ or ‗heterosexual‘. Identity thus 
―comes to bear an intrinsic relation to subordination‖ while ―to be the 
unmarked or unnamed is to belong to the dominant group‖ (Fellows and 
Razack 1998:341). This would explain the silences regarding the dominant 
categories of the women‘s identities. The term ‗identity‘ in my question 
triggered a reflection on those categories linked to subordination rather than to 
domination.  
 
Joan Cocks offers an alternative insight: that to expect people from 
subordinate groups (like women/feminists) to be wholly innocent and always 
ethical in their behaviour is not a sign of respect but conversely implies that 
subordinate groups are not complex in their thoughts and wants (in Caraway 
1992). Imagining feminists as always moral and correct, as Caraways phrases 
it, ―serve[s] to flatten out our messiness, gloss over the truly interesting and 
paradoxical ways we don‘t get things right in our thoughts, motives, and 
action‖ (Caraway 1992:187). This complexity and messiness in thought and 
action is nicely illustrated in Laura‘s reflection on her blindness to other 
categories of subordination than gender: “When it comes to gender I think I 
am fairly good, and for me that is a reaction, an immediate reaction, „ok, there 
are no women here‟, (…) but for example with class it is different because I 
am really [a] comfortable middle-class academic, and I can easily get caught 
up in discussions and just afterwards realise „wait a minute, but all the people 
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I talked to they were university students, academics, middle class people‟ and 
not having that class consciousness at all in the same way”.  
 
While Laura is very reflective about her own blind spots, and wants to and 
attempts to take notice of other types of marginalisation, she also falls in the 
―trap of competing marginalities‖ (Fellows and Razack 1998:339). When I ask 
her why gender rather than other structures of subordination is at the forefront 
of her mind, she says: “First of all I think it is important because I think it is 
absolutely fundamental to change as a power structure I see that it is more 
fundamental than other power structures. And it is also, it is very personal, it 
is a power structure that I relate to personally every day and the difficulties 
related to it, the way I don‟t do with…(…) In the gender structure that is 
where I am in a disadvantaged position, but it is almost the only one, I mean 
age-wise I am in my 30s, which is a fairly good age to be in, it is better than 
being 23 for example and of course also it is not that obvious in Sweden, but I 
know that had I been in Colombia now the fact that I have 2 kids is also an 
authority in itself, being middle class, ethnically white, those are all 
advantaged positions”.  
 
And later in the interview, she says: “I am not sure but sometimes I get the 
feeling that gender in that way is so much more deeply rooted because we are 
forced to produce and reproduce gender roles all the time, you can find 
settings that are fairly homogenous in other ways with class or ethnicity (…) 
But I mean in almost any environment, in each family you have men and 
women, so you have this constant low intensive reproduction of roles that is 
really hard to get at because so much of it is perceived as private, still”.  
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Laura wavers between an acknowledgement that her own experience of gender 
oppression might lead her to prioritise gender and an attempt to find 
theoretical explanations for gender as a more deeply rooted structure 
embedded in the private sphere. This, as Fellows and Razack (1998) 
suggested, could indeed stem from the anxiety to stress gender oppression as a 
category that should not be forgotten. Spelman (1990) observed that when 
racism and sexism are discussed and compared, this often culminates in a 
debate on which of these structures of domination is primary, more basic. As 
she would argue the different reasons that are produced to either advocate that 
race, sex or class is more fundamental are ultimately irrelevant, as the entire 
idea of a ‗competition‘ between oppressions is not constructive. However, the 
argument that gender discrimination is of a different nature than other types of 
discrimination is still not uncommon. In response to a ‗European Commission 
consultation on a possible new initiative to prevent and combat discrimination 
outside employment‟, the European Women‘s Lobby (EWL), which is the 
largest platform of women‘s organisations in the EU argued in 2007:  
 
―Gender-based discrimination is about the structural unequal distribution of 
power and resources between women and men belonging to all groups in 
society and thus should be distinguished from discrimination on other bases 
such as ethnicity, disability and so on. Furthermore, women as a category can be 
distinguished from other major oppressed groups in that they represent a 
numerical majority and it is imperative that they are regarded as a basic unit of 
analysis of social life and experiences and in relation to all other forms of 
discrimination‖ (EWL website 2007).  
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Crenshaw argued in 1991 already that anti-discrimination policies, which 
either focus on sex or on racial discrimination without looking at the combined 
effects of subordination ―cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in 
which black women are subordinated‖ (Crenshaw 2000:209). However, here 
arguments are raised again to separate gender discrimination from other types 
of discrimination. When the EWL states that ‗gender-based discrimination is 
about the structural unequal distribution of power and resources between 
women and men belonging to all groups of society and thus should be 
distinguished from discrimination on other bases‘ (emphasis added), it seems 
that the underlying assumption is that gender affects all while e.g. ethnicity 
does not. It implies that only some of us have an ethnicity, while all of us have 
a gender. Another contemporary example of the belief that gender oppression 
is more essential and widespread than racism would be Robin Morgan‘s call to 
vote for Hillary Clinton during the US election primaries between Hillary 
Clinton and Barack Obama (2008). Morgan, whose book ‗Sisterhood is 
Global‟ has been discussed above, states in ‗Goodbye to all that (#2)‘ for 
example that: ―A few non-racist countries may exist—but sexism is 
everywhere‖.  
 
When Sweden in 2009 replaced its separate acts of legislation, including the 
gender equality act, with one Discrimination Act and also introduced a new 
Equality Enforcement Body, which merged the 4 separate equality 
enforcement bodies on gender, ethnicity, disability and sexual orientation, 
only JämO (the gender equality body) was against this measure, while all 
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other equality bodies were in favour of this change (Freidenvall 2009 and the 
Equality Ombudsman website 2009). The latter equality bodies argued that 
merging the equality bodies into one would lead to ―greater efficiency, more 
possibilities to tackle more than one ground of discrimination‖ and felt that it 
would ―‗upgrade‘ the importance of ‗their‘ discrimination ground‖. In 
contrast, JämO argued that ―the different inequality strands are not similar, 
that the category ‗women‘ cannot be compared to ‗minorities‘‖, and feared a 
―loss of expertise‖ and a ―downgrading of gender‖ (Freidenvall 2009). As 
Squires (2007) notes in relation to the mainstreaming of different equality 
strands, some feminists are worried that the demands of different equality 
lobbies might be incompatible, and that the inclusion of other categories in the 
mainstreaming process is an indication of a decreasing concern with gender.  
 
Laura‘s narrative might also display the ‗blindness‘ that comes from being 
inside the dominant group in her analysis of class and ethnicity. Laura argues 
that she is more aware and sensitive to gender oppression than to other 
oppressions, which she explains through the fact that gender is the only part of 
her identity where she is in a disadvantaged position. While Ruth Frankenberg 
concludes that being subjected to one type of marginalisation, e.g. sexism, 
does not necessarily lead to empathy and awareness of other subordinations, 
Frankenberg also recognises that ―liberatory movements‖ could provide some 
women with ―specific tools‖ that helped them finding antiracist approaches 
(Frankenberg 1993:20). Laura is very aware of how her focus on gender in her 
work and in her private life is linked to her own experience of gender 
oppression and her relative privilege on other accounts. She says that she 
 111 
“sometimes do[es] the exercise to translate [her ideas about gender 
structures] into one of the other power structures” where she is in the 
dominant position.  
 
She gives the example of sessions on masculinity that she facilitates as part of 
her job and which she thinks should be compulsory for all boys and men. She 
later realised that her ideas applied to other power structures, imply that she 
should also be compelled to participate in sessions on racism. Laura: “Does 
that mean that I also think that I should be in groups with white people talking 
about racism and whiteness and how we reproduce these power structures? 
And of course it does, that would be a logical way of dealing with it if I expect 
that from men then I should also expect that from myself and I don‟t. And I 
could always say „yeah, but I have chosen, I focus on working with gender and 
feminism‟ but that is also my easiest choice, that is my disadvantaged position 
that is also where I have something to gain. For me working with my 
whiteness is a lot less rewarding, so of course I am no better than someone 
else”. 
 
Speaking directly to Laura‘s acknowledgment of her own false excuse, ‗and I 
could always say, ‗yeah, but I have chosen to focus on working with gender 
and feminism‘, Fellows and Razack pertinently urge us to ask ourselves the 
questions ―where have we positioned other women within our strategies for 
achieving social justice? What do we gain from this positioning?‖ (Fellows 
and Razack 1998:352). These questions are particularly urgent in the context 
of NGO work, which has a commitment to forms of social and/or global 
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justice and which naturally at the same time can display blind spots in the lack 
of acknowledgement of other systems of power.  
 
Recognising this hesitation to fully engage with other political struggles 
against subordination, they argue that as all structures of subordination are 
interconnected and interdependent, fighting just one type of marginalisation 
might give us ―a toehold on respectability‖, but never real liberation (Fellows 
and Razack 1998:350). They draw on examples of subordinated groups 
dependent for their status on the even lower position of others (e.g. white 
women with black maids, black maids looking down on prostitutes) to show 
how complicity in other oppressions served to maintain respectability by 
drawing boundaries between us and them (Fellows and Razack 1998). The 
recurrent conflict between our theoretical and political understanding of 
multiple oppressions and our emotional response to maintain our innocence, 
points to our anxiety to acknowledge the ―permeability of the boundaries‖ 
between us and them (Fellows and Razack 1998:343). While Fellows and 
Razack‘s call to attend to other subordinations almost has an instrumental 
dimension in their argument that only recognising the interconnectedness of 
the structures of subordination can lead to true liberation (see also Matsuda 
1991), other black feminists rather appeal to morality. Lorde, in the aptly 
called section ‗Uses of Anger‘, asks:  
 
―What woman here is so enamoured of her own oppression that she cannot see 
her heelprint upon another woman‘s face? What woman‘s terms of oppression 
have become precious and necessary to her as a ticket into the fold of the 
righteous, away from the cold winds of self-scrutiny?‖ (Lorde 1984:132).  
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Laura‘s awareness and questioning of her own privilege and the 
acknowledgement of her ‗race to innocence‘, shows however that she is not 
‗so enamoured of her own oppression‘ that she shies away from critical self-
scrutiny. Sandra Harding, in her famous account of feminist standpoint theory, 
advocates a ―strong reflexivity‖ (Harding 1991:163).  
 
This ―would require that the objects of inquiry be conceptualised as gazing 
back in all their cultural particularity and that the researcher, through theory 
and methods, stand behind them, gazing back at his [sic] own socially situated 
research project in all its cultural particularity and its relationship to other 
projects of his [sic] culture‖ (Harding 1991:163).  
 
While Harding‘s standpoint theory stresses the importance of knowledge 
being produced by oppressed groups, she also writes against the tendency of 
over-advantaged groups, men, white feminists, heterosexuals to retreat to a 
passive attitude of guilt in which they feel that they cannot say or claim 
anything anymore (Harding 1991). She calls upon these over-advantaged 
groups to critically reflect on their privileged position and its relation to the 
oppression of other groups as a way to take responsibility (Harding 1991). At 
the same time she acknowledges the inevitable and necessary painfulness of 
these reflexive processes; she says, ―it can't be entirely a pleasure to discover 
the unintentionally racist assumptions that have guided so many of my 
thoughts and practices‖ (Harding 1991:293).  
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In Laura‘s narrative discussed above, it is possible to see glimpses of this 
reflexivity. In response to my question about how her identity plays out in her 
work she says: “I don‟t think there is a moment in my work where my identity 
does not matter of course. And I think I sometimes manage to be conscious 
and to do a good job anyways, but I also think I slip all the time, I forget 
things, (…) I am really prejudiced sometimes about lots of things, but at least I 
think I am fairly honest with myself and I can see it”.  
 
In this example ‗identity‘ is not solely associated with categories of 
subordination but also with domination and privilege, in contrast to the 
silences on dominance displayed earlier in the narratives of Elisa and Casey. 
Here Laura stresses the importance of recognising and making explicit her 
own position and identity. At the same time she realises that while she 
attempts to recognise her position and the prejudices she holds, she ‗slips‘ all 
the time. She cannot reach a perfect position where her recognition of her 
prejudices is complete and finished, where she does not make the mistake 
again. Both Rose (1997) and Maxey (1999) point to the risk of the use of 
reflexivity as ‗transparent‘, as they call it, as a flight to certainty. This 
transparency happens when researchers think that after doing a short reflexive 
exercise in the beginning of their study their knowledge is objective and 
universal again, when they think that the process of reflexivity can be 
completed, and that by being reflexive they are able to know everything about 
their and the Other‘s position. Rather Rose (1997) argues for the 
productiveness of and the significance of the uncertainties in reflexivity, that 
neither the Self not the Other can ever be completely known and understood.  
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When Laura says ‗I think I am fairly honest with myself and I can see it‘, this 
seems to verge on the transparent reflexivity that Rose warns against, the idea 
that the Self is ultimately transparent and knowable. At the same time, the 
‗honesty‘ is one step towards taking the responsibility that Harding advocates. 
She argues that to take responsibility for one‘s position of privilege means 
―learning how I am connected to other whites and to people of colour; by 
learning what the consequences of my beliefs and behaviours as a European 
American woman will be‖ (Harding 1991:283). hooks similarly argues that the 
‗forging‘ of sisterhood that goes beyond false assumptions of universal 
oppression, has to start with ―the individual woman‘s acceptance that 
American [read: Western here] women, without exception, are socialised to be 
racist, classist and sexist, in varying degrees‖ (hooks 1981:157). Following 
Harding‘s suggestion however, this goes beyond mere ‗honesty‘ and would 
mean that when Laura asks whether she ‗should be in groups with white 
people talking about racism and whiteness and how we reproduce these power 
structures‘, the answer should be ‗yes!‘. However, hooks rightly warns against 
‗unlearning racism workshops‘ that entail mainly therapeutic individualised 
acknowledgements of prejudice instead of focussing on the need for change in 
political practices (hooks 1986). As hooks aptly expresses it, awareness and 
acknowledgement of complicity in racism is only meaningful when it results 
in a transformation; ―a woman (…) who learns to acknowledge that she is 
racist is no less a threat than one who does not‖ (hooks 1986:133).  
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As has been discussed above, one other response to the privileging of white 
women‘s experiences and the related phenomenon of the privileging of gender 
over other categories such as race and class in the ‗race to innocence‘ has been 
the introduction of the term ‗intersectionality‘. Black feminists‘ assertion that 
the experiences of black women could only insufficiently be theorised when 
analyses of ‗race‘ and gender were separated, prompted calls for an approach 
that would be attentive to the interaction between different categories of 
subordination.
23
 An intersectional analysis could work against the 'race to 
innocence' in three different ways: First, by showing how gender functions in 
conjunction with other categories like race, it destabilises 'gender' as a fixed 
category and hence it becomes almost impossible to argue that oppression 
occurs solely on the basis of gender without attention to other categories. 
Secondly, while intersectional approaches have mostly been applied to study 
and describe the experiences of those that are facing an array of different types 
of oppression, intersectional approaches can also be applied to groups that do 
not face multiple axes of discrimination, but rather occupy ‗mixed‘ or 
advantaged positions (see Yuval-Davis 2006a). Hence an intersectional 
analysis situates people in a more complex way, which can give insight into 
how people can be both oppressed and oppressors, complicit in the 
subordination of others. Thirdly, an intersectional analysis can show how 
different systems of oppression are dependent on one another and it thereby 
reminds us of Fellows' and Razack‘s claim (1998) that only by addressing all 
                                                 
23
 While intersectionality as a term was only introduced into feminist theory in the 1990s, 
Verloo (2009b) interestingly argues that the earlier debates between radical, liberal and 
socialist feminism can be said to have been equally centred around how gender and other 
categories (in this case mostly class and ethnicity to some extent) intersect or stand alone. 
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these systems of oppression together we can have true liberation.  Elsewhere, 
Razack frames it as follows:  
 
―By understanding the connections between systems of oppression, 
geographical regions and various groups of women, we might better come to 
see why it has been so difficult for each one of us to see our privilege at the 
same time as our penalty. An interlocking analysis reminds us of the ease with 
which we slip into positions of subordination (for example, the sexually 
vulnerable woman, the woman with sole responsibility for child care, or the 
woman without access to managerial positions) without seeing how this very 
subordinate location simultaneously reflects and upholds race and class 
privilege‖ (Razack 2001:14). 
 
One example of how gender functions in conjunction with other categories 
could be found in the fact that both gender and age were very frequently 
mentioned as playing a major role in the work experiences of the women NGO 
workers. I will argue that the intersection of the categories of gender and age 
produced a specific effect that cannot be theorised by considering both 
categories separately. Indeed, as Yuval-Davis asserts, the ―point of 
intersectional analysis is not (…) to reinscribe the additive model of 
oppression‖ but to ―analyse the differential ways in which different social 
divisions are concretely enmeshed and constituted by each other‖ (2006a:205).  
 
When I ask Sarah to give me some examples of how her identity plays a role 
in her work, she tells me what she calls ‗an anecdote‘ of a situation in which 
she met with a Middle Eastern government official to discuss disarmament. 
 118 
She tells me that after the first introduction and greetings, “he said „so what is 
this young woman, young lovely woman doing, what can I help you with? We 
are improving our maternal health programmes, (…) we are really taking care 
of our young ones‟ and I looked at him and said „I think that‟s great, I am glad 
that you said that, but no, I am actually here to talk to you about the chemical 
weapons convention‟”.  
 
While arguably, his statements about the maternal health programmes and ‗the 
young ones‘ can be read as a response solely to her gender, his form of address 
‗young lovely woman‘ points to an image that is co-produced and 
strengthened through the intersection of sexism and ageism. Being young 
coupled with being a woman is read as either not very serious and competent –
just ‗lovely‘- while the combination of youth with male could potentially be 
read as a sign of ambition and strength.  
 
Sonia who works to support women in Africa, relates how in her encounter 
with those women, she feels that “they won‟t treat you as equals or as 
colleagues, but you will always be sort of the little girl, the assistant”. While 
Sonia makes this statement in her relation to what she perceives as a ‗culture 
of seniority‘, the image she evokes, is that of a ‗little girl‘; the figure of youth 
is immediately gendered. This example very clearly illustrates that difference, 
between old and young, male and female, cannot be thought without 
considering power relations (see Ludvig 2006).  
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Stacey‘s complaints about the recurrent and regular sexist behaviour she 
encounters in her work place flow seamlessly from sexist to ageist behaviour. 
Stacey: “At one point there was somebody who thought it was appropriate in 
the mornings to kiss me on the forehead to say hello, as a grandfather with his 
granddaughter”. In this example age and gender are intertwined to the extent 
that it is impossible to separate whether gender hierarchies here are expressed 
through an age-related image of grandfather versus granddaughter or 
age/seniority power relations through gender. As Stacey emphasises, while she 
deviates from the ‗norm‘ in more than one respect, because of her religion, 
because of her ethnicity, her social class, still “being a young woman I would 
say is perhaps the identity that is the hardest to deal with here”.  
 
She observes that working for the international organisation she now works 
for “it is no longer the challenge of being the brown girl”. Stacey: “So I 
mean, that is the wonderful thing about working in an international 
organisation, that everyone is from everywhere else. But that does not mean 
that there are not assumptions about my identity, there are assumptions that 
automatically brown means Indian, brown can usually never mean Canadian 
or [where my parents come from]”.  
 
Hence, while the intersecting identity categories have real material 
consequences for the lived experiences and are shaped by structural forms of 
discrimination, the intersecting categories take on their specific meaning 
within particular locations and times. This implies moreover, that the meaning 
of categories shifts according to the context in which they are interpreted. 
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Thus, it is important that Brah and Phoenix in their above quoted definition of 
intersectionality stress the intersection of categories ―in historically specific 
contexts‖ (Brah and Phoenix 2004:76). Stacey‘s brown skin is ‗read‘ 
differently and took on different meanings depending on the context she is 
positioned in. Sara Ahmed (1997) uses an autobiographical narrative to 
illustrate the multiple shifting of readings of her body in an encounter she had 
as a 14 year old in Australia with the police. In their short meeting, her bare 
feet combined with her brown skin are first read as a deviant Aboriginal and 
hence as a threat to the safety of the neighbourhood, then when she tells them 
which school she goes to, as a middle-class white woman with a sexy sun tan. 
Neither interpretation does justice to her ‗real‘ origin. Again, the brown skin is 
read in conjunction with gender producing the ‗sexy‘ tan. As Ahmed asserts 
elsewhere, black feminists in their work have drawn attention to ―the 
processes of identification which produce contradictory and unstable subject 
positions, where subjects are addressed or ‗hailed‘ in many different ways‖ 
(Ahmed 2000a:112, see also Mohanty 2003: chapter 5).  
 
Pauline‘s description of her experience as a woman working in Bangladesh 
shows how gender functions in conjunction with her whiteness: “I was 
interacting and socially interacting and professionally interacting, apart from 
the interviews, with men (…) and that was quite difficult, really. Because I 
knew that had I been a Bangladeshi woman I would have been eating dinner 
with the women there, but because I was a white woman who had come to 
visit, I was granted a special kind of status like an honorary man basically and 
I was eating with the men and interacting with the men and it was quite 
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uncomfortable I think on both sides, because they are not used to interacting 
in a public gathering with women and obviously there are issues of power and 
things like that”.  
 
Pauline‘s whiteness, in this situation, makes her categorised differently from 
the Bangladeshi women. Pauline‘s story is similar to that identified by Barbara 
Heron in her research about white Canadian development workers in Africa, 
who uses the same term ‗honorary men‘ to describe how whiteness served to 
overwrite their gender and endowed them with a status normally not bestowed 
on the non-white women (Heron 2007, see also White 2003, Cook 2007:182). 
In this instance, Pauline resists the temptation to merely ―slip into positions of 
subordination‖ (Razack 2001:14) as instead of focussing on how her gender 
put her in a vulnerable position, she realises how her whiteness produced her 
as 'honorary man' with access to the men's dinner table.  
 
Similarly, Kate challenges the idea that her gender produces one stable effect 
and instead draws attention to the way in which the context shapes the way her 
gender is read. In addition, she points to the difference between sex and 
gender, with gender being a ‗performance‘ rather than a fixed identity. Her 
interpretation of gender also challenges easy notions of sisterhood through 
shared gender. I asked her whether she thinks that when she visits women in 
partner organisations in the global South some of the differences are bridged 
because of her being a woman.  
 
 122 
Kate replies: “It creates boundaries and it may ease others, with a women I 
might have less [boundaries] but it does not have to be (…). What you 
mentioned before is a bit old school, so there is a woman and therefore there 
is the [connection?]. I think that‟s not anymore true, if it ever has been true, 
presumably not, but it might not anymore be so helpful. (…) I can nowadays 
or at least in NGOs (…) I can take as a woman I can take a gender role that is 
masculine or feminine”.  
 
Kate continues to suggest that it is possible that within the global South there 
is less flexibility and fluidity concerning gender roles and what status you 
have on the basis of these. She then says: “Whereas in those countries, they 
still face fierce opposition. But if you are for example a woman whose children 
are big, then you have quite a lot of status as well, so it also changes 
according to age, I am not sure, it would be interesting to compare a young 
woman, middle-aged, professionally active and an older woman in developing 
country A with one here in our countries. It could also be that at some point it 
is more equal and then perhaps you are in a better status when you are an 
older woman in a developing country than in ours”.  
 
Hence, she relativises the difference between the global North and the global 
South which she first suggested there to be, with reference to other examples 
from the global South where gender does not unequivocally determine 
position and status but functions in a more complex interplay with other 
factors.  
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Sylvia‘s reflections on how being a woman affects her work on gender issues 
also traverses between the different meanings attributed to her gender 
depending on the context. In addition, similar to Kate she differentiates 
between her sex and gender and recognises that as a woman she sometimes 
plays a more masculine role than at other times. As she explains: “Eh, that 
gets a bit difficult sometimes, being a woman and working with gender issues 
sometimes, where there is a certain type of frustration as it is generally very 
much white women who do things. I find going into a room and seeing a whole 
bunch of people who look like me is just depressing and gets a bit frustrating, I 
mean frustrating and disheartening in terms of what are we actually 
accomplishing. If it is just the same people talking to the same people then we 
are never actually moving anywhere. And in that sense there it is a bit, the 
identity issue is even, because [when] it is more likely to be with people from 
the same background and other women [then] my identity as a woman seems 
less important because we are all women. Whereas I think my identity as a 
woman working in a post-conflict situation where 9 times out of 10 I was the 
only woman then it became much more important, because then I had to assert 
certain things, there I had to be almost like the representative woman. And 
there was a lot more stress of feeling I guess of having to make sure that the 
women view comes in, but also there is more of a reason sometimes to be less 
of a woman and be one of the guys in order to fit in. That being a woman 
becomes more an issue, not dealing with gender issues”.  
 
In this short extract, being a woman who works with gender issues takes on 
many different meanings. First, her professional meetings with other women 
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from similar backgrounds to talk about gender equality make Sylvia conscious 
of her whiteness in relation to the overwhelming presence of whiteness in such 
meetings. In addition, she feels that her identity as a woman needs to be 
asserted less in all-women or all-feminist company. In contrast, in relation to 
her work in conflict zones, she notices that she is often the only woman and 
hence feels a pressure to be ‗the representative woman‘ who is supposed to 
give a gender analysis or the ‗women‘s view‘. At the same time, being in 
predominantly male environment she feels the need to adopt a ‗masculine‘ 
attitude in order to fit in the group, and be ‗one of the guys‘.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have situated the different understandings of feminism 
professed by the women NGO workers. The understandings of feminism 
expressed in the interviews cannot be neatly categorised according to the 
traditional tripartite division of liberal, radical and socialist feminism. Instead I 
have argued that the narratives of the women NGO workers about their 
feminisms displayed the major themes and debates within feminism, such as 
the institutionalisation of feminism, the different backlashes against 
feminisms, essentialist versus anti-essentialist approaches and separatist and 
inclusive tendencies. The feminist identities of the NGO workers are often 
linked to a very personal moment of feminist political awakening followed by 
consolidation in education or the women's movement and for the 'post-
feminist generation' by a re-evaluating of experiences on the basis of theories 
encountered at the university. In addition, their personal understandings of 
feminism were often phrased in opposition to other discourses critical of 
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feminism; for example the famous 'feminists as man haters' or feminists as 
blind to other oppressions than gender oppression following the black 
feminists' critique. Furthermore, the process of negotiating the category of 
women (who is included and what features do women share?) is central to the 
practices of the women NGO workers and can lead to contentious and 
ambivalent moments.  Lastly, the interaction between the organisation‘s 
understanding of gender oppression and the women NGO workers‘ 
understanding of feminism influenced and shaped the extent to which 
‗personal feminism‘ and professional tasks related to gender issues are aligned 
or in conflict.  
 
Western feminism has been challenged for assuming universality in the 
experiences of women while basing itself on the situation of white, middle-
class women. The notion of sisterhood as connoting shared victimhood 
therefore has a controversial history. The narratives of the women NGO 
workers show the wide currency of sisterhood as a way to understand 
connections between women on a global scale. While some women‘s 
understandings of sisterhood resembled the much critiqued assumption of 
universality of experience, others problematised sisterhood in response to the 
critique by black feminists. The desire to maintain a notion of sisterhood 
combined with the need to rework the idea as a struggle rather than a given, 
moving towards solidarity, as prevalent in the work of hooks (1986), gained 
empirical shape in the accounts of some of the women NGO workers. The 
assumption of sisterhood as shared victimhood has been linked to what 
Fellows and Razack call, the ‗race to innocence‘. The ‗race to innocence‘ both 
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encompasses the belief that gender oppression is the most fundamental 
oppression and the refusal for critical self-scrutiny in relation to how feminists 
are implicated in other structures of subordination. I have argued that this 
‗race to innocence‘ can indeed be encountered in the reflections of women 
NGO workers on the relation between their identity and their work practices.  
 
At the same time, critical self-reflection can lead to an identification and 
awareness of one‘s ‗race to innocence‘. However, critical reflexivity has the 
risk to turn ‗transparent‘ when it is assumed that one has accomplished one‘s 
‗reflexive duty‘ by merely naming implications in oppression. Hence, critical 
reflexivity is only the first step in a process of taking responsibility and should 
be followed by real transformation in practice. As is evident from Fellows and 
Razack's observation that while ―many feminists have gained an intellectual 
understanding of complicity (…) many of us find it difficult to take actions 
built on the recognition that we are both oppressors and oppressed‖ (Fellows 
and Razack 1998:337), this is not an easy demand.  
 
In addition to critical reflexivity, I have argued that an intersectional approach 
can challenge the 'race to innocence' by destabilising gender, by paying 
attention to the combination of both dominant and subordinate positions and 
by showing how different systems of oppression are connected. I have argued 
that gender functions in conjunction with other categories like ethnicity and 
age, generating, for example, the image (with a particular set of connotations) 
of the ‗young woman‘. Hence, the production of the ‗young woman‘ or the 
female ‗honorary man‘ shows that ‗gender‘ should not be understood as 
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determining experiences in one fixed way; rather gender takes shape in 
specific contexts and in combination with other structures of inequality, which 
position the women NGO workers in subordinate as well as dominant 
positions. 
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5 - Post-colonial Tendencies, Cultural Challenges 
 
Introduction 
Post-colonial theorists have revealed the continuation of colonial mechanisms 
and tendencies, both material and discursive, in our present post-colonial 
times. In recognising the continuities of colonialism after the official 
decolonisation process, they assert that there is no radical break between 
colonial and post-colonial times as post-colonial times still feature similar 
tendencies albeit in a different form or shape (see Ahmed 2000b). The field of 
aid and development is in particular often singled out for its post-colonial 
continuities, both in its continuation of imperialist intervention and in its 
‗civilising mission‘ (Stoler and Cooper 1997, Spivak 1999, Smillie 2000, 
Cook 2006, Kothari 2006b, Eyben 2007b, Duffield 2007). Some critical 
development theorists however also question simplistic arguments that 
development is just ―colonialism by other means‖ and argue that the history of 
development as a concept shows that it has both been used to further colonial 
aims and has been mobilised to deflect these (Cooper and Packard 1997:30, 
see also White 2002).  
 
This chapter provides a post-colonial reading of the narratives of the women 
NGO workers. While the work of the research participants concerned a wider 
range of issues that goes beyond ‗development‘ narrowly conceived, the 
helping imperative present in their work and their operation along a 
North/South axis justifies a post-colonial approach. As Maria Eriksson Baaz 
 129 
emphasises, placing the identities of development workers in relation to the 
post-colonial ―does not mean that these identities should be seen as an 
articulation of already constituted identities drawn directly from the ‗colonial 
library‘‖ but rather that the ―colonial library‖ is used to make sense of and to 
give meaning to situations that arise in the context of development (Baaz 
2005:72). Moreover, it is important to note that people engage in complex 
ways, which cannot be reduced to simple dichotomies of ―acquiescence or 
resistance‖ (Cooper and Packard 1997:30). By tracing post-colonial tendencies 
in the interview accounts I at the same time acknowledge my own complicity 
in these discourses as a white woman located in the west, which is for example 
exemplified by the openness of the interviewees regarding their views of 
women in the South; hence these examples are not intended to serve as a 
scapegoat, but rather to stress the ‗stubbornness‘ of these post-colonial 
mechanisms, to assert the need for vigilance to these mechanisms and to 
explore possibilities of resisting these tendencies. 
 
This chapter will first look at some direct references in the interview narratives 
about (involvement in) the colonial history, both in relation to their own 
position and in relation to their organisation. In the second section of this 
chapter, the post-colonial critique will extend to the reading of discourses of 
‗race‘ and culture as understood by the research participants. As a preamble to 
this discussion, the interviewees‘ understanding of racism will be discussed 
and alternative understandings of racism, which go beyond the individualised 
psychological approach, will be proposed. I will explore the use of notions of 
‗culture‘ as a proxy for ‗race‘ in relation to the ideas of ‗radical difference‘, 
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cultural relativism, and imperialism as a civilising mission. In addition, I will 
pay special attention to the way ‗culture‘ is introduced in relation to women 
from the global South. As Ghandi argues, while in some way feminism and 
post-colonialism have a potential for a productive unity, there are three areas 
where they clash: one, the discussion about the analytic category of the ‗third 
world woman‘, two, the history of feminists as imperialists with the Western 
women liberated at the cost of the ‗third world woman‘ and third, ―the 
colonialist deployment of ‗feminist criteria‘ to bolster the appeal of the 
civilising mission‖ (Ghandi 1998:83). Especially the first and the third area of 
contestation are of relevance in the accounts of some of the women NGO 
workers.  
 
Many post-colonial theorists have argued (e.g. Bhabha 2005, Mohanty 1984) 
that the process of defining the cultural/ethnic/‗racial‘ difference of the Other, 
should be understood in relation to the need to define the Self in contrast to the 
Other. Mohanty (1984) more specifically addresses the way Western feminists 
need the female Other in order to define themselves as liberated in contrast to 
the oppressed Southern women. Hence the third section of this chapter will 
discuss how the NGO workers defined the Self through the otherness of the 
beneficiaries of their projects. While on the one hand the number and variety 
of the examples in this chapter shows the persistence of the ‗race‘/culture 
discourse and the persistence of (post-) colonial images in the narratives, this 
does not mean that this is true for all research participants, which should also 
become apparent from the examples in the discussion below. Many would 
have disagreed with the specific language some other interviewees used, while 
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others would probably have disagreed with the assumptions and 
generalisations made. 
 
As Kothari argues, it is important to explore issues of whiteness and one‘s 
own positionality in the post-colonial process instead of externalising racism, 
in order to gain an understanding and an acknowledgement of one‘s 
complicity, which ―may assist in the realignment of forms of engagement in 
development in a racially cognisant manner that resists inequalities of power‖ 
(Kothari 2006a:15). Hence in the final section of this chapter I will look at 
ways these colonial and racial discourses can be challenged and resisted using 
Spivak‘s notions of ―constructive complicity‖ (Spivak 1999) and ―privilege as 
a loss‖ (Spivak 1990).  
 
Colonialism 
While most of this chapter will concentrate on those instances where post-
colonial tendencies can be traced but are not specifically named as such, there 
were situations in which interviewees made specific reference to (post-) 
colonial times. Interestingly, while some of these references directly 
acknowledge the colonial past and its lasting influence, other remarks 
emphasised the distancing from colonialism or situating it firmly in the past. 
Taking pains to stress that colonialism is not an issue (anymore) at the same 
time paradoxically establishes and confirms it as an issue, especially when the 
remark came without prompting from my side. Some examples may help to 
illuminate this:  
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Elisa first talks about her organisation‘s aim to work with other women in the 
global South, rather than for other women in their projects.
24
 When I ask her 
whether she thinks power differences still play a role which would make it 
difficult to claim to be really working with the women, she replies: “I think it 
is difficult not so much from our, how we frame the problems, but it is 
sometimes then difficult how you are perceived, because the women [in the 
global South] have less access to funds, money, media whatever, and they 
obviously want to do something to develop. And in the world there is so much 
inequality that they (…) At the same time we are not in the year of colonialism, 
we go there twice and we give back a little bit (…)”.  
 
What is interesting about this quote here is that on the one hand, my question 
about power differences prompts Elisa to reflect on inequalities and 
colonialism. On the other hand, she places colonialism in the past when she 
stresses ‗we are not in the year of colonialism‘. This is a striking contradiction, 
because the fact that her pondering on inequality leads her to colonialism 
would suggest that she recognises the post-colonial impact of colonial 
relations, while the next part of her narrative insists on a closure of colonial 
times.  
 
Sonia who works with women in Africa, when asked whether she thinks her 
identity has an impact on her work, says: “Yes, I would think so, but I maybe 
don‟t know how to explain it, but I guess the fact of being Latin American that 
does not make me European, so that does not make me a coloniser”. When I 
                                                 
24
 The concept of partnership will be discussed more extensively in Chapter Seven.  
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ask her whether the women she works with in Africa make references to the 
colonial process (to explore whether that was the reason for her to foreground 
the non-coloniser identity), she told me that they had not made such 
references. If her reference to colonialism is indeed as she says neither 
prompted by the women she works with nor by me, what is it then that makes 
this so important? It could of course be a general acknowledgement of the 
power of colonial discourse. It could also be the case that her stressing of her 
non-coloniser identity may be read as a way to take attention away from her 
other identity markers, i.e. her education, possibly class, and her whiteness, 
where she would have needed to reflect on her position of dominance. Sonia‘s 
argument about the importance of a non-coloniser identity in aid relations 
resonates with arguments made in Ireland about the Irish empathic disposition 
towards developing countries due to their shared history of being colonised 
(Kevlihan 2001).  
 
In answer to the same question, Naomi says: “And coming from Canada, 
which has a fairly mixed up culture in terms of it is not like a European 
culture you know, the people who settled in Canada are not the original 
people in Canada, so I guess I also have that respect for being in, living in 
someone else‟s country and being mindful of that, and being mindful of the 
history of how my country was set up by effectively displacing the original 
people there, and also where I came from (…) in Canada, the French were 
there first and then the British kicked them out. So and I think that sadly that 
kind of thing keeps going on and on in the world and we are not learning from 
history”.  
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Similarly to Sonia she understands colonialism as an identity rather than as a 
relationship and differentiates her identity from a European one. Again this 
differentiation is also based on the colonial process; however she rather 
stresses the difference between Canada as a settler country and Europe as a 
coloniser. The notion that Canada takes a particular role in the international 
arena is expressed by many sources, in particular in relation to peacekeeping:  
 
―Canadian culture inherently includes being a global citizen. Canada 
embraces multiculturalism, immigration, and cross-cultural understanding. 
Canada is recognized internationally as a peace-keeping nation‖ (411 
Initiative for Change 2007, see also Whitworth 2005).  
 
Also, interestingly, Naomi relates the painful element of building a nation 
through displacement of other peoples to the idea that that history has given 
her a special respect, which others with a different history do not have. This 
seems similar to arguments often made by ex-coloniser countries, which state 
that they have a special responsibility towards the ex-colonies and other 
developing countries.
25
 Tom Hampson for example argued in the Fabian 
Society publication ‗2025: What next for the Make Poverty History 
generation‘:  
 
―We need to ask ourselves why it was the British (...) who, of all Western 
peoples, felt the moral certainty last year [in the Make Poverty History 
campaign] to intervene and proselytise‖ and ―We need to recognise that our 
                                                 
25
 Similar arguments have been voiced by the perpetrator countries in relation to WW2: in 
Germany some politicians compared the massacres of the Serbs with the extermination of the 
Jews in the Second World War, to point to Germany‘s responsibility to intervene in the 
Kosovo war (Probst 2003). 
 135 
role must draw on the benefits of our history of empire (…) [and that] we 
have wisdom in our experience and the responsibility that comes with it‖ 
(Hampson 2006:12).  
 
There is an inherent danger however, in justifying intervention, either military 
or through other ways like development aid, by reference to the damage of 
past intervention. In addition, in the extract there is a tension between on the 
one hand the personal understanding of lessons learnt from the past, as the past 
of her country makes her more mindful and on the other hand saying that ‗we 
are not learning from history‘ as the displacement of peoples continues.  
 
Gill refers to that continuation of the intervention of Northern people in the 
lives of the people from the South when she describes an encounter with 
women from an organisation from the South. These women expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the work of Gill‘s organisation; according to Gill they felt 
that “it is again the Western European imperialists that are telling us what to 
do”.  
 
While there are certainly a number of NGOs and government foreign aid 
institutions that originated in colonial times and were a direct offspring of the 
circumstances of that time (see Kothari 2006b, Duffield 2007), only one of the 
interviewees mentioned something along these lines with reference to the 
organisation she is working for. Naomi explained about her own organisation 
which is inspired by Christian principles: “You know there are many [national 
associations of my organisation] that got started in the mid to late 1800s so it 
was really already by the turn of the last century that the [organisation] was 
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in quite a number of countries already so that global nature was something 
that caught on. Now of course, you know, Britain being a colonial power at 
the time certainly helped in its development in other places, and certainly 
India and South Asia, there are a number of [national/local associations] that 
date back to late 1800s you know, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, (…), and then 
with the partition, you also had Pakistan and then finally Bangladesh. But 
there is certainly a link there to colonial times, where you had British women 
who had started [national/local associations] who were overseas. (…) As the 
Empire crumbled, there is also very much a strong push for the [national/local 
associations] to be run by the women of their countries, so that they are run by 
indigenous women if you will”.  
 
Here the organisation‘s global status and the legitimacy it gets through its 
alliances with all the local associations are directly linked to the status of 
Britain as a (former) imperial power. Though the organisation is open to 
women from all different faiths, the Christian dimension of the organisation in 
countries that are not predominantly Christian recalls colonial and missionary 
times. For Spivak, the term ‗global‘ is not innocent here but carries the 
connotation of imperialism; the global is tied to the imposition of the capitalist 
system of exchange on a global scale, on controlling and dominating the globe 
(Spivak 2003a). In a similar vein, she uses the notion of the coloniser 
―worlding the world‖ (Spivak 1999:212) denoting that the assumption that 
only the coloniser‘s entry and presence inscribes the colonised space which 
before that was supposedly ‗empty‘.  
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I was interested in hearing more about the process of transferring the 
governance of the organisations from the British women who were the original 
founders to the ‗indigenous women‘ and hence asked Naomi whether it had in 
some cases been a challenging process. She replied: “We are talking now 
what, 50 years ago, or more so I don‟t think… It is not an issue anymore. You 
know I think during the whole period during the 40s, 50s, 60s when the whole 
colonial structure was being dismantled, well, the official colonial structure 
was being dismantled, and countries were turned back into the hands of the 
people, rather than being run by colonial powers, [the national/local 
organisations] were certainly within that period of the 40s through the 70s 
certainly being run then by women of the country and not by colonial women”. 
 
Here Naomi‘s account displays a similar tension to the one identified in 
relation to Canada as a settler‘s country, namely that on the one hand the 
colonial times and the decolonisation process are firmly situated in the past (‗it 
is not an issue anymore‘) while at the same time, qualifying her argument 
(‗well, the official colonial structure was being dismantled‘) this is disrupted 
(see Cannadine 2001). She defends her organisation (against my suggestion 
that it could have been ‗challenging‘?) by stressing that the handover of power 
in her organisations was conducted earlier than the handover of power by 
national governments.  
 
Grace‘s reflections on colonialism do not refer to her organisation but to her 
own memories of growing up in a country that was a colonial power. She 
recalls: “Probably not for your generation, but certainly for our generation, 
Africa, you know all Africans wore grass skirts, they lived in mud huts and 
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they carried spears, those were the images that you had of Africa that was 
what you had in the books. I suppose my attitude over the years must have 
changed but it has been quite... I have not noticed the change. (…) We were 
certainly brought up to believe, (...), that Americans and on the whole 
Europeans were seen as equals. Whereas these other people, I believe the term 
that was used in this country was „natives‟, wasn‟t it? The „natives‟ or have 
you not come across that? And if you are native then you are slightly lower, 
whereas you might not like the Americans, or the Germans or the French, or 
whoever you are picking a fight with at the moment but they were perceived as 
having the same standards as us. Whereas the others were „natives‟”. 
 
Lazreg (2000) wonders what kind of impact it has on one‘s psyche to live in a 
country defined as advanced and developed. What was the impact on Grace to 
grow up with images of Africa in which ‗all Africans wore grass skirts, they 
lived in mud huts and they carried spears‘? Grace‘s description is very 
powerful as it shows not only the extremity of the colonial images in 
circulation, but also the fact that these images are still from relatively recent 
times. Grace contrasts the ‗equals‘, Americans and Europeans, with the so-
called ‗natives‘, the Africans. The terms ‗native‘, ‗tribe‘, indigenous‘ and 
‗local‘ always stand in a hierarchical relation to the ‗global‘.26 In Grace‘s 
narrative, she realises that it is not necessarily stereotypes or images of other 
countries or peoples in themselves that are problematic, but the hierarchy 
associated with these images; ‗if you are a native you are slightly lower‘. 
Crewe and Fernando differentiate between  
                                                 
26
 For a discussion on the ‗global citizen‘, see Chapter Six.  
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―a) those representations that are no more than simplifications about cultural 
differences between groups and that have no insidious effect, and b) 
prejudices that become translated into policies that result in cultural 
aggression or the systematic discrimination against, exclusion or oppression 
of people based on their racial identity‖ (Crewe and Fernando 2006:41).  
 
However, as Barker (1981) points out, in the context of debates about 
immigration policies and the multicultural society, increasingly a discourse 
has developed where mere cultural difference (also if not associated with a 
hierarchy) is used to justify xenophobic standpoints by reference to the need to 
maintain a homogeneous and ‗pure‘ British nation.  
 
When I asked her why some differences, such as skin colour, are seen as 
‗significant‘ and others, such as colour of shoes not, Grace started reflecting 
on an encounter with American students where differences were also noticed 
and named but without the associated hierarchy: “You see, last week we had 
three American students staying with us for the week and you tend to think 
because we all speak English that there be no problem but it was interesting 
the cultural difference when we really sat down and talked, I thought, „where 
are you guys, what planet are you from?‟. It is interesting, now if I said that 
about a black person I would have been accused of being racist but because I 
was saying it about Americans it was acceptable”.  
 
Again Grace‘s statement can be understood in Crewe and Fernando‘s terms 
when they state: ―The perception of racism implies a power difference. Non-
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white people are rarely labelled racist when expressing sweeping and negative 
judgements about white people‖ (Crewe and Fernando 2006:41-42).  
 
‘Race’/ Culture 
In the theoretical engagement with race in development practices (which I will 
here extend to wider NGO practices and to encounters between those working 
on a national level with migrants), there is a strong sense that ‗race‘ in 
development is undertheorised (see Crewe and Fernando 2006). White (2003) 
compares the attention given to gender in development with the (lack of) 
attention granted to race issues and claims that official publications make 
almost no mention of ‗race‘ (see also Goudge 2003 and Kothari 2006a). She 
notices that the ―international etiquette‖ no longer allows one to express a 
simplistic worldview in which the Western countries need to save the 
uncivilised, traditional, passive and backward developing world (White 
2002:418). However, this view ―nevertheless lurks within the ‗discursive 
bricolage‘ of development‖ (White 2002:418).  
 
Her observation implies two things; one, while assumptions about people from 
Third World countries are often not expressed anymore in the crude terms 
(such as in the example of Grace where Africans were presented as living in 
mud huts with spears), the underlying assumptions will still find their 
expression in different terms. Second, the term ‗bricolage‘ points to the fact 
that this racialised or imperial/post-colonial discourse is not unified and 
consistent, but rather consists of a range of different discourses that could 
often be conflicting.  
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The silence on ‗race‘ in development discourse can be linked to the current 
taboo on racism. As Essed states: ―Today many Whites condemn more blatant 
forms of racism and are often motivated to maintain non-discriminating self-
concepts‖ (Essed 1991:5-6, see also Byrne 2006). Two understandings of 
racism circulate most prominently; one where racism is understood as the 
expression of extreme right-wing ideology and, to a lesser extent, one where 
racism is understood to be an inevitable, inherent response of all (white) 
people (Lasch-Quinn 2001). Both accounts of racism are highly psychologised 
and individualised and logically prompt responses of denial. This section will 
first provide two examples of such understandings of racism before discussing 
examples of how ‗race‘ (presented as culture) appears in some of the 
narratives of the women NGO workers. Such discussion about the 
understanding of racism is important to understand what the possible obstacles 
are for an engagement with both the racist structures that underlie some of the 
power relations NGOs encounter and with one‘s own implication in the 
colonial and racial libraries that give meaning to encounters with the Other.  
 
The following narrative by Kim serves to explore some complexities in 
relation to understanding and acknowledging racism. Kim
27
 works in the 
country where she grew up with asylum seekers, providing counselling but 
also arranging financial issues, which the government delegated to the NGO 
she works for. In the light of the general silence regarding racism, Kim already 
breaks a taboo by narrating the following encounter during the interview. She 
                                                 
27
 The interview with Kim was a pilot interview. Kim‘s work fitted the same criteria as the 
other NGO workers, except the focus on gender/women issues. 
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tells me that there were ‗clients‘ who told her she was a racist. When I asked 
her why this happened, she says: “I think it is just the frustration. Like if you 
tell people sometimes „sorry I cannot pay you the money‟, for sure for them 
this is a negative message and maybe their way to react is the frustration and 
then maybe they even try to get you at a weak point and to say „but you are a 
racist, this is only because I am black‟ and whatever. For me it is clear I am 
not a racist and that‟s why I don‟t feel insulted with this because also I think I 
have so much experience that I know that sometimes things that are said are 
not meant in that way but also out of a situation of frustration or out of an 
emotional, I don‟t know …”. 
 
In the narrative, Kim emphasises that she is not a racist. While she initially 
says here that she did not feel insulted, when the conversation continues, she 
does say that she felt hurt when accused of being racist. In the encounter that 
Kim narrates she is personally accused of racism, rather than that her 
organisation or the government policies that they execute are called racist. 
Moreover, as racism is often associated with extreme right-wing ideologies 
and with conscious, individual behaviour, it is not surprising that Kim defends 
herself against the charge of racism. This dominant understanding of racism 
might however stand in the way of a critical engagement with the context, 
which resulted in the charge of racism. Kim acknowledges that the accusation 
of racism comes out of a frustration with the system the woman is dependent 
on (e.g. payment from the government). In the context of immigration that 
Kim works in, it would not be surprising if the woman felt faced with racist 
policies and regulations. In the United Kingdom for example, in the 1970s the 
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notion of ‗institutional racism‘ was introduced, which described the racism of 
schools, prisons, the police and other public institutions (Peters 2005).
28
   
 
Subsequently I asked Kim: “So, it does not make you doubt? You are not like 
„Maybe I am a racist‟?”  
Kim replies: “No I can be clear about that, that I am not a racist. I think 
sometimes it does hurt. Once for example, a woman was saying this to me and 
it was so not true, because it was even one of my clients that I really liked so 
much and I made so many exceptions for her which I was not allowed to do 
and I did so much for her, because I thought she was so nice and then (…) she 
said „you are doing this just because you don‟t like me, you are always doing 
something, like you make obstacles in my life‟. And I tried to explain her, „no, 
these are the rules that are coming from the government and I am just 
executing them‟ (….) Then she said also I am a racist, and all these things and 
I was really hurt. I did not doubt I was a racist, I was sure I was not and I am 
sure I am not, but I was so hurt, because I liked her so much”.  
 
Again Kim‘s narrative shows how sensitive the issue of racism is, both 
through Kim‘s reference to feeling hurt (also in the light of her more personal, 
closer relation with this woman) and to her stressing that she is certain she is 
not a racist. Here the defensive response might admittedly have been 
reinforced by my second question.  
 
                                                 
28
 However, as Füredi (2007) notes, the notion of ‗institutionalised racism‘ which gained wide 
currency in the UK with the 1999 MacPherson report that evaluated the police‘s response to 
the murder of Stephen Lawrence, was defined in the report as a psychological response. Hence 
again, racism was individualised and psychologised.  
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Grace‘s comments underline the taboo on racism: “I think a lot of people, your 
more liberal minded people would be quite horrified if you suggest that maybe 
within us there is a degree of latent racism that is almost inbred”. Grace‘s 
account is different from Karin‘s in suggesting that everyone might be 
(latently) racist implying a different understanding of racism. Interestingly 
Grace is using the term ‗inbred‘ rather than ‗learned‘ thus implying a natural 
rather than a historical reason for racism (see Barker 1981:4-21 on the 
discourse of the ―naturalness of xenophobia‖ or ―pseudo-biological racism‖).  
 
Kim‘s defence against charges of racism, which consists of stressing how 
much she had actually liked the woman and how often she had done her 
favours despite regulations that forbade her doing so, is instructive in further 
emphasising that the dominant understanding of racism is individualised. If 
one would move away from a personalised/individualised understanding of 
racism, where racism is understood as a more complex phenomenon it is 
perfectly possible for racism and being nice to coexist. As Mohanty argues: 
―Even if we think we are not personally racist or sexist, we are clearly marked 
by the burdens and privileges of our histories and locations‖ (Mohanty 
2003:191, see also Razack 2001). Kim‘s position, or the fact that the role of 
her and the woman are as they are rather than being easily reversed, is 
embedded in unequal structures of capitalism, colonialism and racism. As 
Essed (1991) suggests one of the major problems with earlier studies on 
racism has been the sharp distinction between individual and institutional 
racism.  
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This ―places the individual outside the institutional, thereby severing rules, 
regulations and procedures from the people who make and enact them, as if it 
concerned qualitatively different racism rather than different positions and 
relations through which racism operates‖ (Essed 1991:36).  
 
Furthermore she argues that racism is never just personal and individual but 
rather always reflects wider processes of domination (Essed 1991). Essed‘s 
highly relevant intervention highlights the complexity of processes of racism 
and could eventually serve to encourage the recognition of racist structures, 
which is the prerequisite for challenging these processes. Challenging and 
resisting racism should hence not take place on the level of the individual but 
on a wider societal and structural level (Essed 1991).  
 
After the Second World War (Malik 1996, Füredi 1998), with decolonisation 
(Duffield 2006), with the current discourse on multiculturalism
29
 (Malik 1996, 
Byrne 2006, Heron 2007), and national discourses of the ‗tolerant nation‘ 
(Essed 1991) it has become more acceptable to refer to cultural differences 
than to ‗race‘ in order to discuss social differences. The fact that nowadays it 
is more often stressed, in post-modern approaches and in mainstream 
discourse that ‗race‘ is a construction and not a biological category might also 
partly explain why the conflation between ‗race‘ and ‗culture‘ is more easily 
made (Mohanty 1992). Byrne for example noticed in her interviews with white 
                                                 
29
 According to Malik (1996) the concept of the plural or multicultural society originated in 
colonial societies, as the idea of cultural differences served to justify the inequalities. While in 
the interwar time, the concept of the plural society was only applied to colonised places, after 
the Second World War it started being applied to Western societies and started to be 
incorporated in social and political discourse.  
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mothers in London that ‗colour‘, ‗culture‘ and ‗race‘ were often used 
interchangeably (Byrne 2006).  
 
The replacement of ‗race‘ by ‗culture‘ or ‗ethnicity‘ linked to the taboo on 
explicit expressions of ‗racial‘ assumptions has been called the shift from a 
―biological to a sociocultural idiom‖ (Duffield 2006:70) and the 
―culturalisation of difference‖ (Razack 2001:17). This shift leads to a new 
form of racism, ―culturalised racism‖ (Razack 2001:60), ―sociocultural 
racism‖ (Duffield 2006:71) or ―ethnicism‖ (Essed 1991:6), which targets both 
migrants and non-Western societies abroad (Malik 1996, Duffield 2006). 
Essed defines ―ethnicism‖ as an ―ideology that explicitly proclaims the 
existence of ‗multiethnic‘ equality but implicitly presupposes an ethnic or 
cultural hierarchical order‖ (Essed 1991:6). Razack (2001) goes one step 
further by arguing that the effect of the discourse about the tolerance of ethnic 
and cultural diversity in a multicultural society has the effect of denying 
(responsibility for) racism. Similarly, Malik states that the multicultural 
society, rather than representing a society of equals, is a society ―where 
equality has given way to the toleration of difference, and indeed of 
inequality‖ (Malik 1996:170, see also Füredi 1998:224).  
 
However, it is important to note, as Crewe and Harrison point out, when race 
is replaced by culture there is a particular understanding of culture at stake: 
―Culture is often reified as a collection of rituals and customs exhibited 
principally by the less evolved, at times to be celebrated and at other times to 
be overcome‖ (Crewe and Harrison 1998:25, see also Malik 1996 about the 
relation between race and ethnicity). This means that on the one hand culture 
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is homogenised, and on the other hand that culture is often only ascribed to 
some, and not to others; in Crewe and Harrison‘s words: ―‗they‘ have cultural 
barriers while ‗Westerners‘ are guided by modern rationality‖ (Crewe and 
Harrison 1998:133). Rather than understanding every practice to be embedded 
in ‗culture‘ and treating culture as changing and heterogeneous, practices are 
ascribed to one culture without differentiation.  
 
This can be recognised in the following reflections by Kim: “Because there is 
also a difference for the different groups, for example people from India they 
have a very strong community, they help each other a lot, I have the feeling 
they have a great sense for each other which in other cultures you cannot find 
it so easily. For example with Chinese people it is very difficult, I also don‟t 
know a lot about Chinese culture, it is very difficult because sometimes there 
are people coming from China and they are living several years here not 
speaking one word of German”.  
 
Kim makes sense of her experience with different groups of migrants by 
attributing the differences to culture. While she attempts to understand her 
encounters with different migrant groups, she resorts to generalised statements 
about how culture makes people function. At the same time, while she makes 
these statements, she claims not to know much about the cultures involved. 
Just like Crewe and Harrison stated, culture is seen as a barrier for 
communication, with language as an ideology rather than a means for 
communication, which needs to be overcome for the work to be successful. 
This idea of culture as a barrier to overcome is present in the account below. 
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Again, Kim emphasises that her ideas about different cultures are just her 
‗personal opinion‘ to stress the tentative nature of her assertions. On the other 
hand, the fact that these images of the different cultures are recognisable to a 
wider audience indicates that they are not so ‗personal‘ after all but rather 
circulate within different groups and institutions.  
 
Kim: “So it is impossible to talk with [the Chinese] at all without somebody 
translating so either they have to bring a friend or we have somebody to 
translate but it is very, very difficult. But still with some of them I have the 
feeling after 3 years I made it! Especially with 2 women from China, (…) one 
had a very big problem with her health, like she had to go to the gynaecologist 
(…) and imagine this without somebody translating and she would not even 
ask me for this, but she would bring the letter and [say] „what shall I do?‟. 
And she had already [had] an operation and it did not turn out well and it was 
very complicated so I arranged with someone to go with her to the doctor and 
translate there. And I think since then she has the feeling she can come and 
tell me things, because maybe she was not used to this is the culture (…) But I 
think this is a just personal opinion now, well, that the Chinese people do not 
connect so much, like the Indian people that if there was someone new coming 
telling „ok you need this paper, you need this paper and then you go there and 
get your appointment”.  
 
Since the contrast that is drawn here between Chinese and Indian people and 
their ability to build a community and find their way in the country of arrival, 
is explained mainly by reference to ‗culture‘, it negates differences in 
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(English) language skills. For Indians, English language skills are, due to the 
colonial history, also a cultural-historical attribute rather than only an 
educational or class attribute as is the case with the Chinese. The meaning of 
‗culture‘ shifts within Kim‘s narrative, held together under the umbrella of 
‗communication‘; in the first instance, Kim refers to the language problem of 
the Chinese women, then to the ‗cultural taboo‘ of talking about physical, 
sexual health issues (norms and values), and finally about culture as 
‗connecting‘ or being part of a (information) network (culture as 
embeddedness). Interestingly, while on the one hand, culture is presented as 
fixed and homogeneous, on the other hand in these reflections there seems to 
be some space for ‗negotiating‘ between different cultures.  
 
Veronica for example tells me that the migrant women she works with “know 
that Dutch people are not really touching each other so, while African women 
they touch each other all the time, but we discuss that, also in trainings, „how 
would you like to be, if you come in the training room, what would you like me 
to do, shall I give you a hand, what would you like me to do?”. The physical 
behaviour of people is presented as radically different in the different cultures, 
with the quite typical distinction between one specific Western country versus 
the whole African continent. On the other hand, following a more 
participatory approach, for Veronica it is possible to come to an agreement, 
almost to develop a new ‗culture‘ within the mixed group, where everyone 
will have to make some concessions.  
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The language of ‗culture‘, ‗indigenous‘, ‗local‘, ‗tradition‘ which has replaced 
explicit racial terms makes it more difficult to pinpoint to the racialisation of 
the discourse (Kothari 2006a). Kothari (2006a) argues that cultural differences 
have replaced biological explanations ―as the main reason why some people 
who had more power were more ‗developed‘ than others‖ (Kothari 2006a:11, 
see also Razack 2001:19). As Kothari observes this shift from race to culture 
had the additional effect that people could be ‗blamed‘ for being different as 
they chose to ‗stick to their culture‘, whereas when ‗race‘ was assumed to be a 
natural category, people were seen as helpless to be different  (see also 
Narayan 1997). If, in contrast to race, which was ‗natural‘ and based in 
biology, culture was learned it could be unlearned as well. ―The difference 
was that cultural change seemed open to the individual, but Africans who 
chose not to make the transition were seen as wilfully obstructionist rather 
than quaintly backward‖ (Cooper in Kothari 2006a:11). This is apparent in 
some aspects of Sonia‘s reflections on the relations with the women she seeks 
to assist. I ask her how she maintains a link with these women despite the 
geographical distance between them (she is located in the global North while 
the beneficiaries of her projects are generally located in the global South).  
 
Sonia: “So sometimes it is difficult, sometimes, I don‟t know, I think that you 
have to help them a lot, you have to really guide them, you have to be there for 
very silly things (…). But many times (…) I think that you really need to be 
there and reminding them of the things and being very, very pushy and then 
you get the results, but you have to be behind them”.   
Interviewer: “And why do you think that is”?      
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Sonia: “I don‟t know, I don‟t know. I think it maybe it‟s the way they are used 
to doing things”         
Interviewer: “Is there a moment that you think you would just give up; I don‟t 
want to push anymore, because they don‟t want to do it maybe?” 
Sonia: “No, it is not they don‟t want to do it, (…) it is just that sometimes they 
are used for people doing the things for them, so they don‟t take the 
responsibility they would rather have you doing the things”.  
 
Baaz identified that specifically in the context of NGOs who work towards 
empowering the Other in a partnership, there is a ―contradiction between the 
message of partnership and donor images that oppose a superior, active, 
innovative Self to an inferior, passive, unreliable ‗partner‘‖ (Baaz 2005:147). 
Sonia‘s organisation actually has a real commitment towards facilitating 
political representation rather than as an organisation representing the women 
they work with, which Sonia also repeatedly stresses. Hence on the one hand, 
she relies on an understanding of the women in the South as autonomous 
while at the same time when contentious situations arise, images of the Other 
as passive can creep up again.  
 
With my question above I attempted to suggest that the women might not have 
wanted to cooperate with her organisation so that rather than just being 
passive, they were actively resisting working with them. For Sonia however, 
this is not an option, ‗no, it is not they don‘t want to do it‘ and she asserts 
again that the explanation of their behaviour must lie in a culture difference. 
She does not interrogate how (images of) the attitude of passivity and reliance 
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on assistance from the North have originated. Baaz in her research also finds 
examples ―of how ‗resistance‘ –or advice not taken- is interpreted in terms of 
passivity‖ (Baaz 2005:76). Related to this notion of the passive Other is the 
image of the Other as dependent which features strongly here despite being 
caught in a paradox since the language of partnership suggests cooperation 
with an independent/autonomous being. I also asked Sonia what kind of ‗silly 
things‘ she has to help them with. She replied by giving an example about a 
group of women from Africa for whom she had to arrange visas and flights, 
who were supposed to come for a visit to the global North to represent 
themselves politically. As she had previous experience with visa problems, she 
had arranged all the relevant documents for them and had stressed numerous 
times to the women the importance of arranging the visa in time. Her story is 
worth quoting in some detail:  
 
Sonia: “So at the end of the day, I think they were supposed to travel on a 
Saturday, and Friday is a holiday there, so they don‟t work on Friday and 
Saturday. So on Thursday someone called me and said „Oh, but my visa is not 
ready, and I am like „what do you mean your visa is not ready?‟, „oh yes, I 
went there and they did not have it‟ and I am like „I have your ticket for 
Saturday‟, so I started calling all of them, none of them have a visa! I called 
the embassy and they [said] „they did not fill out their papers properly plus 
they show up late‟. And I was like, „people come on, I am trying to help you, 
please help me too‟! So I was with the embassy on the phone, they did not get 
it, I had to change all the tickets, so I felt like „ok, I am trying to help you, I am 
trying to get everything ready, I tell you in advance, I plan everything in 
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advance to make my life easier, you don‟t do your part, now I have to change 
everything‟, because I have to change all the tickets, all the hotels, move 
everything 2 days. (…) And so in that sense sometimes it is frustrating, it is 
like I am trying to help you and I am only asking you some silly thing to go to 
the embassy and get your visa and you don‟t do it”. 
 
This analysis does not seek to belittle the problems that arose because of the 
issue with the visas - the organisation lost a substantial amount of money as 
the flights and hotels had to be rearranged – however, it is more interesting 
here to look at the underlying assumptions of Sonia‘s reflection that she leaves 
unquestioned. The account above is even a stronger reflection of what Baaz 
describes in terms of the conflicting messages of partnership requiring an 
active equal partner and of aid with the colonial image of the passive Southern 
individual. None of the women Sonia worked with in the example above had 
her visa ready for the journey. Yet, Sonia situates the problem mostly with the 
women rather than exploring other reasons for this situation, this ―complex 
emergency‖ (Duffield 1994:44) to have arisen. She does not question whether 
the women were interested in travelling to this meeting in the first place or 
whether there were other reasons why arranging the visa might not have been 
the main priority at that point in their lives, even though the fact that the 
women come from a conflict ridden area could have prompted that question. 
She could have considered whether the difference in social location might 
have meant that the women had other responsibilities or caring duties that they 
could not leave behind.  
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The situation could have prompted Sonia to ask even larger questions about 
the way the relation between her and the women is embedded in colonial and 
racial structures. However, as Razack points out, the dominant understanding 
of culture understands culture as values, traditions, knowledge ―exist[ing] in a 
timeless and unchangeable vacuum outside of patriarchy, racism, imperialism 
and colonialism‖ (Razack 2001:58); presenting culture then as the reason for 
the developments in the project has the effect of forestalling thinking about the 
effects of imperialism, patriarchy and racism. In addition, Sonia does neither 
question her own role in the problems with the arrangement of the visa nor 
does she question whether the embassy might possibly be more responsive to 
her, calling from an important organisation in the North than to the women 
from the country. As Crewe and Harrison hold in relation to the development 
context: ―[T]he notion of ‗cultural barriers‘ [does not only] simplif[y] 
complexity [but] also serves to situate the ‗failure‘ of their technology within 
rural communities‖ (Crewe and Harrison 1998:146). They insist on the 
complexity of ‗failure‘ and the fact that failure has different meanings for 
different people depending on the context and their notion of success (Crewe 
and Harrison 1998).  
 
Later in the interview when she reflects Sonia says that she has learned to 
book more flexible tickets and that “next time I will phone them every single 
day and that‟s it”. However, while that indicates a willingness to admit that 
she can improve her performance, it still relies on an assumption of 
inadequacy not on her, but on the other side. This is also reflected in her 
response when I ask her whether she was still feeling disappointed or angry 
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when the women finally came. She replied: “No, but I think my little revenge 
was not to give them a single second for free, I had them working all the 
time”. The idea of revenge denotes that the women had failed her, not that she 
had failed them possibly and also signals again the power relation where she 
can ‗make them work‘ despite for example being their junior, not having been 
to their country etc. Sonia‘s description displays a number of stereotypes 
resonating with colonial images. Firstly, the narrative entails a presentation of 
the NGO worker as rational and organised versus the Southern chaos and 
irrationality. Linked to that image, there are recurrent assumptions about lack 
of proper time keeping (see also Baaz 2005), ‗they did not fill out their papers 
properly plus they show up late‘, with Western methods of time keeping and 
punctuality as the ultimate measure; the lack of time keeping is also often 
interpreted as lack of commitment (see also Essed 1991 on Dutch views on 
Surinamese culture in the context of time keeping). It is interesting to note that 
the stereotype of the lack of time keeping coexists with the image of the 
reliable women who guarantee a timely repayment of micro credit, discussed 
in Chapter Four. 
 
For Veronica who works directly with migrant women in her own home 
country, time is also an important issue. The context in which she mentions 
time is slightly different as it comes out of a reflection on how her values and 
prejudices impact on her work, so she situates ‗time‘ not as an objective 
measure but as a culturally subjective value. At the same time, possibly 
paradoxically, she insists on the women ‗learning‘ time keeping, so placing 
her values of time keeping as superior. Veronica: “I think you always have 
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something with your own prejudice and your own norms and your values with 
you at work because sometimes I don‟t understand why they are doing what 
they are doing. So I think of course I will bring them also into my work, I hope 
to think I won‟t, but I think I do, yeah, I think I do. I really hate, I really, really 
hate it that they are late, really, I hate it, and I always tell them, I always 
reprimand them if they are late and sometimes I find that, I think to myself, I 
am not their mother, they have to learn themselves but yeah, that is really 
what I find very important, so I tell them all the time”. So while Veronica 
mentions time keeping as a subjective value, her comment that they are always 
late implies again an understanding of time and lateness as a neutral and 
impartial value.  
 
Secondly, Sonia presents the women as dependent, immature, possibly even 
child like in their failure to do even the most ‗silly things‘. Veronica clearly 
attempts to consciously resist the idea of the women as ‗children‘ by telling 
herself ‗I am not their mother‘. In addition, she is aware that her view is part 
of her own prejudices and norms, which she makes explicit here. At the same 
time, the fact that the image of the mother appears to her is still suggestive of 
the strength of the discursive colonial representation of the colonised as 
childlike (Noxolo 2000). Both Sonia‘s and Veronica‘s accounts show that the 
partnership discourse complicates this image as there needs to be space for 
‗the child to mature and grow up him/herself‘, as Sonia describes “as I said 
they are always expecting people to do their things. But there comes a time 
when they have to do the things themselves, I cannot take the plane to go all 
the way there to take the passport to the [embassy]”.  
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As Koster (2008a) observed in the context of a national organisation working 
with female migrants, staff of the organisation might present themselves as a 
representatives of a homogenous set of national cultural values, which have to 
be conferred to the migrant. The result of taking this position is that staff are 
cast in the role of the teacher and the migrant in the role of the student 
reinforcing power differences. This tendency is indeed noticeable in 
Veronica‘s narrative and surfaced as well in the interviews with some other 
women working for national organisations with female migrants.  
 
Sonia‘s repeated invocation of the notion of ‗helping‘ is not only rare in its 
explicitness of using the word ‗helping‘, but also interesting in its ambivalent 
use. The way Sonia expresses ‗helping‘ denotes both her merely assisting with 
the process of arranging things and the larger project of ‗helping the women 
from Africa‘. When she says “I am trying to help you, please help me too”, on 
the one hand this could be understood as a reciprocal relation in which if you 
give someone help you also expect help back in other situations. On the other 
hand, the circumstances of their relation and the way Sonia understands that 
relation make it clear, that the ‗helping‘ is not reciprocal; rather there is an 
assumption that the women should be grateful with Sonia‘s support and aid 
and hence can be expected to deliver on her terms. As Kothari suggests, ‗race‘ 
in the development discourse functions to imply who is developed and who is 
underdeveloped and hence who is in the position to help and who should 
receive this help with gratitude (2006a). The women are cast as helpless and 
hopeless, reinforcing Sonia‘s role of responsibility. 
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Self versus Other 
The complexity of mechanisms of identification with the Other (because of a 
shared identity as women or as human beings) and at the same time distance 
and differentiation from the Other (with religion, race, culture as a barrier) 
makes it imperative not to reduce the analysis of the Self-Other relation to a 
simple interpretation. Rather as Bhabha repeatedly points out in his analysis of 
colonisation the coloniser has an ambivalent relation with the colonised, one 
characterised by ―conflict of pleasure/unpleasure, mastery/defence, 
knowledge/disavowal, absence/presence‖ (Bhabha 2005:107). The Other is the 
object both of ―desire and derision‖ (Bhabha 2005:96).  
 
For Sonia the Other as the culturally radically different is both exciting and 
frustrating, as she describes here in one breath: “I think that the cultural 
differences are sometimes very challenging and sometimes in a way very 
rewarding to be able to discover them. I think that I am very lucky that I am 
able to see many things that a lot of people don‟t, that just always live in the 
same place. So sometimes it is difficult, sometimes, I don‟t know, I think that 
you have to help them a lot, you have to really guide them, you have to be 
there for very silly things…”.   
 
And similarly: “I find it challenging [to relate to other people from different 
cultures], because I am talking to them and let‟s say I have all my culture that 
they don‟t know, particularly when I say I am from Argentina, it is like 
„where?‟, …what? So I know I have a lot of things inside me that they don‟t 
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know and that they probably would not understand and at the same time they 
have the same thing, they have their culture that comprises a lot of things I 
might not know and not understand, but we can still talk to each other and do 
something together, I think that is great. I am sorry I am going to be your most 
naïve person, but I think that is great”.  
 
It is interesting in this account that, for Sonia, culture is also central to her own 
understanding of Self, which is in contrast to Crewe and Harrison‘s (1998) 
previously quoted claim that culture is often only ascribed to the Other and not 
to the Self. In this latter narrative, there is no obvious hierarchy of cultures 
present anymore but rather a celebration of multiculturalism. A potential 
danger of this particular understanding of cultural diversity is that cultures are 
still seen as stable ‗possessions‘. To learn about cultures is ―not to create a 
more rich and universal culture, but to imprison us more effectively in a 
human zoo of differences‖ (Malik 1996:150). 
 
Spivak and Suleri take Bhabha‘s idea of the Other as an object of desire a step 
further by drawing attention to what Spivak calls ‗reverse racism‘ or ‗reverse 
ethnocentrism‘ (see Spivak in Keenan 2002), the uncritical celebration of the 
subaltern,  ―elevating the racially female voice into a metaphor of the good‖ 
(Suleri 1992:759). Strikingly, Suleri specifically refers tot the female voice 
begging the question about whether reverse racism operates only when 
femininity intersects with race. Naomi encountered such ‗reverse racism‘ in 
her work: “When I came as intern (…) my colleague [intern] was from 
Uganda and so very often we did things together and I was really struck by, I 
don‟t know what you would label it as, maybe it is a little bit of racism, maybe 
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there is a little bit of interest in the „exotic‟ which you know is a bit racist. But 
you know we would go somewhere, (…) and somebody was interested in my 
African friend, because she was really different, I mean I am sure if I would 
have come there (…) by myself, you know, people would have been interested 
in exploring the difference between Germany and Canada, but it is not nearly 
that different as someone who is coming from Uganda, you know what I mean, 
and it was not the only time that that happened. But I was really struck by that 
and found it very interesting”.  
 
Bhabha‘s understanding of colonial stereotypes underlines the complexity of 
the stereotype, stressing that it is not a mere one-dimensional image of 
somebody/something. He emphasises the ambivalence and instability of the 
colonial discourse and states that precisely because of this ambivalence the 
stereotype is ‗needed‘ to reaffirm a certain image, to fix the Other who escapes 
easy classification (Bhabha 2005). Moreover, closer analysis shows that 
stereotypes themselves contradict each other and crush the unified image of 
the Other, as for example with the stereotype of the black man as being 
aggressive and sexually active and promiscuous existing alongside the image 
of the black man‘s passiveness and servitude (Bhabha 2005). According to 
Bhabha,  
 
―[i]t is the force of ambivalence that gives the colonial stereotype its currency, 
ensures its repeatability in changing historical and discursive conjunctures; 
(…) produces that effect of probabilistic truth and predictability which, for the 
stereotype, must always be in excess of what can be empirically proven or 
logically constructed‖ (Bhabha 2005:95).  
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He continues arguing that more work is still to be done to trace the way 
ambivalence functions as a strategy of discrimination (Bhabha 2005). The 
accounts above highlight elements of that ambivalence, e.g. the women as 
partners and as ‗children‘. This was linked to the ambivalent understanding of 
‗helping‘ as both reciprocal and as one-way aid. I have attempted to follow 
Bhabha‘s suggestion that the critical analysis should move from merely 
identifying stereotypes as positive or negative ―to an understanding of 
processes of subjectification made possible (and plausible) through 
stereotypical discourse‖ (Bhabha 2005:95).  
 
One extremely powerful example of Bhabha‘s ambivalence of the stereotype 
can be traced in how Vita discusses the veil or headscarf when she reflects on 
her work with migrant women in her own country. While I did not necessarily 
steer the interview towards a discussion about the headscarf nor discussed the 
headscarf in any detail with other interviewees, the ‗scarf‘ keeps reappearing 
in her reflections. The first time the ‗veil‘ appears in the interview is when 
Vita expresses her strong disapproval of a political campaign by an extreme 
right wing party in her country that uses an image of a female judge in an all-
encompassing burka as a way to generate anti-Islam sentiments. Vita displays 
similar awareness of the topicality of the head scarf when she tells me that 
there are journalists who come to her organisation and ask her “can you find 
[me] someone with a scarf [to interview]?”.   
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The scarf surfaces again when Vita describes a woman who she helped 
through her organisation: “She has a scarf and she is a Muslim and I don‟t 
know, I can see it when they have a scarf, otherwise I hardly ask, unless it is 
important and she tells me: „in our culture, Vita‟, -[we] are talking about [the 
fact that] she has children and she is divorced and this husband he sees the 
children and he helps her- and it appears that in their culture, they are not 
allowed at all to see their ex-husband. And I am thinking „Jesus!‟, it is 180 
degrees different from what our legislation is trying and what is common in 
Denmark; the more the parents meet and are together with the children, the 
better. And she wants it because she can see it is good for the children. [But] 
her parents, her family, their friends they don‟t want it and they could even go 
in a fight about it, and I am thinking „what is she going to do?‟”.  
 
While on the one hand, Vita stresses that she is not necessarily interested in 
the religion of the women she supports, she does not only notice ‗the scarf‘ but 
also immediately uses it as the main descriptive category of the woman. Later 
in the interview it is used in a similar descriptive way as one of the main 
identity markers about someone else: “She wears a scarf and she is divorced 
and her husband wants her to come back not to live I don‟t think, but to 
marry”. Through the image of the ‗woman with the scarf‘, a story with a clear 
‗us‘ (the host community) and ‗them‘ (‗her culture‘) is constructed with the 
‗woman with the scarf‘ caught in the middle. The same ambiguity of 
professing disinterest in the headscarf while at the same time showing its 
importance through her repeated mentioning reappears when I ask her how she 
would define ‗success‘ in her work. “I would define it when the women get on 
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with their lives when they stand on their own two feet, maybe they don‟t take 
off their scarf tomorrow, I don‟t really care, I must say, I hardly ever discuss it 
with them”.  
 
The final manifestation of ‗the scarf‘ appears in Vita‘s narrative of a migrant 
woman engaged with her organisation about whom Vita is worried: “Because 
I keep thinking where she is and how they are. And then she came and her 
scarf became more and more dark and sort of really black”. When the woman 
appeared at the centre the next time “she came and she was dark and we were 
talking and talking and we had a nice sort of… she was fragile and I said to 
her „could I ask you something, you had this very nice blue scarf on when you 
first came and now you are so black?‟. And she says „in our culture, when 
people die we dress in black‟ and there had just been bombs in her home 
country. And what we see as extreme is culture and I came to think of my 
friend when she lost her girlfriend, she shaved all her head and she dressed 
black (…) and I got so much more wise, because that is what they do and I can 
understand that instead of thinking „aaah‟. And when the women ask me and 
we talk about [the head scarf], I say „it will offend many people, [but] it is a 
choice‟”.  
 
The scarf in Vita‘s reflections and stories is both a symbol of the political and 
media obsession with Islam, possibly as a threat to Western values or perhaps 
to feminist values, as in the right-wing political campaign, which featured the 
fully veiled judge. For Vita, as a response to that, it is important for her self-
identity as a tolerant liberal woman as opposed to the political parties and the 
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media to consider the scarf ‗unimportant‘. Yet as a symbol of her tolerance it 
becomes immensely important and hence resurfaces every time again in her 
descriptions. In Vita‘s narrative the headscarf often symbolises difference and 
otherness, while at another moment she can incorporate it again in a discourse 
of similarity through the image of her mourning friend who shaved her head. 
The scarf emerges as a symbol for perceived oppression, while at the same 
time it is a sign of political agency, ‗a choice‘, even with the power to 
‗offend‘.  According to Bhabha:  
 
―Stereotyping is not the setting up of a false image which becomes the 
scapegoat of discriminatory practices. It is a much more ambivalent text of 
projection and introjections, metaphoric and metonymic strategies, 
displacement, overdetermination, guilt, aggressivity; the masking and splitting 
of ‗official‘ and phantasmatic knowledges to construct the positionalities and 
oppositionalities of racist discourse‖ (Bhabha 2005:117).  
 
In Cook‘s study of Western Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) volunteers in 
Gilgat, Pakistan, clothing plays also a central role for the Western volunteers 
in situating themselves in relation to the women in Pakistan (Cook 2005). 
Dwyer similarly recognises the importance attributed to the veil as an 
―overdetermined marker of identity‖ and insists in her study of young British 
Muslim women on the diversity of motivations to wear the veil and on the 
―historical dynamism‖ of the meaning of the veil (Dwyer 1999:6-7). The veil 
has been a contentious issue for feminists both in the global South and in the 
global North and there is no consensus around its interpretation even among 
those whose arguments follow a similar line. In her famous essay ‗Under 
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Western Eyes‟, Mohanty (1984) criticises simplistic readings of veiling as 
oppressive and calls for a contextualised and subtle understanding of the 
different meanings of the gesture of veiling as a politically more productive 
strategy. While Razack (2001) makes the same point about the homogenising 
and essentialist features of the critique of the veil, she does explicitly stress her 
viewpoint that the practice of veiling is definitely oppressing women. In her 
view it is more important to stress the function of the veil as a ―marker of 
difference‖ which designates African and Asian women ―as bodies to be saved 
by benevolent and more civilised Europeans‖ (Razack 2001:6-7).  
 
The above examples have already provided a glimpse of how constructions of 
the Other are very closely connected to constructions of the Self (see also 
Baaz 2005). Sonia‘s depiction of the women in Africa as disorganised, chaotic 
and unreliable is dependent on her own portrayal as organised and consistent 
and vice versa. As will be discussed now, Elisa‘s story has some similar 
underlying assumptions. In addition, building on the earlier discussion of the 
use of (a homogeneous and essentialist account of) culture to ―render 
intelligible everything that otherwise remains puzzling (…) while preserving 
their foreignness‖ (Narayan 1997:103-104), it will be argued that culture is 
specifically often invoked in relation to women in the South. One of the main 
paradigms in the relation between feminists of the North and the South is the 
women as ―victims of culture model‖ (Lazreg 2000:7).  
 
After the Tsunami happened, Elisa discovered some statistical evidence that 
stated that the death toll of the Tsunami was proportionally much higher for 
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women than for men (see for example Oxfam briefing note March 2005). 
Subsequently, after a sleepless night over this discovery, she liaised with 
Indian NGOs on the ground and decided to visit the affected area to find out 
the reasons for the number of women casualties. Elisa: “What we found on the 
ground in the South Indian region, that the women, nobody had a chance in 
the tidal waves, because of the status of women in society, which is defined as 
being immobile, not very active, (…) the whole relation to the body is such 
that they would never go out of their way and run like mad or whatever, you 
see. They would never undress, even in the situation of danger, they were just 
swept away even if they would have the chance, you know but in the sari they 
could not move. The men were climbing on the trees, they would not, they 
were just frozen in time, it was incredible, incredible, so many women 
drowned. And then we thought we had to do something, that something was 
that we came up with [a] swimming  (...) project (…) and this was in time with 
a new development, a new stage of the organisation, we felt we have to leave 
mainstream, we have to look into areas that are constantly overlooked and 
pose the questions in those corners where others don‟t even go into, because 
they are kind of messy and untidy”.  
 
While the explanation in this narrative can sound initially quite seductive, at 
least to me when I first heard it, it is important to take a closer look at the way 
the problem and the intervention of Elisa‘s organisation are framed. When 
Crewe and Harrison (1998:43) write about the persistency of the idea in the 
development industry that traditions ―hold[…] people back‖, their statement 
gets an almost literal meaning in Elisa‘s description of the Indian women as 
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being immobile in the face of the floods due to the requirements of their 
tradition. In Elisa‘s story, all Indian women, or at least all South Indian 
women are immobile and inactive and have an uneasy relation with their body 
that requires them to ‗never go out of their way‘ and ‗never undress‘. When 
Elisa continues to describe ‗they would not, they were just frozen in time, it 
was incredible, incredible, so many women drowned‘, her explanation almost 
sounds as the account of an eye witness in its vividness despite the fact that 
Elisa has not been there at the time and obviously has not been able to speak 
with the women casualties. Elisa describes the women as both constrained by 
the role imposed on them by society and quite literally by their clothes, ‗in the 
sari they could not move‘. Her description however also turns the women into 
passive victims, as there is no account of struggle or resistance, not in the 
particular situation of the floods nor to the more general perceived oppression 
within society. Quite clearly, there is an underlying assumption that women in 
the West are mobile as opposed to the immobile women of India; both in the 
sense that there is an assumption that Western women would have managed to 
escape the floods and in terms of the Western pro-active women flying to 
India, discovering the cause of the high death toll, setting up a project for their 
immobile Indian female beneficiaries.  
 
Pigg, writing in the context of development work, argues that the important 
step by anthropologists
30
 to take ‗culture‘ into consideration in development 
                                                 
30
 As Malik points out, anthropology has an ambiguous relation to race. One of the key figures 
in the history of anthropology, Franz Boaz for example on the one hand undermined scientific 
biological racism with his cultural explanations for human differences, while on the other hand 
reasserting the differences, ―rearticulat[ing] the themes of racial theory in a different guise‖ 
(Malik 1996:151). Similarly, he argues that the other major figure in anthropology, Lévi 
Strauss, stressed the significance of cultural difference over racial difference, but at the same 
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policies to counteract policies that treated local communities as ―empty 
vessels‖, has resulted in the implementation of very simplified notions of 
culture in development thinking, which does not take account of variety within 
groups, and sees culture as fixed and outside context, time and space (Pigg 
1997:263-264). In the specific context of gender analysis, a similar mechanism 
can be identified; while culture was introduced into gender analysis to resist 
gender essentialism, the result has often been cultural essentialism with an 
implied hierarchy of civilised versus uncivilised (Kapur 2005).   
 
An additional problem of an analysis that exaggerates the explanatory value of 
‗culture‘ is that not sufficient attention is paid to additional factors, such as the 
damaging effects of some forms of modernisation (Narayan 1997). The Oxfam 
report and other newspaper articles that refer to the report do suggest as one of 
the reasons for the high number of female deaths the fact that they could not 
swim well or could not climb in the trees (see for example Oxfam briefing 
note 2005). It is unclear what the relation is between Elisa‘s organisation and 
Oxfam, which raises questions about the relation between her organisation‘s 
research and theirs and the ‗uniqueness‘ of her findings.  
 
What is more important however, is that a number of other reasons are 
mentioned in the sources, which move away from using ‗culture‘ as the sole 
explanatory tool. For example, women were at the beach waiting for their 
husbands who were on sea fishing as the women also play a major part in the 
fishing industry (on sea the violence of the Tsunami was less strong than at the 
                                                                                                                                 
time regards cultural differences in a such a rigid, static way that it collapses back into racial 
theories (Malik 1996).  
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beach) or that the women were bathing in the sea or at home with their 
children as it was a weekend day (see Oxfam briefing note 2005, BBC News 
Asia-Pacific March 2005, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and 
Development 2005). It also remains questionable if knowing how to swim 
would be enough if one lacks the muscle strength to swim against a Tsunami 
and whether women and children in the West would have survived such 
disaster. In addition, one could question whether in cases of similar disasters 
in Western countries, culture is similarly introduced as the explanatory 
concept (do women there also suffer ―death by culture‖?) (Narayan 1997:84).  
 
It is important to stress that other research participants were more conscious of 
the differentiated nature of ‗culture‘. Sometimes this became clear through the 
absence of ‗cultural explanations‘ for complex encounters in the interview 
narratives. In the interview with Gill, she more explicitly addresses how her 
visit to Uganda opened her eyes to the diversity within ‗a culture‘. She 
differentiates culture, across Africa, between towns and cities, and between 
people positioned differently in society: “When I went to Uganda they were 
like „yeah, there is some conflict in Uganda‟. So you are wondering (I was 
going to the capital) „will I experience something, will it be unsafe, what will 
happen there?‟, You come there and then you see that what is happening in 
that part of the region is really not impacting on anything in the capital. And 
also throughout my contacts, maybe people don‟t have that much experience, 
they think Africa, they don‟t think that in Uganda there is a difference from 
Kenya, and also culturally there is some difference and economically, and 
also in Uganda you then have the capital and you have the smaller towns and 
then you have the villages and then you have people in the societies that are 
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really being discriminated and some that are [better educated], that have 
more access to resources, you see all these differentiations”. 
 
Another interesting element in relation to Elisa‘s story about their Tsunami 
intervention is why certain issues ‗cross‘ national borders and receive the 
attention of Western media and what the agenda is behind the difference in 
visibility between different disasters or practices (Narayan 1997). Stacey 
seems to be aware of this discourse which fetishises malpractices against 
women in the global South when she, in another context says: “you turn on 
the news and you see that little girls are being buried and that women are 
hacked up by their partners and burned and thrown away no matter in what 
country”. Had Stacey followed the mainstream discourse you would have 
expected her sentence to finish with ‗in Africa‘ or in the global South. 
However, she makes the important point of adding, ‗no matter in what 
country‘ and thereby shows a more critical engagement with cultural 
explanations.  
 
Lastly, it is important to investigate the role of Elisa‘s organisation as the one 
who ‗discovers‘ the reasons for the number of fatalities and as the one who set 
up a project to ‗fix‘ the problem with a swimming project that had both a 
practical side in terms of providing swimming lessons and an advocacy side. 
The story about the women in India who died in the Tsunami very quickly 
turns into a story about the development of the Western organisation. Elisa 
presents her organisation‘s intervention as exceptional, as going away from 
the mainstream through asking about otherwise unaddressed areas. It should 
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be stressed that it is very important that her organisation specifically addresses 
the gender dimension of the Tsunami disaster and indeed the immediate relief 
work has the tendency to overlook the specific needs of women as a 
vulnerable group (see report Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and 
Development 2005). In addition as Crewe and Harrison (1998) hold one area 
in which development organisations often chose not to interfere with ‗culture‘ 
as they understand it, is in the area of traditions concerning gender relations. 
However, was Elisa‘s organisation the only one who asked questions about the 
high number of female victims of the Tsunami and were they indeed the only 
one to find this answer, if it is the only answer? It is contentious to reconcile 
the assertion that these are the messy and untidy corners no other organisation 
wants to engage with, with the fact that within one visit to the field the 
solution to the riddle of the high number of women casualties was solved by 
this Western organisation. Hence, this is not merely an issue about whether 
Elisa‘s organisation was necessary or justified but also about the centrality of 
Western knowledge production as a post-colonial phenomenon. Pauline 
stresses her awareness of this when she says: “There is still a number of areas 
in the world where you walk in and you are the white woman or the white 
man, and you are here to impart knowledge”.  
 
In the discussion of this narrative, I do not wish to downplay the importance of 
incorporating culture into understandings of development aid, to insist on a 
gender analysis, or to deny the potentially empowering aspect to learning to 
swim; however, I concur with Narayan who insists that the ―good intentions‖ 
of Western feminists need to be complemented ―by care and attentiveness to 
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avoiding the ‗colonialist stance‘‖ when analysing patriarchy in other countries 
(Narayan 1997:60). Bhavnani and Coulson (2003:83) have for example 
suggested the ‗Women, culture and development‘ (WCD) framework 
(following the WID, WAD and GAD approaches) in which they propose to 
take cultural differences in account while combining a structural and 
local/particular analysis in order to avoid ―seeing women as in need to rescue 
from their culture‖ and without agency.  
 
Kate for example stresses the agency of women in relation to work in 
sweatshops: “There is a clear position from most of the women working in this 
way in India, in Bangladesh in export processing zones, they want to work in 
there, they want that bit of cash which gives them more economic 
independence”. Hence, while the garment industry is equally embedded in 
cultural expectations about racial and gender roles, with Asian women being 
seen as docile, disciplined workers, with ―nimble fingers‖ (Harcourt 
2009:734) Kate explores multiple angles of intervention instead of only 
focussing on culture: “perhaps in opening up that situation, not trying to find 
one response but support wherever you can for them to be empowered, be 
stronger, legal, political, economic, trade-unions, employment conditions. Or 
from the other side you can start from here on conditions for investment, 
obligations for investors in-country to respect any kind of standard, you can 
work on the legal system with human rights”. 
 
Cook observed in her ethnographic case study on Western development 
workers in Gilgit, Pakistan, that the female research participants, when asked 
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to describe themselves, characterised themselves as free and autonomous in 
opposition to the oppressed local women (Cook 2006). While in Elisa‘s 
account the contrast between the mobile Western women and the immobile 
Indian women was more implicit though clearly present, in Grace‘s reflections 
this juxtaposition is made more explicitly. Grace speaks here of her 
experiences with a group of migrant women from Somalia.  
 
Grace: “Their opportunities for studying English are very limited because the 
culture dictates that the man takes priority and the woman‟s job is to stay at 
home with the children and I find it quite hard actually, because, it is 
something that I find quite difficult to take onboard, because it is so different 
to the European culture, isn‟t it, where I have my right to go out and have my 
own job (…). And to understand these women‟s acceptance of the role 
imposed, I would say imposed, they would see it as normal, I see it as a role 
imposed on them and they are far more difficult people to get to know, partly 
because of the lack of English and partly because they are not encouraged to 
integrate with the English community”.  
 
Grace contrasts the culture of Somalia with the ‗European culture‘ and at the 
same time also directly transfers this to herself versus them, ‗where I have my 
right to go out and have my own job‘. She includes me as the interviewer in 
the ‗us‘ by seeking confirmation for her statement in the ‗isn‘t it?‘ making me 
complicit with this discourse. The women Grace describes are quite literally 
made ‗speechless‘ and passive through the language barrier. At the same time 
she leaves little room for the possibility of resistance on the side of the 
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women, by asserting that the women ‗accept‘ their role in the household and 
that ‗they see it as normal‘. By contrasting her understanding of the role of the 
women as ‗imposed‘ with the assumed ‗acceptance‘ from the side of the 
women involved, the gap between ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ is widened further; it is not 
only that the lives of women there and here are radically different, it is even 
that their desires in life are constructed as radically different. Due to her 
recourse to a cultural understanding of difference, Grace fails to see 
connections with mothers who stay at home in Western cultures, like the so-
called ‗yummy-mummies‘ whose choice to stay at home is perceived and 
discussed very differently. In addition, the cultural explanation leaves little 
room for alternative explanations such as the costs of professional childcare or 
the lack of social networks providing informal childcare.  
 
According to Mohanty, feminist discourse exercises power through this 
homogenisation of the diverse group of women in the Third World. Mohanty 
here identifies the very significant theme of Other as the reverse image of the 
Self, the dependence on an image of otherness as ‗oppressed‘ in order for the 
self to be ‗liberated‘. Mohanty speaks about a Western feminist self-
presentation and a Western feminist re-presentation of Third World women:   
 
―Universal images of ‗the third world woman‘ (the veiled woman, chaste 
virgin, etc.), images constructed from adding the ‗third world difference‘ to 
‗sexual difference‘ are predicated upon (…) assumptions about Western 
women as secular, liberated, and having control over their own lives. This is 
not to suggest that Western women are secular liberated and have control over 
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their own lives. I am referring to discursive self-presentation, not necessarily 
material reality‖ (Mohanty 1984:335, see also Ghandi 1998, Lazreg 2000).  
 
I was interested to hear whether Grace had ever expressed her concerns about 
the women she worked with to the women themselves. She replied that as the 
language barrier restricted the conversation, she had never talked to the 
women about ‗their role‘. When I asked her whether she ever met their 
husbands, she told me that as they brought the women to the group, ‗deposit 
them‘, she had met them and that they were more proficient in the language of 
the host country.  
 
Grace: “I don‟t feel that I could question the blokes as to why they take this 
attitude, because I think they would perceive it as intrusive and possibly racist 
because you are questioning their traditions and their standards and their 
code of practice and their faith almost. So I find that quite tricky, it is one that 
I never worked out how to handle. I don‟t know, I don‟t know how you do it, 
because you want to say „for goodness sake, you are living in England now, if 
your wife is got to have a life here, she has got to learn English for the sake of 
your children, (…) And it must be very isolating for these mothers if the kids 
speak English and they do not know what the kids are talking about”.  
She continues: “Before challenging it, before talking to the men, to their 
husbands, their fathers, I would need to know a lot more about the culture, 
about the background and about the particular area they came from. It is not 
an area I know enough about to challenge, you have to be careful, haven‟t 
you, that you don‟t offend people by challenging in a situation that you don‟t 
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know enough about because you can say the wrong thing out of ignorance 
almost”. 
 
Culture here is presented as something that is mysterious at first but ultimately 
‗knowable‘; similar to Vita‘s sudden understanding of the ‗blackness of the 
scarf‘ as a sign of mourning and Elisa‘s realisation that ‗culture‘ played a role 
in the high number of women that died in the Tsunami. Spivak challenges this 
notion of culture as knowable: ―In the meantime I remain a consensus breaker 
among metropolitan activists, who feel they can know everything in a non-
vague way if only they have enough information‖ (Spivak 2003b:204-205). 
Grace‘s assumption that her intervention could possibly be understood as 
racist very clearly shows the conflation of ‗race‘ with culture and religion as 
discussed before.  
 
It is striking to see how the Somali women concerned have not only become 
‗speechless‘ in the sense that they are excluded from the discussion as they 
could not communicate in the language of the host country, but that they also 
have disappeared completely but as mothers and as wives. Grace expresses 
how she would want to tell the husbands that the women should have a life 
and learn the language ‗for the sake of the children‘. At the same time she is 
concerned about the isolating effect the lack of language skills will have on 
the women, but even that isolation is passive, by virtue of the children learning 
the new language and thereby excluding the mothers. Grace defends her 
choice not to intervene and talk to the husbands by reference to a hesitation to 
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‗offend‘ the men, specifically in the context of not knowing enough about ‗the 
culture‘.  
 
Underlying Grace‘s story there is a juxtaposition of assumed options; either 
confronting the husbands and possibly offending them versus leaving the 
women in their ‗imposed role‘. However, her choice for non-interference 
seems hard to explain merely by reference to a fear to offend. For Bhabha, 
―[liberal democracy] is a recognition of cultural diversity within the 
conventional totalising, knowing frame of Western rationality. It is not an 
appreciation of serious cultural difference”. The latter, he argues, is a matter 
of living with the ―insurmountable ambivalence which accompanies the 
question of ‗knowing‘ other cultures within the framework of still-dominant 
host culture‖ (Bhabha quoted and summarised in: McLennan 2003:76). Hence 
there is a tension between the multicultural celebration of difference at the 
level of the symbolic versus the understanding of socio-cultural substantial 
differences. Spivak, in the context of the initial response by the British 
colonisers to the phenomenon of ‗sati‘ (widow burning) in India, speaks of an 
―interested use of cultural relativism‖ (Spivak 1999:297). Grace uses a form of 
cultural relativism to justify her non-intervention (see Ahmed 2000b:166) 
while at the same time she does not, as Bhabha suggests ‗appreciate serious 
cultural difference‘.  
 
Vita works with migrant women directly by providing a meeting and 
information space. She would like the migrant women who come to the space 
that the organisation provides, to be members of the organisation as, according 
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to her, is usual in her country. Her account displays similar tensions between 
respecting different circumstances and scepticism about these same 
circumstances, which are measured according to universal Western standards.  
 
Vita: “But I have not been strict enough about [requiring membership] and I 
don‟t want to scare the foreign women from coming. I think they are, I see so 
many similarities for women, half a generation older than mine, for me too, 
but I am sort of in the next generation, but for many years [they] have had 
little money, it goes to the children, the husband, the house, the family and 
then the women. So when they have to sort of say „I need to pay this‟, maybe 
they would themselves think, „no‟ or maybe the family would say „what is that 
about?‟. Now there are 2 women being married to men from Denmark happily 
coming here [and] after years I say „should you not be a member?‟, „my 
husband does not think so‟ and it is men from Denmark [whispers]…Jesus, 
Jesus!”. 
 
Implicit in this account is a notion that the women are in a ‗backward‘ position 
as they are being compared to Vita (who is middle-aged) and to women half a 
generation older in the host community. At the same time, Vita recognises that 
the position of the women, which prevents them from paying the membership 
contribution (their needs being served last, after those of the husband and 
children) is actually common among those migrant women with husbands 
from the host community, so from Vita‘s own country. Her initial assumption 
that the men from the host community should be more emancipated is severely 
challenged by this instance, which she expresses in her silent cursing.  
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Kate on the other hand, problematises the fact that Islam or other cultures are 
often seen as the site of oppression using a gender perspective: “What is 
interesting is that for example (…) there are two things, the one is that 
Islamophobia is basically identified as „they oppress women‟, whereas 
Islamist extremists would say the same thing „they are exploiting women in the 
West, sexual exploitation‟, so both would use the gender identity to challenge 
the other”. At another point she similarly challenges the ‗us versus them‘ 
divide: “More people will lose out in globalisation, increasingly in our 
prosperous societies (…) and in the South you might have more rich people as 
well. So this clear divide is [reduced] and I think from the gender 
[perspective], it could be an advantage, because you understand it is not them 
and us, [but] that [it] keeps changing”.  
 
This is a significant comment as it stresses again that it would be a mistake to 
believe that the North and the South are homogeneous categories without 
differences and inequalities within these areas. The fact that around half of the 
NGO workers I interviewed were active within their own countries (not 
abroad) and supported women from the global South with a migration 
background underlines this point as well. It is important to note that while my 
research concentrates on those women NGO workers that are located in the 
global North and the relative privilege they are endowed with through their 
roles and their locations, it should not be assumed that all the interviewees 
were born or their parents born in those countries that are associated with the 
prosperous West. Hence, the relationship between those research participants 
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with a migrant background with the women they supported follows more 
complex patterns of simultaneous identification and differentiation. I now 
want to turn to the intersubjective element of the intersectionality of social 
divisions, or, in other words, to the way identities are understood within 
relationships and through relationships.  
 
Kim, who has an migrant background herself and now works with migrants, 
notices: “There are so many paths, sequences of integration, that I see there 
are people that really assimilate to the point that people that stay like they are 
in their culture and try to survive somehow with this and [then] something in 
the middle”. When I subsequently ask her whether the fact that she and her 
family made a choice for a certain model of integration has consequences for 
who she identifies with more in her work, she says: “No, because as I am born 
in Austria at one point it was clear my life is here (…) , maybe I miss it a bit 
too that I have nothing from the culture from my parents, I miss this part and I 
think sometimes I like to see that people can manage to handle both of it, 
because I have the feeling I did not handle both [cultures], I just adopted one. 
(…) It was maybe easier to integrate, it was easier for me to adapt to the 
language because I had no choice. With whom should I speak a different 
language?” While the meaning of culture is still quite static in the narrative, 
Kim‘s experience of her own assimilation makes her respectful of those who 
manage to straddle two different cultures. She rejects my idea that she would 
more readily identify with those migrants that have chosen the same path of 
assimilation. This indicates that for her it is the dilemma of how to bridge (or 
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not bridge) different cultures that she recognises rather than that identification 
is based on similarities regarding the chosen form of integration.  
 
Fay shares the same migrant background with some of the women she 
supports. The women Fay supports are in a very marginalised position and 
hence the recognition of sharing the same national background with those 
women has a very different effect from meeting another compatriot at work 
conferences, which “would be very light and it would be, what are all the 
opportunities that we have, look at what we have here!”.  However, when she 
meets marginalised women that she supports through her work who are from 
her country the encounter is more complex.  
 
Fay: “She is relating her story to me and I understand because there are a lot 
of structural and other barriers, first there was the communist system, you 
could not leave your country and then you have European migratory 
restrictions you cannot enter the country. Yes, it is women my age who want to 
travel, they want to have jobs, they want to do something and there are just 
(…) no opportunities. And this generates anger also [in me] and even more so 
if then they tell me of experiences that they have had of discrimination here, 
because it is a discriminating and racist society. And you are aware that you 
are living in the same society and some experiences you have also had and 
you share and others not because you are privileged in some way. Then there 
is the question, how do you look at them and at yourself? And at the beginning 
it was difficult for me because I felt guilty also for having had, or for having 
 182 
certain privileges because I thought the starting point was the same for us and 
why is it possible for me to be here and for her to be here?”.  
 
This narrative underlines once more that while our analysis should pay 
attention to the structural barriers shaping people‘s lives, categories of 
identity, like nationality and gender should not be read as universally 
determining the experiences of people. In the words of Sotelo, ―political and 
economic transformations may set the stage for migration, but they do not 
write the script‖ (Sotelo quoted in: McCall 2005:1782: ftn.15). Fay 
experiences in this encounter both identification of commonalities and 
differentiation through what she calls ‗her privileges‘. Nancy Fraser uses the 
notion of ―cross-pulls of (…) various affiliations‖ to point to the conflicting 
ways in which people can be positioned in relation to others (Fraser 2003:26). 
Fay‘s narrative of her encounter illustrates the relational aspect of her 
positionality as a woman NGO worker with a migration background. As Brah 
and Phoenix point out, the idea of the significance of intersectionality has not 
only opened spaces to think differently about the complexity and variety of 
power relations but also of ―emotional investments” (Brah and Phoenix 
2004:82). Hence, while on the one hand Fay is situated more comfortably than 
the women she supports, which could put her in a dominant power position, 
her emotional investment in challenging a discriminating and racist society 
stems also from her identification with these women and her own similar 
experiences. It would be too simplistic to argue that women from migrant 
backgrounds cannot be racist or are always and by necessity more reflective 
about their position. However, they can draw on their own experience of being 
 183 
in multiple positions, which might generate an increased awareness of the 
complexity of other people‘s situations.  
 
Challenges and Resistances 
Goudge stresses in ‗The Whiteness of Power: Racism in Third World 
Development and Aid‘, a study of development workers based on interviews 
and her own experiences as a development worker in Nicaragua that she is not 
interested in establishing a ―blame culture‖ in which she would hold aid 
workers solely responsible for ―racialised approaches‖ to the global South 
(Goudge 2003:43). In line with the aforementioned acknowledgement that 
racism should not be understood as a psychological and individual 
phenomenon, I concur with Goudge‘s refusal to merely blame individuals or a 
specific group. This does not mean however, that the women NGO workers do 
not carry a responsibility for the perpetuation of those images and practices. 
As Goudge (2003) points out indeed their practices will be influenced by 
‗racial‘ images, and hence their practices in turn will inevitably influence other 
practices and reinforce racialised discourses. Hence, building on the 
discussion above which traced ‗race as culture‘, ‗radical difference‘, cultural 
relativism, imperialism as a civilising mission and defining Self through 
otherness in the reflexive accounts of the women NGO workers, I will now 
more specifically focus on how these racial and colonial discourses can be 
challenged and resisted.  
 
Grace, who first told me how she grew up with images of Africans walking 
around with spears and living in mud huts, also mentions that her perception 
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of African people must have changed over time, though she has not 
consciously experienced this change happening. This already hints at a 
concern that these images of her youth, though at first sight outdated, are more 
pervasive than she would like. This concern comes to the fore more strongly in 
what she says afterwards: “You know I was brought up, really that my 
background was totally white and black people, it was the very much the sort 
of slave mentality, where they were second class citizens and that was what I 
was brought up with and I do sometimes wonder if push came to shovel 
whether…this attitude that I was brought up with is more deep rooted than I 
think it is and whether it could bubble up to the surface at times, and I think if 
you are honest, I think you have to say „yeah, I think it could, and I have to 
guard against it‟. I don‟t know whether I should say this when I am working 
with [migrants], but I am sure it is true”.  
 
There is a tension here between what Grace identifies as a need for an 
acknowledgement that she still carries these images she has been brought up 
with, which despite attempting to suppress them ‗could still bubble up to the 
surface‘ and the taboo associated with this acknowledgement discussed in the 
first section of this chapter. There is a sense of (political) correctness and 
professionalism, ‗I am not sure whether I should say this…‘ that might form a 
barrier to a critical reflection on latent racism. Sereny (2003) stresses that we 
all have to recognise our reaction towards otherness before we can fight it. 
When we are in denial about our racism and think of ourselves as innocent of 
these kinds of feelings, ―we need to remember that this innocence is only as 
real as our capacity to maintain denial‖ (Sereny 2003:250).  
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Gayatri Spivak (1999:370:n79) argues for a responsibility that is articulated 
through an acknowledgement of complicity (see also Razack 2001). Spivak 
expresses the hope that we may discover ―a constructive rather than a 
disabling complicity‖ despite the fact that indeed ―there often seems no choice 
between excuses and accusation, the muddy stream and mudslinging‖ (Spivak 
1999:3-4). As Grace refers mostly to the way she has been brought up with 
racist images, situating it in the past rather than the present, the question 
remains whether her vigilance against ‗old racist intuitions‘ goes as far as the 
constructive complicity suggested by Spivak, which takes account of how one 
is still embedded in a racist or otherwise unjust system. I asked Grace what 
one‘s response should be in these kinds of situations and how she thought you 
could guard against racism.  
 
Grace replied: “I don‟t know, it is hard to say isn‟t it, unless you know a 
particular circumstance, I think you have to examine your conscience and to 
think when you make judgements about people, „am I being fair, have I taken 
into account everything that happened to these people, do I know enough 
about them to be standing in judgement on them‟? I don‟t know. Don‟t know, I 
would hope I would not be racist, but I think maybe if you are aware that you 
could be, that that is fairly good guard against being racist if you are aware 
that… Maybe I am wrong, maybe there are people who could not be racist, 
but… A lot you tend to hear is about institutionalised racism (…), and you do 
think when you look at the fact that African boys don‟t achieve as much as 
they ought to: „Is this expectations from the school, do we quite 
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subconsciously not expect enough from our black pupils, or is it poverty 
because poverty has a huge impact on achievement?‟ I don‟t know, I thought a 
lot about institutional racism, and I don‟t really understand it, which is a bit 
scary. Because when you have been teaching, teaching is one of these areas 
that is accused of having this institutionalised racist attitude, and do I fall into 
that trap without knowing it? And if you don‟t know, you don‟t know if you 
have done it”. 
 
In this narrative Grace suggests that everyone is racist ‗maybe I am wrong, 
maybe there are people who could not be racist, but…‘. At the same time her 
understanding of ‗guarding against racism‘ is relatively individualised and 
psychologised as it refers to examining one‘s conscience and the impossibility 
of making proper judgements. The other striking feature of the quote is the 
repetition of ‗I don‘t know‘, which does imply that Grace does not seek easy 
closure on the question on racism. This resonates with Spivak‘s account of 
constructive complicity, in which the acknowledgement of complicity should 
never result in a new ―moral confidence‖; rather this acknowledgement of 
complicity can ―never be complete‖ (Keenan 2002:192).  
 
Whereas the earlier discussion mainly concerned individual racism due to 
upbringing, Grace now addresses institutional racism. As Grace has been a 
teacher in the recent past, she now more clearly shows an understanding of 
how she is also currently embedded in racist structures, rather than relegating 
it to the past. In addition, when she refers to poverty she looks beyond racist 
explanations to structural material reasons for underachievement among black 
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boys. This last move goes further into the direction of what Razack calls a 
politics of ―accountability‖ (Razack 2001:10) or Spivak a constructive 
acknowledgement of complicity (Spivak 1999), by which they mean an 
acknowledgment of how one is embedded in structures of domination and how 
we are produced by these systems and reinforce those systems with our 
‗knowledge‘ about others. Spivak considers her greatest task in teaching her 
privileged students at Columbia University to ―unlearn [their] privilege as a 
loss‖ (Spivak 1990:9). The privileges of these students hinder them in the first 
instance to see other people‘s perspectives (see also Minh-ha 1991) and as 
their feeling of superiority is ‗learned‘, one should attempt to ‗unlearn‘ it and 
through that gain access to a wider range of experiences.  
 
Both Sylvia and Sarah make a conscious effort to point out the very visible 
identity markers that can pose an obstacle in the relation between them and 
others. In addition, they attempt to address the stereotypes that arise on both 
sides. Sylvia: “When I am in the South I usually find ways of identifying the 
things that make me different from wherever I am and then pointing it out in a 
funny way first, so it is like „I know what you are thinking, I am assuming this 
is what is going through you mind‟ so let me just address it and let you know 
that I am aware of it too and then we move on from that (…) I think more often 
it is the differences that become the defining things in your identity in relation 
to the people you are around and so to try and go through things without 
acknowledging that difference ends up creating this false sense of who you are 
and in relation to them because then that is where any kind of stereotypes are 
going to come in (…) that is going to be in the differences. So to be able to just 
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throw that out at the very beginning and acknowledge that it is there, it kind of 
makes it a bit easier to then look past them”. 
 
Sylvia‘s emphasis on acknowledging ‗differences‘, and not just differences, 
but the differences that have been made significant through colonial 
discourses, racism, sexism etc. might go some way towards a constructive 
acknowledgement of complicity. At the same time, in the final sentence, 
which expresses the idea that one can ‗throw that out at the very beginning‘ 
which ‗makes it a bit easier to look past them‘, an assumption seems to surface 
that these differences are transparent (easy to find and pinpoint) and possible 
to transcend. Also, the notion of ‗difference‘ fails to name the potential power 
inequalities that might be at stake in the relationship. Sarah has a more explicit 
acknowledgment of the challenge related to discussing the assumptions that 
are made about each other in relation to different cultural codes of what can be 
discussed and what should be left out. At the same time, her reflection seems 
to imply that only ‗culture‘ can be a barrier for an open discussion, which can 
be mitigated by diplomatic strategies. Sarah also uses the phrase ―[to] have a 
strong work relationship beyond that‖, with which again is implied that there 
is a potential to get beyond the differences. Almost literally similar to Sylvia‘s 
―throw that out at the very beginning, Sarah talks about ―get[ting] rid of those 
assumptions‖.  
 
Sarah: “Or there are assumptions made, „you have had this kind of 
background and have had these kind of experience‟, and I find that if I notice 
myself that I am making assumptions I ask questions and sometimes this can 
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be very difficult culturally in different situations because again some things to 
ask in some cultures there are some things you ask and some things you don‟t. 
And because I am trying to work and do this in a multi-cultural environment, 
again it goes back to this diplomacy to be very delicate in situations and also 
to really be considerate and attentive to body language to also the frequency 
and level of response. (…) because I know if I might be making assumptions 
then the other person might be making assumptions about me so by me asking 
I am offering the right to asking back so to get rid of those assumptions. And 
again one of the primary things is to develop a core relationship with someone 
from there, to know a person on a person‟s sense, „do you have a family, (…) 
what have you done professionally?‟, have a strong work relationship beyond 
that, those are the relationships that carry. And it is time, it can be quite time 
intensive”.  
 
As Kapoor points out, in Spivak‘s understanding of ―unlearning privilege as a 
loss‖, ―it is not enough to try and efface oneself, to benevolently try and step 
down from one‘s position of authority; in fact, as Spivak has reminded us, this 
gesture is often a reinforcement of privilege, not a disavowal of it‖ (Kapoor 
2008:55-56). Instead, ‗unlearning privilege as a loss‘ means tracing the origin 
and route of one‘s preconceptions and discriminatory habits (Kapoor 2008). 
Sarah and Sylvia both attempt to indeed act according to the latter, by making 
explicit the stereotypes and assumptions that arise from colonial, racist and 
sexist discourses. Minh-ha argues that Westerners also have a duty in 
attempting to ‗rename‘ themselves as something different than merely 
Western, a category that they have helped to construct and by which virtue 
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they have enjoyed privileges. Comparing it to the role of men in the feminist 
struggle, she stresses that  
 
―we are not dealing here with a situation of equal power relationship, and in 
that sense, we cannot really talk about ‗the Other of the Other‘ (…) but people 
from the West do, indeed, need to liberate themselves from their own 
privileged status‖ (Minh-ha 1996:16).  
 
Sarah‘s account clearly shows that the question of identity and difference 
cannot be separated from the issue of power and knowledge. Her approach to 
the national sections of her organisation, which consists of stressing that they 
are more knowledgeable than she is in their national context is initially 
hindered by their expectations of her in her role as secretary-general. Speaking 
of her engagement with the national sections of her organisation while she 
herself is situated in the international headquarters: “it is again not being so 
self-deprecating that is sounds foolish but also really putting yourself in the 
situation to recognise that there is specific knowledge, like I can‟t know 
everything and there is a certain humbling. I think the international to 
national connection is a very good example of it, where I don‟t know the 
national situation very well, I have a perspective, but I need the expertise 
there and it is like I have a pool of experts that I go to on specific issues and 
they are like „oh, but you are the secretary-general, you should know all this‟. 
„No, the reality is I need your knowledge, I need your guidance to be able to 
do this”.  
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Spivak, in her concern with privilege, calls for a ―suspending oneself in the 
text of the other. For this, the first condition and effect is suspension of the 
conviction that I am necessarily better, I am necessarily indispensable, I am 
necessarily the one to right wrongs, I am necessarily the end-product for 
which history happened‖ (Spivak 2003c:181). When Sophie reflects on how 
her identity affects her work she first says: “It means that I can…of course it 
means something. It means I represent money, I can access a lot of people that 
I would not access if I was born in Zambia. But I come and I have a lot of 
power coming to Zambia”. Immediately, however, she continues: “But it also 
means that I am someone that can‟t understand the situation in Zambia. I feel 
that they think, I mean I have friends in Zambia that I have known for several 
years and I always feel that they have so far to get an equal relationship still. 
Because even when I think I sort of grasp the situation, they would never say, 
they will always say „but this is Swedish‟ or „you don‟t understand Zambian 
culture‟. And it is probably true sometimes. Sometimes I don‟t think it is true. 
But I think it is very difficult because of class, (…) but also that I am white, 
that I come from Europe, it makes it difficult to be honest, it is not something 
that I like, but it makes it difficult to have equal friendships or friendships that 
are based on equality from both perspectives probably”. 
 
As Sophie realises, her privilege, in terms of money and access to power, that 
comes with her identity, is immediately also turned into a ‗loss‘ in the context 
of her engagement with Zambia and her Zambian friends. Her privilege means 
that ‗she can‘t understand the situation in Zambia‘ and even more 
significantly, it means that her Zambian friends deny her the possibility of that 
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understanding turning the power imbalance upside down. While she thinks at 
some points she does manage to ‗sort of grasp the situation‘, they perceive her 
as locked in her own cultural understanding. Minh-ha might take a similar 
perspective to the Zambian friends who insist that Sophie does not 
―understand Zambian culture‖ when she states:  
 
―[the master‘s] privileged position hasn‘t allowed him to benefit from that 
double vision inherent in any dominated person  (…) There are exceptions 
naturally: sensitive, non-coded, mobile beings have always existed.‖ (Minh-ha 
1991:123). 
 
Spivak has commented in her later work on the popularity of her idea of 
‗unlearning privilege as a loss‘ and has chosen to revise this statement. As she 
writes: ―I became aware of the sheer narcissism of the practical politics of 
unlearning one‘s privilege, I quietly changed it to ‗learning to learn from 
below‘, but nobody paid much attention‖ (Spivak 2000:121). Spivak‘s 
revision is significant in her rightful warning against the risk of navel gazing 
(and reverting again to a psychologised and individualist understanding of 
discrimination) in the process of reflecting on one‘s own privilege. In addition, 
her assertion that we have to learn to learn from below is an important 
corrective on popularised alternative development theories, which stress 
bottom-up over top-down approaches without engaging with the difficulty of 
learning from below (see Duffield 2007:233, Kapoor 2008). Sarah‘s narrative 
while working with this notion of ―learning to learn from below‖ when she 
talks about ‗a certain humbling‘, at the same time shows the complexity of this 
strategy in a context where power structures shape relationships, when she 
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recalls how the national organisations expect her to know everything because 
she is the secretary-general. It is important to note that in the context of 
Sarah‘s work and the context of many NGOs who operate from Northern 
capital cities, the learning from below is often a learning from ‗somewhere in 
the middle‘, the national partners, the Southern NGOs, rather than a learning 
from the really marginalised communities, or the beneficiaries; the latter 
would even be infinitely more challenging.  
 
Conclusion 
Post-colonial theory has emphasised how colonial tendencies have persisted, 
albeit under a different guise, in our current ‗post-‘ colonial times. 
Development work is one example of the perpetuation of the ‗civilising 
mission‘. However, it would be too simplistic to merely situate development 
work as ‗colonialism continued‘ since some development work has also been 
set up to counter the effects of the post-colonial system of inequalities. The 
recurrent discussion about the ‗post-‘ in post-colonialism among post-colonial 
theorists who try to emphasise that it should not be read as a simple ‗after‘ and 
‗beyond‘, is mirrored in the ambivalent way the women NGO workers talk 
about colonial times. While some directly refer to colonial times and the 
continuities they recognise, most often colonialism is mentioned as something 
firmly situated in the past. However, the fact that colonialism still needs to be 
mentioned affirms the opposite; colonialism is still there in its post-colonial 
guise and has not disappeared, is not just of the past, but still resonates in our 
current times.  
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While in colonial times, intervention could be justified on the basis of ‗race‘, 
in which the Western race was perceived to be superior to other ‗races‘, the 
notion of race is not acceptable in current parlance. However, the fact that 
‗race‘ is not explicitly talked about and named as such does not mean that the 
assumptions of racial superiority and difference have vanished. As Kothari 
(2005) has pointed out, ‗race‘ seems to be replaced by notions of culture, 
traditions, and rituals. While it was an important contribution of anthropology 
to insert ‗culture‘ into the development discourse as a dimension of life and to 
show how ‗cultural difference‘ influenced interactions between ‗the West and 
the Rest‘, merely ‗adding in culture‘ does not immediately lead to a nuanced 
understanding of how culture functions, and shapes lives in ever changing 
ways. On the contrary, ideas about culture are often reified and homogenised. 
In addition, the hierarchy inherent in ideas about ‗race‘ is often translated to a 
hierarchy between cultures or alternatively could lead to a cultural relativism.  
 
Some of the women NGO workers persistently used the term culture to make 
sense of their work experiences and encounters with the Other (see also Baaz 
2005). Some of those narratives feature generalisations about the Other in 
which culture is used to understand radical difference. I have here not argued 
against an approach that considers culture as an important element, which 
shapes people‘s lives but against a reified view of culture as rigid, consistent 
and homogenous instead of fluid, changeable and diverse. A further risk 
associated with this use of culture as an explanatory construct is that it 
downplays and flattens out the significance of power differences (Razack 
2001). In addition, the cultural images that some of the women NGO workers 
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sketched displayed many similarities with colonial images of the native. 
Culture was not only used to describe difference per se, but often also 
indicated a hierarchy. Hence, while culture had replaced ‗race‘, these 
narratives show how racism and post-colonialism still shape some of the 
women‘s understandings of their encounters with the women they seek to 
support.  
 
‗Culture‘ was also used to make sense of the relation between the Self and the 
Other. Here the hierarchical relation between Self and Other, Western culture 
and native other culture featured strongly. More specifically this is significant 
in the relation between women, in which as Mohanty has claimed, images of 
oppressed, home-bound victimised Southern women are used to depict 
Northern women as liberated, mobile, and free agents. Hence, since 
assumptions about the Other are tied to ideas about the Self, an important 
question that needs to be asked when resorting to cultural explanations is, as 
Razack suggests: ―What do I gain from understanding something in this way?‖ 
(Razack 2001:20). Furthermore, perceived difference in culture has become 
strong currency for a political left liberalism that wants to present itself as 
tolerant, and in favour of multiculturalism. Ultimately, however, this liberal 
tolerance still relies on culture as fixed and with clearly marked boundaries. 
However, while ‗othering‘ was prevalent in the narratives of some of the 
research participants it is crucial not to lose sight of the internal heterogeneity 
of the research participants and the differences in position. While among some 
women, cultural stereotypes featured strongly with a range of risky 
implications, as has been shown, other women NGO workers consciously 
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challenged one-dimensional accounts of the Other by pointing to 
contradictions, diversity and ambivalences. In addition, I argued that the 
process of ‗othering‘ is complicated in those cases where the women 
interviewed have an migrant background, as their encounters with the Other 
indeed include differentiation but also identification of a partly common 
history.  
 
Rather than merely establishing and recognising the racial and colonial 
discourse that shapes the experiences of the women NGO workers, it is 
important to think about how to challenge and resist this discourse. I have 
attempted to find practised, lived forms of ―constructive complicity‖ (Spivak 
1999), in which responsibility should be articulated through an (ever 
incomplete) acknowledgement of one‘s embeddedness in structural injustice, 
in the narratives of women NGO workers. While it is possible to catch 
glimpses of Spivak‘s intended responsibility, there remains a danger that after 
a short reflexive moment there is easy ‗closure‘ on the complicity question. In 
addition, I have argued that ―unlearning privilege as a loss‖ (Spivak 1990) can 
be a useful tool for recognising structural privilege and acknowledge how this 
privilege, rather than solely providing advantages, can bring the disadvantage 
of forming a barrier between the Self and the Other. Some of the narratives of 
the women interviewed indeed show traces of this realisation of privilege as a 
loss. However, I would concur with Spivak‘s rectification of her statement and 
the subsequent change to ―learning to learn from below‖ (Spivak 2000:121) to 
avoid the unlearning of privilege as a loss to become a mere narcissistic 
exercise. In the context of the women‘s work it becomes clear that the power 
 197 
difference and the actual distance (the implications of which will be discussed 
more extensively in Chapter Six) to those who are in fact ‗below‘ are barriers 
in establishing this ethical relationship.  
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6 - Performing Global Citizenship  
 
Introduction 
This chapter will use different theories about global civil society and global 
citizenship to analyse the reflections of women NGO workers on their work. 
The debates in global civil society theory and global citizenship theory are 
instructive in highlighting and analysing issues of representation, the 
public/private divide and (global) responsibility in particular. These three main 
themes form the basis of much contestation in the literature on global civil 
society and global citizenship. The public/private divide features strongly in 
both global citizenship and in global civil society theory and together these 
bodies of theory help to uncover a number of contradictions related to the 
public/private divide. At the same time, the civil society theory and global 
citizenship theory respectively draw attention to some distinct issues. While 
the framework of civil society theory sheds light on particular challenges 
faced by the women NGO workers in relation to representation, global 
citizenship theory is useful in the analysis of notions of (global) responsibility 
expressed by the research participants. 
 
The reason for combining the debates on global citizenship and global civil 
society is that these are intertwined and at some points even overlap due to a 
similar historical development. In some perspectives, ‗global civil society‘ and 
‗global citizenship‘ are presented as the same (for example Carter 2001:93 and 
Carter 2001:83), while in other perspectives, global civil society is said to play 
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a key part in the formation of global citizenship (Desforges 2004). Armstrong 
makes this confusion about the relation between global citizenship and global 
civil society very explicit by stating:  
 
―There is an odd slippage in the literature, however, on the question whether 
global civil society expresses the emergence of global citizenship, or in fact 
engineers that emergence. Here prominent accounts of global civil society 
become somewhat circular‖ (Armstrong 2006:352).   
 
In the first section of this chapter I will discuss the critique of the 
representative role NGOs take in relation to the women NGOs workers‘ 
narratives. I will show that the women NGO workers displayed an awareness 
of the problems associated with practices of representation, both in terms of 
the conflict between presenting an ideology and representing a constituency, 
and in relation to the heterogeneity of the group to be represented. As a 
response to critiques of representation, some organisations have attempted to 
take on a facilitative rather than representative role; however, closer 
examination of this attractive alternative reveals that the pitfalls of this 
facilitative role are similar to those of the representative position. The section 
finishes with a discussion of the relation between the two meanings of 
representing – darstellen and vertreten. The second section builds on the 
themes of inequality between NGO workers and target group and the potential 
career benefits of the representative role, by providing a closer analysis of the 
women‘s narratives about responsibility. I will argue that a sense of global 
responsibility is often explained with reference to the opportunities that the 
women have enjoyed, but that at the same time the NGO work itself provides 
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the women with new opportunities. I will continue to discuss the narratives 
about the ‗benefits‘ NGO work offers, in relation to the discourse that is 
critical of ‗NGOisation‘, and the possibility to make a career out of activism.  
 
While the public/private divide is a central defining feature of the concepts of 
citizenship and civil society, different theoretical frameworks show that this 
relation is ambiguous as well. Civil society has both been conceptualised as 
situated in the public and in the private sphere, by respectively republican and 
liberal theories. More recently, the rethinking of citizenship has challenged its 
relation to the public and private spheres. Feminist theory has a long-standing 
engagement with the public/private divide. More specifically it has attempted 
to make the separation of spheres explicit in order to counter the invisibility of 
the private (domestic) sphere and has challenged the current rigid divide. The 
notion of the ‗political‘ is intertwined with the debate on the different 
conceptions of public and private. Politics can be variably understood as 
linked to a certain kind of morality (e.g. linked to the idea of a public 
instrumental morality or personal passion) or to either the state (public) or 
civil society (public or private). Hence, women NGO workers are in a range of 
ways implicated in the public/private divide, as will be discussed in the third 
section. This final section will describe understandings of the political in 
relation to the private/public divide.  
 
Global Civil Society and Representation 
Kaldor‘s classical interpretation of global civil society identifies ―a role for 
global civil society in the representation of marginalised global constituencies 
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and in providing internationalised spaces for a world-wide public to deliberate 
in‖ (Kaldor quoted in: Baker and Chandler 2005:6). With global civil society 
being conventionally perceived as playing a role in the representation of 
marginalised groups and with NGOs currently having access to almost all UN 
conferences and committees
31
 (Hahn and Holzscheiter 2005, Eade 2007) 
questions need to be asked about the who, what and how of representation. 
The issue of representation, who can represent and who/what is being 
represented in the context of NGOs with a women/gender dimension centres 
around a few contentious issues.  
 
Chesters observes that actors in the political arena use the normative 
connotation of ‗global civil society‘, ―as a version of the good society 
stretched to the end of the earth‖, for its strategic and rhetorical effect 
(Chesters 2004:323). Chandhoke (2005) problematises the representative role 
of global civil society by questioning its representativeness and accountability. 
She wonders which and whose norms are selected by civil society actors as 
worthy of being pursued. Anderson and Rieff (2004) criticise the ambition of 
global civil society to act as representatives and intermediaries while lacking 
the democratic setting of the ballot box that national civil society is situated in. 
Alvarez, writing in the context of Latin America, problematises this further in 
relation to feminist NGOs when she states:  
 
―Even when feminist NGOs explicitly deny that they represent the women‘s 
movement, they are too often conveniently viewed as doing so by elected 
                                                 
31
 According to Eade ―the list of NGOs with consultative status runs to 60 pages, each with 
about 40 entries –that‘s one NGO a day for six and a half years‖ (Eade 2007:632).  
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officials and policy makers who can thereby claim to have ‗consulted civil 
society‘‖ (Alvarez 1998: 313, see also Squires 2007).  
 
In order to highlight the contentiousness of NGOs taking on representative 
roles, Anderson and Rieff (2004) suggest that the work of NGOs should rather 
be understood as modern missionary work, an attempt to spread a series of 
values, notably the universal declaration of human rights. They maintain that 
NGOs‘ reluctance to accept that alternative label stems from their 
unwillingness to give up the moral hegemony they have achieved under the 
banner of ‗global civil society‘ (Anderson and Rieff 2004; Roy 2004 calls 
NGOs the ―secular missionaries of the modern world‖). Some others point to 
the dangerous implications of NGOs‘ image of moral immunity (Stirrat and 
Henkel 1997, Hilhorst 2003, Hahn and Holzscheiter 2005). 
 
NGOs were conventionally defined as non-governmental, non-profit and non-
violent (Willetts 2002) and derived their moral position from these features. 
However, these three dimensions became questioned with NGOs increased 
reliance on state donor funding and involvement in global governance, with 
the aid sector becoming industries where aid workers work as moral 
entrepreneurs and also with NGOs supporting Western military (humanitarian) 
interventions (Petras 1997, Van Rooy and Robinson 1998, Duffield 2001, 
Vaux 2001, Nederveen Pieterse 2006, Duffield 2007). Amoore and Langley 
(2004) argue that the normative connotation of global civil society downplays 
the very power struggles within global civil society about issues of 
representation and resistance. Drawing on Foucault‘s notion of 
‗governmentality‘, they propose that global civil society should be considered 
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as a site of government, ―as a place where the global political economy is 
shaped, regulated or deregulated, disciplined or sustained‖, rather than a site 
outside government/the state (Amoore and Langley 2004:100). This new 
conceptualisation would open up a space for debate on the ambiguity of global 
civil society (Amoore and Langley 2004).  
 
Corry (2006) however, counters Anderson and Rieff by accusing them of 
using a very narrow notion of legitimacy when that is necessarily connected to 
the ballot box. While their understanding of representation is dependent on 
democratic accountability of the representatives, an alternative interpretation 
of representation makes the identity of the representatives a crucial element of 
their representative position (Squires 2001). I agree with Corry that legitimacy 
should be more broadly defined than the ballot box, but I would also argue 
that Anderson and Rieff‘s criticism opens up an important discussion on moral 
hegemony. As long as global civil society is perceived as representing ‗all the 
people‘ and its work is equated with ‗morally good work‘, there is little room 
for discussion about representation and the underlying notions of morality 
implicit in the relief and advocacy work. While the term ‗missionary‘ carries 
specific connotations of colonialism, it is useful for its subtext of ideology and 
converting others to this ideology.  
 
The essential distinction that comes out of Anderson and Rieff‘s work is 
between representing an ideology and representing a particular group of 
people. Their point is that representing an ideology does not need to be 
dismissed per se; however, the ideological dimension should be made explicit 
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rather than clouded in the moral hegemony derived from claiming to be 
representative of a particular community. From the perspective of Anderson 
and Rieff Sophie‘s work would be an example of this modern missionary 
work. While Sophie is indeed here unambiguous about her agenda, the 
question remains whether her organisation, in order to gain credibility and 
legitimacy, relies on an assumption of representability. When I ask Sophie 
how she responds when women who are supposed to be beneficiaries of her 
organisation‘s projects disagree with her concerning the agenda of her 
organisation, she says: “What they often do [disagreeing]! No, I have no 
imagination that I represent the will of all the women in the world, absolutely 
not. I represent a political idea and an ideology that some women share and 
some women don‟t and that might be in Zambia or in Tanzania or in Sweden”.  
 
Chandhoke, stressing the fact that access to global civil society is often 
restricted to privileged groups, asks the critical question ―are citizens of 
countries of the South and their needs represented in global civil society, or 
are citizens as well as their needs constructed by practices of representation?‖ 
(Chandhoke 2005:362). The relevance of Chandhoke‘s intervention becomes 
clear when Doezema (2001) accuses Western feminist activists of imposing 
their Western idea of sexuality and victimhood on Third World sex-
workers/prostitutes, who might not at all agree with what is advocated on their 
behalf. Beth works for an organisation on women and aids, in which most staff 
members are also HIV-infected. Beth however is an exception in her 
organisation and hence in her position, representation is a contentious issue. In 
the interview, Beth recalls an instance in which practices of representation 
inevitably fabricated the needs of those concerned. Beth argues that not all the 
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HIV-infected women her organisation works with are necessarily politically 
conscious about the issue of Aids and that her organisation therefore delivers 
workshops to women in which they attempt to educate and politicise them. 
Beth recognises however that through this practice they run the risk of being 
charged with indoctrination.  
 
The problematisation of the representational role of civil society organisations 
stems not only from critical global civil society approaches, but has been 
articulated in key feminist approaches as well. These feminist approaches (see 
for example Harding 1991) have privileged personal experience in theorising 
women‘s oppression and strategies for overcoming that oppression and have 
questioned the capacity of women in privileged, dominant positions to speak 
on behalf of the oppressed (see also Chapter Three on sisterhood and its 
critiques). Hence for women working within this critical feminist tradition, 
their position as women speaking on behalf of other women and other 
oppressed groups is delegitimised. Beth‘s story illustrates this feminist 
emphasis on personal experiences in theorising women‘s oppression. She tells 
me that when a situation occurs in which she is asked to represent the voices 
of the women she lobbies on behalf of, she would always phone some people 
who are HIV infected to hear about their needs. However, at the same time 
Beth realises that inevitably, her representation can never be ‗pure‘ as it is 
never the case that person A and B who grew up in the same place with the 
same circumstances want exactly the same things. Hence, in Beth‘s view it is 
the organisation‘s task to assume a political standpoint while at the same time 
trying to connect to the women‘s experiences. Interestingly, Beth specifically 
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mentions that she insists on not playing the representative without consultation 
despite the fact that career-wise it would have been advantageous to present 
herself as a representative.  
 
Fay‘s account displays similarities with both Beth‘s and Sophie‘s reflections 
when she wonders whether representation is possible when there is internal 
diversity in the represented group. With Beth, she points to the political 
dimension of deciding how the representation will be constructed. Fay: 
“Sometimes we do special things, a workshop or something when we really 
want to have space to talk with the women because something is coming up or 
so and we really want to know „what would you say to this?‟ but in the end we 
make a decision, (…) because every woman has a different opinion or a 
different thing that she finds good or not and when you have 10 [women] from 
10 contexts they would come up with different things. (…) We have to make a 
decision, we have to draw from all these inputs and elements and with our 
background, and where we position ourselves as an organisation”. Following 
on from Chandhoke (2005), it appears as if representation is always and 
inevitably mediated and constructed.  
 
While Fay emphasises that it is important for her own organisation to decide 
on one political position rather than representing the true multiplicity of the 
needs and desires of her beneficiaries, it also happens that the demand for a 
univocal account comes from the negotiating partners of the NGOs. Catherine, 
discussing how her broad-based advocacy organisation tries to incorporate the 
different needs and perspectives of women in their policy recommendations, 
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remarks: “It makes it more complex, also because the policy makers don‟t 
necessarily think in those terms, they already don‟t really think in terms of 
integrating women, but then when you go a step further, and say, „well, not 
only integrating women, but women are not a homogenous group, and you 
have to go further than this‟, then of course it gets even more complicated”. 
Catherine‘s perception of how policy makers respond to complexity, is 
supported by Eyben‘s observation, based on her 30 year experience with aid 
work, that politicians want ―to keep issues simple‖ (Eyben 2007b:37, see also 
Squires 2007:153).   
 
Fay however specifically criticises those organisations that display the kind of 
tendency described by Anderson and Rieff, when she says: “We allow of 
course for contradictions in this or for others who have another position but I 
know another organisation, they always say when they go somewhere „the 
women they say and the women they tell us‟ so they try to make themselves 
invisible, so we do not exist, we only tell you what the women say. This is not 
what we do. Because we have a position as an organisation and we also have 
to tell the women, you know, what our position actually is”.  
 
Ultimately however, similar to Chandhoke‘s view that it is problematic that 
only a privileged few have access to a representative role, Fay realises that 
some of the problems associated with representation will only be resolved 
once the women she works with, represent themselves. This would mean, as 
Squires describes Phillip‘s terminology, a move away from a ―politics of 
ideas‖ focussing on accountability as a measure of fair representation to a 
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―politics of presence‖ based on the identity of the messengers (Squires 
2001:16-17). Fay: “Lately I have been thinking about this and of course there 
are considerations like it is your job and it is also money and so, but I think if 
there would be [women] who would come up and say „I want to do this myself‟ 
it would be great really”.  
 
In this statement, like in Beth‘s, it becomes clear that not only is the power to 
represent subject to a certain privilege, but also that the representative role 
itself has the potential to reinforce privilege in terms of providing a career. 
Moreover, this illustrates the key paradox that many research participants 
recognised, namely that successful representation or success in empowering 
women to represent themselves, leads potentially to redundancy of the role of 
the women NGO workers interviewed. This clashes with the usual concern of 
NGOs with their own legitimacy, as identified by Hilhorst, who states that 
―NGO actions are geared towards legitimation, which means that in order to 
find clients and supportive stakeholders, NGOs have to convince others of 
their appropriateness‖ (Hilhorst 2003:4). Beth recalls that once at a job 
interview she said that the ultimate aim of the organisation should be to make 
itself redundant, a comment that she says was met by surprise. This 
contradiction has been observed in other places as well: ―Despite the aid 
industry‘s ethos of transience and working itself out of a job, the UN‘s Yei 
[South Sudan] compound had been built to last‖ (Duffield 2009:21).   
 
Pauline puts the dilemma of redundancy this way: “Part of the experience 
from Bangladesh really challenged me about what I wanted to do, because if 
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you are really serious about development work then your job might not exist in 
a few years and it should not. And to be honest, I have a lot of faith in using a 
system where you recruit nationals from the countries working in NGOs 
because I think they know a lot better than shipping in Western staff who have 
to get used to a culture, have to understand it, won‟t speak the language or it 
will take a long time”.  
 
Anna similarly, after a meeting with people from the region she is 
representing, had to think hard about her own role. Anna: “I had to make sure 
for myself, that it was really something I was adding to as opposed to just 
being in a job where I just get a good pay check and that was enough to 
justify”. Kapoor argues that Spivak‘s notion of ‗working without guarantees‘ 
implies that one has to be both conscious of the limits of one‘s own knowledge 
and ―representational systems‖ in the short term, and of the ―long-term logic 
of our profession: enabling the subaltern while working ourselves out of our 
jobs‖ (Kapoor 2008:58).  
 
This paradox of making oneself redundant through good work is particularly 
challenging for people who are very passionate about their work and who can 
often not imagine doing other work outside the NGO sector. Anna adds a more 
positive note on the idea of forging your own redundancy: “And I think it is 
based in the fact that the people you are standing before have the knowledge, 
(…) so it is just a matter of pulling it out, and empowering them to use it, 
which is I think very special in a way, if you can do that right, you do make 
 210 
yourself redundant in a way. (…) I mean what an amazing accomplishment to 
actually say „our work here is done‟”.  
 
Anna‘s statement follows Kapoor‘s argument that in working with no 
guarantees, failure (to be a true representative) should be seen as success 
(Kapoor 2008). From the above accounts it becomes clear that most of the 
women NGO workers interviewed were aware of the problems associated with 
representation as suggested by Chandhoke (2005), Anderson and Rieff (2004) 
or by feminist theorists such as Harding (1991).  
 
Consultation with those that are represented can also put a burden on the 
represented group. This becomes clear when Catherine says: “We also want to 
be able to represent the views of migrant women and the challenge here is that 
migrant women are not enough organised, so they are not very present in the 
migrant organisations, or anti-racist organisations, they are not always very 
present in women‟s organisations. So it is really something that needs to be 
done to give migrant women a space, to input in policies”.  
 
In Catherine‘s account, her organisation wants to consult with migrant women 
before they feel they can adequately represent them. However, the ambition to 
include the ideas of migrant women turns into a demand on those women 
when they are subsequently found not to be ‗enough organised‘. So 
Catherine‘s organisation needs them to be organised as a migrant women 
group as that would give easiest access to THE voice of migrant women. 
Through this, Catherine‘s project runs the risk of ―conflat[ing] social position 
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and identity with political position and opinion‖ (Verloo 2006:222-223). Just 
because migrant women would share a social position does not necessarily 
guarantee a shared political view. Furthermore, Catherine relates the fact that 
this project of inclusion has been challenging due to the lack of organisation 
on the side of the migrant women rather than on the side of her own 
organisation, or anti-racist or migrant organisations for not having sufficiently 
included migrant women in the first place.  
 
Pauline struggles with exactly that realisation that consultation of women or 
collecting their experiences might turn into a burden on those that are 
supposed to benefit. She says: “I think there is great opportunity for Western 
researchers and Western development workers to be a burden (…).  I wanted 
to go and interview the women who have faced the worst human rights issues, 
(…) [but] actually when you go there you are going to have a crowd, because 
you are the white woman, the staff is coming with you, you are going in a car. 
(…) You have to talk through a translator who was male, you are perhaps 
embarrassing her, but you won‟t be able to tell because of the translation 
issues. You are dealing with someone who perhaps had little or no education 
and maybe does not understand your questions and you are forcing someone 
to relive a painful area of their life”.  
 
Pauline here identifies a number of complexities related to her collecting 
women‘s experiences, some of which are practical (translation issues) and 
some more structural (lack of ‗common language‘ through educational 
differences, impact of being a white woman). From the mid-1990s, NGOs and 
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development organisations made a more explicit effort to involve their target 
group in their interventions and to hear about their experiences and their 
needs. Robert Chambers, as a response to the shortcomings he identified in 
NGOs‘ field visits32, formulated the Participatory Rural Appraisal approach 
(PRA), which suggested strategies for consulting and empowering the poor. In 
the interview Pauline made clear that she is aware of Chambers‘ critique of 
field visits and his participatory approaches and she told me that she was a 
‗fan‘ of his approach. However, her observation that Western researchers and 
development workers can easily become a burden also chimes with some of 
the critiques of the PRA approach itself. Kapoor criticises the PRA approach 
for naively believing that the subaltern voice can transparently be heard and 
represented and for ignoring what he calls the ―knowledge/power problem‖, in 
which every production of knowledge creates power relations (Kapoor 
2008:50). Kapoor‘s observation that ―women whom PRA purportedly takes 
great care to include in the public space, can feel intimidated (and be 
intimidated) when speaking in public, especially on such sensitive issues as 
sex, rape and violence‖ is very apt in the context sketched by Pauline (Kapoor 
2008:50). Kapoor‘s critique goes a step further than Pauline‘s comments here 
when he argues that the supposedly participatory safe space works as a 
panopticon in which the person who is ‗empowered to speak‘ is/feels 
monitored and under pressure to express him/herself in a certain way. In 
addition, he emphasises that the power/knowledge problem persists beyond 
the specific speech act, as the narrative of the subaltern is co-opted and 
interpreted in a specific institutional framework  (Kapoor 2008).  
                                                 
32
 Chambers‘ critical approach to field visits will be further discussed in Chapter Seven.  
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Some organisations take a conscious step away from representation to the 
creation of a platform for other women to express their opinions and to 
facilitate dialogue. One interviewee, Sonia, who works to include African 
women in decision-making processes, specifically expresses that she does not 
want to represent other women but that she wants to give them the opportunity 
to speak for themselves. It is necessary however to remain vigilant and critical 
of attempts of NGOs to move from a representative to a facilitating role 
according to the logic of participation. The process of facilitation brings to the 
fore the same recurrent issue that has been identified in relation to 
representation, namely the internal diversity of the group.   
 
Sonia recognises that it is hard to let a diverse group of women express their 
needs with one voice: “There is a lot of politics and a lot of differences, but 
(…) I mean we want them to be women, not to be South Darfuri, North 
Darfuri, West Darfuri, (…) if you go to the (…) negotiation table, (…) we want 
you to represent women, nothing else, you have to forget all the other. But of 
course, I mean, one thing is saying it and the other thing is actually doing it”.  
 
In Sonia‘s narrative it remains unclear whether the push for including women 
in the decision-making process is motivated by the ambition to introduce 
feminist ideas, or the interests of women or gender equality (Squires 2007). In 
Sonia‘s organisation in contrast to Catherine‘s, the emphasis is on facilitating 
women to speak for themselves rather than representing them. If one takes a 
closer look at this facilitation of self-representation however, the demands on 
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the women are actually quite similar as in the case of Catherine‘s organisation 
wanting to represent migrant women‘s ideas. While Sonia acknowledges the 
gap between theory and practice and the difficulty in bracketing out other parts 
of one‘s identity (their regional background in this case) in order to speak as 
women of Sudan, she still requests from the women to only foreground their 
gender and national perspective. This points to an interesting conflict since 
deciding not to speak for others and letting others speak can lead to imposing a 
burden on others by demanding a simplified, essentialised (re)presentation 
which ―may structurally disadvantage some gendered identities while 
privileging others‖ (Squires 2007:155). So there is an engagement with the 
women in relation to the role they can perform at the peace negotiation table, 
while there is less space for engaging with the individual‘s perceptions of her 
identity, which is made up of a complex range of components, and multiple 
perspectives. Sonia‘s conception of identity is essentialist as it assumes a 
stable experience of being a member of a particular group independent of 
time, history, social location or personal situation (Razack 2001).  
 
In the context of the reception of Third World women‘s writers Amireh and 
Majaj talk of a ―collapsing of writer and text‖ into one (Amireh and Majaj 
2000:16), and they argue that this ‗reading‘ is particularly present when the 
stories are appreciated for their authenticity. What happens with the Sudanese 
women seems similar to what happens in literature. The women are expected 
to present the authentic voice (see also Spivak 1999:60); what they say is 
what/who they are, even though their identity and thus their perspectives 
might be more complex. By expecting the women to foreground their identity 
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as women rather than as black or specifically geopolitically situated, it is also 
assumed that women‘s exclusion from the negotiation table is only dependent 
on their gender and not on their race, class, ethnicity, or geo-political location.  
 
In relation to the notion of consultation of the target group it is interesting to 
explore what happens if one provides a platform for Southern women to speak 
and subsequently the women demand something different than what has been 
expected. One interviewee, Stacey, narrated that when she talked to women in 
India about plans to build a school in their community, it appeared that many 
of the women did not want to send their daughters to school as long as the 
patriarchal system that subsequently would force them to move in with their 
husbands, have children and cook was still in place. They told her that they did 
not want to revive the hope in the daughters of a professional future when in 
practice this was not probable within the current system.  
 
Stacey then reflects: “So that for me at that time and at that stage of my own 
career and my own life I was very surprised to hear, you know, if you got a 
school that is going to be built there, why would you not send your kids there. 
For me I could not figure out the logic, but their logic makes a lot of sense at 
the same time, so I was surprised by that, but I was not disappointed by taking 
off the recommendation to build a school in the village, because in the end it 
was not really mine, it is not about what I want, it is about what they want and 
how they can use me as a tool basically to ensure it”.  
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Stacey here emphasises how she should be ‗used as a tool‘, which very much 
reflects the facilitating role. Despite her knowledge about the positive relation 
between education and health, she decides to take off the recommendation to 
build a school as the women tell her that within the current system the chances 
their daughters will actually attend the school are slim. I find it interesting here 
that she emphasises that in a dialogue with the other women she came to 
understand their ‗logic‘ and that once she had understood this logic it was 
easier to accept to do (or rather ‗not do‘ in this context) something that was 
initially counterintuitive for her. Stacey seems to follow Spivak‘s call on the 
academic feminist to ―learn from them, to speak to them, to suspect that their 
access to the political and sexual science is not merely to be corrected by our 
superior theory and enlightened compassion‖ (Spivak quoted in: Young 
1990:166-167) or the earlier mentioned idea of ―working with no guarantees‖, 
recognising the limits of your own knowledge system (Kapoor 2008:58). In 
Stacey‘s account the image of the Southern Other not ‗able‘ to speak for 
themselves is also problematised, when the mothers she speaks to appear very 
capable of voicing their concerns.  
 
Stacey later remarks: “Very rarely do you need to convince women of their 
own rights, I have found that they know what they need, (…) they know exactly 
why they are not getting it and they know what they need to get it. (…) They 
don‟t need to be told by anyone else what they need; they certainly do not 
need to be told by me”. This fragment runs counter to assumptions of a ‗false 
consciousness‘ of Southern women who, because of their oppressed position, 
would neither know ‗what is good for them‘ nor be able to voice their needs.  
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Spivak‘s notorious article ‗Can the Subaltern Speak?‘ (Spivak 1998) is of 
particular relevance here. Spivak discusses the paradoxical way in which the 
subaltern Indian woman is cast in the practice of sati (widow sacrifice) by 
both colonialism and traditional patriarchy. She states: ―Between patriarchy 
and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the 
woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling 
which is the displaced figuration of the ‗third-world woman‘ caught between 
tradition and modernisation‖ (Spivak 1998:306). In Stacey‘s example above, it 
is easily conceivable that the women‘s resistance to the school being built 
would be simplistically read as a sign of their ‗backwardness‘ and 
unwillingness to provide chances to their daughters to be educated instead of 
the more complex reading Stacey narrates.  
 
In the article Spivak also tells and reclaims the story of a young female 
activist, Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, who kills herself during her menstruation to 
show that her suicide is a political act and not, as the suicides of young women 
were conventionally understood, an act of desperation of a woman pregnant 
from an illegitimate relationship. While Spivak has been criticised for 
negating the agency of the subaltern by claiming that she cannot speak, Spivak 
intended to stress that the subaltern when attempting to communicate, is not 
heard (see McEwan 2009:69-70). In the reworked version of the article in the 
book ‗A Critique of Post-colonial Reason‟, Spivak states this last point more 
clearly: ―[I] think it is important to acknowledge our complicity in the muting, 
in order precisely to be more effective in the long run‖ (Spivak 1999:309).  
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Pauline encountered a particularly challenging situation in which it appeared 
as if the realisation of ‗the subaltern‘ that she would not be heard, meant a 
seeming reversion to a call for a traditional, almost colonial form of 
representation. Pauline: “I had a group of women in one village ask me to 
speak for them, and that is the first time anyone has ever said that to me in my 
life and I did not know how to react because 1) I did not know what I could do, 
[and] 2) the way our concepts work and the way our views on debate and 
rights I think in the West is that people should speak for themselves and I have 
always kind of believed that. But then I thought „oh, actually, these women are 
so vulnerable, they are so remote, they are so deep in this power structure of 
this community, that actually, they can‟t [speak for themselves]‟”.  
 
Spivak has repeatedly alluded to the fact that ‗to represent‘ should always be 
understood as having the double meaning of vertreten (as in: political 
representation) and darstellen (as in: to depict, to portray) (Spivak 1990:108, 
see also Spivak 1998). Therefore, if Pauline would decide to represent the 
women in the political sense of speaking on behalf of them, she cannot escape 
also ‗portraying‘ the women and herself, similar to Chandhoke‘s earlier 
mentioned statement that ―citizens as well as their needs [are] constructed by 
practices of representation‖ (Candhoke 2005:362). It is, according to Spivak, 
necessary to be conscious of the ―complicity between these two things‖ as 
―there can be a great deal of political harm‖ if the necessary and inevitable but 
contentious relation between those two types of representing is not understood 
(Spivak 1990:109). Pauline, in giving a political voice, would at the same time 
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paint a picture of the women of this village, which implies a second burden of 
responsibility in addition to attempting to represent them well. The risks 
implied in this darstellen can be exemplified by Mohanty‘s critique of the way 
women of the Third World have been portrayed in Western feminist research 
as the ―average third world woman‖ as discussed in Chapter Five (Mohanty 
1984:337).  
 
When I ask Pauline how she responded to this request to speak for the women 
and to tell others about the situation the women were facing, she replies first 
that this request was particularly poignant as it came from a group of women 
who were also marginalised because of their religion. She then continues: “So 
basically having been put on the spot, I first of all explained, as I had before 
anyways, who I was and why I was there and I said that while my project 
would be taken to [my organisation] and while I would tell people [back 
home] about what I had seen and what the issues were, I could not promise 
that any results would come from that and that was, that was really hard as 
well, (…) because the women there expected me because of how I looked and 
that I arrived in a car that I had some power and I guess in a way I obviously 
did compared to them, any time I could have got a plane home if anything had 
happened but I did not have the power to influence funds or anything like that 
and yeah, it was really hard”.  
 
When I ask Pauline how they responded to that reply, she said: “They just sort 
of accepted that. Now I don‟t know if they accepted it because I was a white 
person and I spoke and that‟s the end, that‟s the answer or whether they were 
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ok with that, or whether they were frightened to say anything else”. At the 
very end of the interview when I asked her whether there is anything else she 
would like to say, Pauline returns to the issue of representation and says: “It is 
also very difficult to retell it and make sense of it yourself  (…) I think that is 
the difficult thing because if you are going to accept that perhaps women in 
those situations can‟t represent themselves to the level of the people debating 
in the West, because they are never going to have that connection then you 
need to be able to do it, not on behalf of them, but… in a way that you think 
they would be happy with. And I think in that sense it is never going to be a 
consistent position, it is always going to be full of contradictions, and full of 
different issues, and full of misunderstandings, and full of things that you don‟t 
know”.  
 
This last statement of Pauline‘s resonates with the ethical position advocated 
by Spivak (1999) who argues in ‗The Critique of Post-colonial Reason‘ for a 
responsibility that is articulated through an acknowledgement of complicity.  
Again, this acknowledgement of complicity should never result in a new 
―moral confidence‖; rather this acknowledgement can ―never be complete‖ 
(Keenan 2002:192). Ingrid Hoofd, with reference to the Dutch translation of 
the word ‗complicity‘ which is composed of ‗with‘ and ‗duty‘/‗responsibility‘ 
concludes that ―the rendering explicit of an activism‘s complicities therefore 
also shows which kind of responsibilities and activism carries forth; indeed as 
if it were its duty to do so‖ (Hoofd 2005:5). This is consistent with Spivak‘s 
original critique in ‗Can the Subaltern Speak?‘ which argues both for the 
impossibility of recovering the voice of the subaltern and for the ethical 
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obligation to try (see also McEwan 2009:70). One has to try, rather than be 
silent, since the decision not to speak altogether in order to avoid speaking for 
others is some kind of cultural relativism that turns into solipsism, since it re-
centres the one who refuses to speak; ―I can only speak about myself, or I can 
only speak about the impossibility of my speaking‖ (Ahmed 2000b:166). As 
Spivak states in the last sentence of the original piece: ―Representation has not 
withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task 
which she must not disown with a flourish‖ (Spivak 1998:308).  
 
Global Citizenship and Responsibility 
In the previous section, the discussion on the complexities of representation 
introduced notions of responsibility, the inequality between the one 
representing and the one being represented and the potential career benefits of 
the representative role. This section will further discuss the notion of 
responsibility taking the ambiguities in global citizenship theory as its starting 
point.  
 
The notion of global citizenship involves paradoxes and ambiguities at a 
number of junctures. The first complication occurs over the idea of 
responsibility as global citizenship appears not to be a mere geographical 
extension of national citizenship, but is rather imbued with highly normative 
and aspirational notions of global justice (see e.g. Falk 1994 and Oxfam 1997, 
Duffield 2007:233 on ―international citizenship‖). Falk for example maintains 
that despite the fact that the global business elite might regard themselves as 
global citizens as they are citizens of the globe rather than tied to one specific 
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country, they do not deserve that label as they lack a sense of global 
responsibility (Falk 1994). He contrasts traditional and global citizenship by 
arguing that the first functions across space, while the latter operates across 
time:  
 
―reaching out to a future to-be-created, and making of such a person ‗a citizen 
pilgrim‘, that is, someone on a journey to ‗a country‘ to be established in the 
future in accordance with more idealistic and normatively rich conceptions of 
political community‖ (Falk 1994:139).  
 
Moreover, he suggests that the notion of global citizenship implies a 
normative and utopian shift in the spirit of politics from ―an axis of feasibility 
to an axis of aspiration‖, rooted in the pragmatic realisation that ―what is 
currently taken to be realistic is not sustainable‖ (Falk 1994:140). Hutchings 
(2004) traces three forms in which the individual is manifest in cosmopolitan 
normative theories. First, as a subject subjected to power structures of state 
and non-state institutions, second, as a citizen who can influence these 
institutional structures and whose rights protect him/her from mistreatment 
and third, as pilgrim, who acts according to ideals (e.g. of universal freedom) 
that transcend the current political structure. Citizenship should then be 
understood as ―the middle term that holds the moments of both subjection and 
pilgrimage within it‖, hence the citizen is neither completely autonomous nor 
entirely passive (Hutchings 2004:2). Hutchings claims that Falk‘s account of 
global citizenship sketches a too bright picture of the potential of the global 
citizen ―which effectively collapses citizenship into pilgrimage and sets the 
‗citizen-pilgrim‘ up as the ‗truth‘ that will challenge and overturn the ‗power‘ 
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of global subjection‖ (Hutchings 2004:2). Using a Foucauldian analysis she 
shows that the global citizen is not a ―heroic outsider‖ or ―deus ex machina‖ 
speaking from a neutral position outside power, but that s/he is produced by 
and (re)produces power relations (Hutchings 2004:10). Since for Foucault 
knowledge, truth and power are inextricably intertwined the language of 
human rights can never be a pure truth uncontaminated by power; this does 
not mean that human rights are good or bad, just that they are not ‗ultimately‘ 
or universally true (Hutchings 2004).  
 
Hutchings ‗moral‘ conclusion resonates with what I perceive to be the merit of 
Anderson and Rieff‘s (2004) notion of ‗modern missionary work‘, namely that 
it renders visible the underlying construction of values upon which global 
citizens act. However, in one of Hutchings‘ final comments, problematically, 
agency seems to disappear, which makes it difficult to find an opening to 
promote better practice:  
 
―When, in contrast, all political interventions are understood to be both 
uncontrollable by their authors and always already politically loaded, then 
there is always need to worry about their effects and to expect that these 
effects may well be multiple and normatively ambivalent‖ (Hutchings 
2004:13, emphasis added). 
 
The emphasis on the normative dimension of global civil society and global 
citizenship should be considered an important shift away from the mere rights 
and duties associated with national citizenship to a notion of responsibility. 
Yet this responsibility seems to be based on an implicit assumption that there 
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is an ‗elite‘ of global citizens, e.g. NGO workers, development workers, 
activists who care for the ‗weaker‘ Other, the ‗non-global citizen‘, rather than 
that all are global citizens with a reciprocal responsibility (see Duffield 
2007:233 on ―rights and aid solidarity‖ versus ―global solidarity‖). Indeed, the 
second ambiguity in the notion of global citizenship concerns the relation 
between global citizenship and alterity. On the one hand, global citizenship is 
seen as an extension of national citizenship (Falk 1994). It hence carries the 
traditional connotation, associated with national citizenship, that it can only 
exist in opposition to an Other.  National citizenship implies to be a member 
of an in-group that is part of a clearly delineated area, which differentiates 
itself from outsiders that are excluded by these borders. Bowden (2003) even 
goes as far as suggesting that universal global citizenship is impossible in the 
absence of an outsider to contrast itself with. On the other hand, the notion of 
‗global‘ could indicate that it equally applies to all citizens of the world 
without exclusion. Dower for example holds that ―all human beings are global 
citizens in virtue or rights and duties which we all have as human beings‖ 
(Dower 2002:40).  
 
Hence the notion of global citizenship is on the one hand inscribed with the 
idea of exclusion (as ‗citizenship‘ is dependent on others being non-citizens) 
and on the other hand (as ‗global‘ potentially includes all) with a notion of 
inclusion. Hutchings (2005) indeed argues that the global citizenship debate 
has overlooked the fact that citizenship has always been a privilege and has 
always been dependent on coercive powers, which were both enabling and 
restricting (see also Werbner and Yuval Davis 1999). The notion of 
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responsibility of the global citizen similarly turns out to be articulated 
simultaneously through otherness and sameness; the global citizen is 
responsible for others both in virtue of his or her sameness of sharing the same 
globe and in virtue of his or her difference of not being the one in need of help 
and of being in a comparatively privileged position to be able to act as a global 
citizen.  
 
This can be identified in a story that Anna told me about the connection she 
feels with the people her project supports. Anna works to improve the 
opportunities for women‘s governance abroad. Anna had the impression that 
for most ‗Western‘ people she met while she was on holidays in a Southern 
country, their holiday was a refuge from work that they did not want to go 
back to. Anna, however, contrasts herself with these people by saying that she 
realised while enjoying herself in the water and on the beach, that what she 
experienced during her holidays made her actually realise she could not wait 
to get back to her work. 
 
Anna: “Because there, you know, I mean I am very lucky that I got these 
opportunities and the fact is that I wanted everyone that I met, men or women, 
to have that opportunity as well: to swim in the water, to have a vacation, for 
women to walk around, the possibility that life can be enjoyable as opposed to 
that life is drudgery and just waiting to get to the end of it. And so this is the 
only way I can explain it, that sort of makes me connected to sort of everybody 
and so that everyone has these opportunities”.  
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So, Anna explains her motivation for her work and her connection to the 
people who benefit from her work simultaneously through sameness -all 
people would like to have vacation, to enjoy life- and through difference -she 
has these opportunities, while the people she wants to help do not have these 
opportunities (yet). At the same time her assumptions of differences and 
sameness are also based on assumptions of homogeneity. She wanted 
everyone she met to get the same opportunities as well assuming that none of 
these people had had that opportunity yet. This is also reflected in the binary 
contrast she sketches between enjoyable life on the one hand (the reality for 
her) and drudgery on the other hand (reality for the people she meets in India). 
In addition, while at other points in the interview she explicitly expressed that 
she is concerned with providing people with opportunities and choices rather 
than dictating what they should do, what ‗their way to development‘ is, at this 
moment she assumes that what is attractive for her as a way of relaxation and 
holidays, lying on the beach and swimming in the water, is wanted by all. So 
while Anna‘s recognition of difference between her and the women she meets 
on her holidays serves as a motivating force for her to do her work, it lacks 
acknowledgement of the diversity and complexity of women‘s lives in the 
South.  
 
Anna emphasises her opportunities as the basis for her feeling of global 
responsibility elsewhere again. Anna: “Because I have had these opportunities 
I would wish that others have these opportunities. And one way to do that is to 
focus on projects where I feel that through these processes, at the end of a 
very, very long road and with other projects focussing on all kind of different 
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things, there is the opportunity that there will be the possibility that these 
people have these opportunities; not because they got lucky but because of 
their constitutions, because of their legislations”.  
 
Anna was not alone in basing her sense of responsibility for others on the 
opportunities she had enjoyed. When I asked Sophie why she cared about 
others far away, she for example responds: “Why would I care? Why would I 
not care? I have energy and every opportunity in life that I can use I guess”.  
 
Sylvia‘s story, without using the term ‗opportunity‘ reflects a similar line of 
thought. A professor in Sylvia‘s university involved her and other students in a 
research project in a hosiery factory in a rural area close to the university. 
Sylvia interviewed the people working there who told her that they did not 
have enough money to send their children to university. Sylvia: “And my 
professor made the link to say that these people are all paying taxes and all 
this tax money is going for my education, so effectively they are paying for me 
to go to university when they can‟t pay for their own kids to go. And so, what 
she said was that because we are given this privilege just by accident of birth, 
that you have a responsibility to not waste that. And that does not mean… I 
mean you can go off and be a business man, making lots of money and also 
continue to be someone who does service in the community (…) and that is 
still giving back or you can be out in townships in Bolivia feeding the poor 
and that is another way of doing it. (…) That I was given the fortune to grow 
up in a stable family and go to university and always have enough to eat, it is 
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really just because of where I happened to be born and that not everybody is 
that lucky. So I can‟t waste it by doing nothing”. 
 
In all three narratives the link that is established between having opportunities 
and being responsible for global others, relies on the liberal assumption that 
opportunities can be increased for all without having consequences for other 
people‘s (or their own) opportunities. So Sylvia‘s response to observing the 
poverty of those people that support her university studies is not to give them 
the money ‗back‘ or to rally against an inadequate redistributive tax system. 
Rather the realisation that others ‗suffer‘ for her to do her degree makes her 
conscious of a responsibility to do ‗something‘ for global justice. In research 
on gap year student volunteers, a similar tendency to ―ascribe some form of 
lotto logic‖ to the inequalities they are faced with is identified in the students 
(Simpson 2004:689, see also Heron 2007:42). Simpson (2004) implies that the 
students understand the inequalities through differences in luck (for example 
in location of birth) rather than through structural phenomena such as 
colonialism, racism, or capitalism, which they are themselves complicit in. 
Alternative views would emphasise the relational dimension to privilege, and 
point out that privilege is dependent on the underprivileged circumstances of 
other people. Crewe and Harrison ask the question whether it is actually 
―possible for some to be empowered without disempowering others‖ in the 
light of the relationality of power differences in an unequal world (Crewe and 
Harrison 1998:562, see also Razack 2001:23). Hutchings uses the language of 
global citizenship when she states 
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―the capacity to identify oneself, be recognised and act as a global citizen is 
parasitic on the dramatically undemocratic and inegalitarian nature of the 
global order in general, both institutionally and normatively‖ (Hutchings 
2005:97, see also Mohanty 1997:5 on the citizen-consumer).  
 
A telling example of such global citizenship and the implication of NGOs is 
the Body Shop‘s marketing strategy in which mostly Western women are 
encouraged to buy products inspired by ‗beauty secrets‘ from the non-Western 
world, ―who can in addition feel better by buying the soap (recommended by 
UNICEF) to do their bit to stop violence against children‖ (Harcourt 
2009:134).   
 
Another example of a relational approach to global responsibility is Iris 
Marion Young‘s social connection model of responsibility (Young 2006). 
Young (2006) dismisses the idea that responsibility is connected to 
membership of a nation-state or well-defined political community alone and 
suggests that the classical liability model of responsibility is not sufficient in a 
global context for assigning responsibility. Instead, she proposes a social 
connection model of responsibility, which is grounded in an interconnected 
world in which one is participating in diverse processes that create structural 
injustice (Young 2006). In contrast to the liability model, the social connection 
model is not isolating specific agents as liable, recognises shared 
responsibility, and judges the background conditions for injustice rather than 
taking these for neutral and acceptable. It is more forward than backward 
looking, and responsibility is only discharged through collective action to 
change the unjust situation. Young (2006) argues that one‘s position in the 
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structures that produce injustices, in terms of power, privilege, interest and 
collective ability, determines the degree of one‘s responsibility, which 
injustices need to be addressed and how that should be done. This last point of 
Young however, does resonate with the interviewees who feel that because of 
their privilege they carry increased responsibility. 
 
In the discussion on representation above, I noted the power to represent is not 
only reliant on a certain privilege, but also that the representative role itself 
has the potential to reinforce privilege in terms of providing a career. A similar 
thing can be said about the responsibility and the privilege of being in the 
position to ‗practice‘ this responsibility in NGO work. So while doing the 
work itself was often justified on the basis of a feeling of responsibility 
because of the opportunities enjoyed in life, the work itself also appeared to 
give opportunities of various kinds.  
 
Sonia for example said: “I know I can have a job where I can do something 
good for someone else and that is the reward beside my salary.  In fact I 
worked for 6 months without being paid, and I still love it. So that‟s the 
reward, to be doing what I always wanted to do (…) This might sound stupid 
(…)  I was in New York because of this job, and we were walking by (…) a 
Sephora store [large and luxurious make-up shop] and there were some 
women working to get things off boxes and I remembered, I passed by and I 
thought „Oh my god, I am so lucky‟, there is nothing bad with that job, but I 
would not like to have to do that. I am so lucky, I am working in what I want, 
(…) and being paid and even travelling and meeting all these people and 
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having all these interesting things to do. So I guess that‟s my commitment, I 
realise that I am so blessed to be able to, the same way maybe you with doing 
a PhD, like your commitment to write your thesis, like „oh my god I have this 
great opportunity, why would I let it go?”.  
 
Sonia describes her love for her job and the commitment to her job 
simultaneously in terms of the opportunities she received to actually be able to 
get the job and the opportunities the job itself gave her, in terms of being able 
to travel, ‗do interesting things‘ and meeting new people. Cook (2007) in her 
research on female volunteers for Voluntary Service Oversees (VSO) noticed 
that one reason to take the volunteer placement was for career advancement. 
The women were able to have authority and responsibilities that they would 
not have had in a job in their home countries (see also Goudge 2003). The 
‗gain‘ in doing the job does not necessarily have to be financial -and many 
might say that in NGO work it is unlikely that the gain is financial- but can 
vary from career opportunities, to travel, to meeting people, to ‗leaving a 
legacy‘. If one moves away from highly idealised accounts of the global 
citizen as a moral figure, one can see that Ahmed‘s figure of the (global) 
citizen-consumer displays similarities with the women NGO workers, when 
she states: ―The production of Western women as consumers involves a form 
of global nomadic citizenship predicated on the ability to inhabit the globe, 
travelling within it, and ‗finding‘ differences that are always elsewhere‖ 
(Ahmed 2000b:170).    
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It has been observed in different geographical contexts that the proliferation of 
NGOs has also impacted the women‘s movement. As Lang (1997) notices in 
the German context, these structural, ideological and personal changes have 
shifted the focus to professionalisation. This entails  ―a conviction that 
voluntary work and engagement should be replaced by paid labour‖ (Lang 
1997:114) which potentially results in political commitment being replaced by 
a commitment to sustain the organisation merely as employer (de Alwis 2009). 
At the same time, more recently, other voices have also commented on the fact 
that women‘s organisations have lost much of its subsidies in the last 15 years, 
which had the effect of little job security for feminists who are often forced to 
work for the women‘s movement on a voluntary basis outside normal paid 
work (Wieringa 2009). Roy (2009), in the context of Indian feminist groups, 
points to a discourse in which the ‗career feminist‘ is very negatively 
evaluated by the, often older, generation of feminist activists (Lang 1997, 
Menon 2004, de Alwis 2009). She notices a feeling of nostalgia for times 
when feminist activism was practised after regular work, in the evenings on a 
voluntary basis.  
 
Dean similarly argues that there is ―often a sense of what we might call post-
second wave melancholia, in which the acknowledgement of that 
institutionalisation has brought certain gains is offset by a sense of loss of the 
early radicalism and autonomy of the movement‖ (Dean 2008:285). The 
critique of professionalisation of women NGOs is closely linked to the critique 
of the representative function of such NGOs as discussed in the last section, 
which is for example expressed in the questions Silliman raises: ―Who [do] 
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such professionalized groups represent, who [do] advocacy networks include 
and exclude, to whom [are] they ultimately accountable [?]‖ (Silliman 
1999:40). Similar discourses are very strong in the NGO sector in general, 
where from the 1970s a specific personal comportment, in terms of self-
effacement, restrain in consumption patterns, ethical living, acceptance of low 
salary with long working hours, came to be expected from NGO workers as a 
token of their commitment to their work (Hopgood 2006, Duffield 2007, 
Duffield 2009).  
 
It is only possible to understand how the women NGO workers presented their 
motivation for their work and their sense of responsibility for global others in 
relation to this persistent discourse in which activism and altruism are 
presented as incompatible with, what is seen as selfish, career choices. Some 
of the following examples will illustrate this idea.  
 
Pauline says: “Obviously part of my motivation is my own career development 
as well, and I‟ll be quite honest about that, while I do really care about 
making a difference, I obviously also care about developing my career and 
developing my experiences broadly too”.  
Veronica states: “I only can do these things, this sounds very egoistic, this 
sounds selfish, if I get something back from it, with my voluntary job, I learned 
how to write proposals, project proposals, how to get money for an 
organisation, how to be an own independent foundation so that, all those 
things I learned. So in that way, I mainly saw it as helping myself”.  
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Kate similarly expresses this: ―Motivation to do the work, (…) I am earning 
money here and I have an interesting job, in these NGOs you have perhaps 
also more flexibility than in some other organisations and you work on issues 
that I do believe in”.  
 
It is striking that in both Pauline‘s and Veronica‘s narratives a justificatory 
tone appears. This can be identified in the phrases ‗I‘ll be quite honest about 
that‘, denoting that it is normally a taboo to mention this and ‗this sounds very 
egoistic and selfish‘, which anticipates a negative response from the 
interviewer. At the same time, Kate‘s response at the time seemed deliberately 
provocative to counter the romanticised discourse in which justice work 
cannot be combined with career strategies. And indeed, while my response 
was not negative, in retrospect I realise that initially I had not anticipated that 
kind of response, as I similarly operated under an unreflective assumption that 
NGO work and careerist instrumentalism was incompatible. Or put more 
starkly, unconsciously I had associated the first with altruism and the second 
with selfishness.  
 
The fact that the opportunities gained should not be conceptualised as purely 
economical or careerist is reflected in some other examples, in which an 
explicit emphasis is put on the idea of ‗leaving a legacy‘. When I asked Sarah 
where her sense of global responsibility comes from, she says: “It is a moral 
obligation in a lot of ways, and I don‟t quite know where that comes from or 
what it grows out of, but I do, I can‟t imagine not doing this. Even for a short 
time when I did not work in this field and I was the most dissatisfied person in 
the world, [I asked myself] what is this leading to, what is my legacy? I say 
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there is some ego, what is the legacy I leave for the future, have I made a 
difference, have I made the world a little bit better than the world I came 
into?”. Again, the word ‗ego‘ is used that seemed to stand in contrast to the 
altruism.  
 
Ruth displays a similar concern with leaving a legacy: “So, I think part of it is 
that it gives me great satisfaction to be able to do something that adds to more 
than just me. And I guess that is something that most people feel. I don‟t know. 
And of course what it gives me personally is that I have an interesting life and 
very diverse. I mean it is very challenging (…) and that is something that I 
like”.  
 
However, the dominance of the critical discourse about combining careerism 
with altruism can also be noticed when interviewees explicitly defended 
themselves. While I, as the interviewer, neither hinted that financial or other 
gains might be a motivation to do the job nor expressed judgment either way, 
many of the interviewees responded as if these assumptions had been made. 
That is not only visible in Pauline‘s and Veronica‘s statements above, but also 
in Stacey‘s response: “The motivation for doing this work [are] (…) my own 
personal social convictions to equality and to justice, and specifically with 
respect to women, (…), because my motivation for doing this work is not 
financial, it is not based on professional aspirations, it is really based on a 
personal commitment to ensuring (…) opportunities for equality for women in 
various settings. (…) My personal responsibility, I think is, I can‟t imagine 
 236 
doing anything else, so in that sense the personal responsibility I feel is, I am 
not quite sure what I would do if I did not have this personal responsibility”.  
 
Stacey‘s account is not only exemplary in reflecting the prevalence of the 
discourse of professionalisation, in stating specifically that ‗it is not financial, 
it is not based on professional aspirations‘. The other main theme that runs 
through this extract, which is that she cannot imagine doing something else, 
linked to a sense that it is this sense of responsibility that defines her as a 
person, was present in a number of the research participants‘ narratives.  
 
Some of the encounters with the women NGO workers and their reflections on 
their feeling of responsibility coupled with notions of personal gain challenged 
my unquestioned assumptions that some forms of motivation are more or less 
‗ethical‘. Similarly, Sophie displays some doubt concerning the importance of 
the right motivation, arguably moving from a Kantian ethics to a more 
utilitarian view. When I asked her why she cared about others far away after 
answering the question, she says: “I assume your next question will be „does it 
make me feel good?”. She continues to say that she becomes angry and is 
quite tired of encountering people who ―are in it for…that they become very 
„good people‟”. However, Sophie continues thinking aloud: “I am thinking 
about that a lot, and maybe that‟s ok, I have been switching, who cares about 
the reason…if they do the work‖. When I ask her why it makes her angry, she 
replies: ―It just annoyed me a bit, because if that‟s the case, they are not doing 
enough, the world sucks so…and it is not fair sort of, to do it for that reason. 
But they are doing it, so why not? We need more people that do it”.  
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The beginning of this section argued that global citizenship is articulated 
simultaneously through sameness and through difference, with the difference 
being that one is in the position to ‗do‘ the helping. Subsequently, I noted not 
only that a sense of global responsibility is often articulated through a 
reference to opportunities that the women have enjoyed, but also that the NGO 
work itself provides the women with new opportunities. This idea of gaining 
something from the work, in terms of travelling, meeting people and creating a 
legacy was conceptualised as part of a (reaction to) a discourse which is 
critical of ‗NGOisation‘, or the possibility to make a career out of activism. 
The following account of Veronica however would be a challenge to the 
assumption that work to ‗help‘ others should not contain an element of self-
interest. Veronica coordinates a buddy project for ‗vulnerable‘ women and in 
that role she is also present at the application interviews of prospective 
buddies.  
 
Veronica: “If they come to the intake, to the first interview, I also ask them 
„ok, what, why this group?‘ and if they say „oh, I saw a movie on television 
about trafficking and I thought oh, wow, what an excitement what happened‟, 
then I don‟t think you are a good buddy. But also when they say, „oh, I really 
want to help these women‟, then they really have to convince me that they 
would be….because it is not equal, but we try to do it as equal as possible this 
relationship. But actually a lot of women, a lot of volunteers say, „well, I live 
in (…) a multicultural city but I don‟t have any coloured person in my social 
network so I would like to learn from another culture‟ (…) or „I am also new 
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in Amsterdam (…) so I need to [get to] know the city as well, maybe we can 
explore it together‟”.  
 
Here Veronica displays an awareness of the way in which some helping 
impulses are reliant on the denigration of those helped. As has been discussed 
in previous chapters, post-colonial feminism has criticised the construction of 
the poor victimised Third World subject. In particular, feminist critics of the 
victims discourse on trafficking (which is also persistent within feminist 
circles) have spoken out against the victim stereotype (see Doezema 2001, 
Augustín 2005). While it might be counterintuitive, given the current critical 
discourse against selfishness and instrumentalism in NGO work, in Veronica‘s 
project those prospective volunteers that motivate their interest in the project 
solely on an ‗altruistic‘ basis, are actually deemed unsuitable for the project. 
Veronica acknowledges that the relationship can never be completely equal, 
but she aspires to make it ‗as equal as possible‘. She attempts to establish this 
maximum level of equality by encouraging volunteers to consider what they 
can gain themselves from their role as a buddy. Personal gain is presented here 
as an example to narrow the power gap between the person in need and those 
supporting. In addition, it has been suggested in the context of social work that 
a cool and professional approach can ―make compassion work‖; making the 
discomfort of the inequality more bearable (Sennett 2003:20). Veronica‘s 
example unsettles the idea that personal gain in the helping role is morally 
questionable and that gaining something automatically widens the gap 
between the ‗helper‘ and those ‗helped‘ through increasing privilege. At the 
same time it is imperative to acknowledge that a stronger challenge against 
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notions of benevolence could lie in the acknowledgement of complicity in 
global inequalities; following this recognition, one would realise that the less 
privileged are owed support rather than that it is benevolently bestowed on 
them.   
 
Global Citizenship and Global Civil Society –The Public/Private 
Divide 
In the previous section some interview narratives have been discussed which 
emphasised the passions of the NGO workers for their work and the way their 
feeling of responsibility was linked to their sense of personhood. This section 
will further explore the notions of the public/private, professional and 
personal. The significance of the public/private theme was noticeable in two 
ways: first in explicit comments by the interviewees on the difficulty of 
separating the two spheres, but also implicitly when the interviewees chose to 
talk about their personal life and experiences while being asked about their 
work as I will show below. I will argue that notions of professional versus 
personal approaches appeared to rely on a similar distinction as the private and 
public sphere, in which the first denotes a different morality than the latter. I 
will argue here that despite the charge against NGO workers concerning their 
(uncommitted) professionalism as discussed in the previous section, the 
narratives of the NGO workers show the significance of the private and 
personal sphere for their work practices. I will also maintain that the women 
NGO workers were in various ways engaged with setting or trying to maintain 
the boundaries between private and public, personal and political. The setting 
of the boundaries happened in response to a range of challenges that the 
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women faced when their work life spilled over into their private life and when 
their personal life impacted on their work. In this context, the feminist slogan 
‗the personal is political‘ seems to be extended to ‗the political is personal‘.  
 
The logic of civil society theory and citizenship theory in some ways suggests 
that the work of the women NGO workers takes place in the public realm. It is 
interesting to note that there were at least three people who could be said to 
‗personify‘ the organisation they were working for33. Signs of this 
‗personification‘ of the organisation could be detected in various forms. For 
example, one interviewee told me that jokes had been made about changing 
the name of the organisation to her own name. Another research participant 
was asked very personal and intimate questions based on assumptions about 
the personal life of the NGO worker in relation to the working remit of the 
organisation. Fay puts it as follows and links this personification with the 
emotional, which is conventionally associated with the private sphere: “As I 
said [my organisation] is a self organisation (…) so the fact that the 
organisation exists, in itself is very emotional”. As Gal confirms ―political 
acts conventionally categorised as public are frequently shaped by sentiment 
and emotion‖ (Gal 2004:262).  
 
However, as became evident from the interviews, it was significant across the 
entire group of research participants that the nature of the job combined with 
the commitment of the interviewees towards their work makes it hard for most 
of the interviewees to separate work from their private life. As Catherine 
                                                 
33
 The cases are too particular to elaborate much further here as this would easily lead to the 
identification of the research participants.  
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comments: “It is sometimes difficult to be so much in [the work], because it 
has an impact on… I cannot read anything or I can‟t watch TV, or see any 
movie without looking at it from a gender perspective (…). When I see 
anything I always count the number of women (…), so sometimes I have to 
stop myself because it is getting a bit too much. That is also why I can‟t really 
see myself being extremely active in another organisation in my free time. I 
mean I could do environment or I could do human rights or animals or Tibet 
or whatever in my free time, but I am usually not doing women, because that 
would be too much”.  
 
At the same time the interviews displayed conflicting understandings of ‗the 
political‘ and ‗politics‘, which were tied to understandings of private and 
public. I was surprised for example when Catherine said: “I would not like to 
be in politics because that is really too much, but I am doing politics in a 
different way”. When I remarked: “I was thinking I would even say that you 
are in politics?”. She replied: “No, but in an electoral position, because I 
think that is really hard. I mean my job is eating on my private life in my head, 
I am not talking about time, this is more a different issue. But if you are in 
political life, in terms of being an elected person it (...) does not seem that you 
can be at the same time an elected person and a normal person anymore, it is 
a bit like being a rock star or something”. 
 
 Catherine‘s understanding of the ‗political‘ is firstly connected to the state 
and hence in the first instance she defines her NGO work, associated with civil 
society, as not being politics. The state is defined as ‗public‘ in both liberal 
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and the republican accounts. Interestingly, as a consequence, Catherine then 
considers being an elected politician as more intrusive of your private life than 
her current work, which does ‗eat on her private life in her head‘, because 
one‘s private life is negated by being a ‗public persona‘. Sperling et al. (2001) 
observed that though civic activism is political, the participants of civic 
activism often did not define it as political. As institutional, state politics is 
male-dominated, and as this is often the only sphere conventionally defined as 
political, they conclude that ―politics itself is defined on a gendered basis‖ 
(Sperling et al. 2001:1170, see also Ferree and McClurg Mueller 2004). Fay, 
on the other hand, considers her organisation and her work very political. This 
rather corresponds with a republican understanding of politics as taking place 
in the sphere of civil society. She even says: “I do not see myself as helping 
others, as I said the spine of this whole thing is the political”. She initially 
seems to follow Catherine‘s intuition that politics is linked to the public rather 
than the private sphere when she says: “I am passionate about being political 
but at the same time it is also very personal for me”. However, if one does not 
read the ‗but‘ in ‗but at the same time it is also very personal‘ as a strong 
juxtaposition with the political dimension mentioned, this phrase could also be 
read as indicative of a broader feminist understanding of what the political is, 
according to the slogan ‗the personal is political‘.  
 
Sarah‘s story is similarly exemplary in its approach to the relation between 
private and professional life: “Yes, it is very difficult to separate [the private 
and the professional life] and I think it is something that I think is an ongoing 
challenge. It is also work that is done a lot of times by volunteers, so it is a big 
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part of somebody‟s life and I think, not only for me, but also for a number of 
others that I talk to, the separation is almost impossible. And it drives 
people…, I have seen it burn people out as well, which is rather unfortunate 
but it happens”.  
 
These examples clearly indicate that the separation between private life and 
working professional life is seen as impossible and as necessary for one‘s 
sanity at the same time. Sarah‘s account corresponds to Moghadam‘s 
observation that a lot of the work of women‘s organisations is still based on 
―labour of love‖ and that as a result of this, there is a ―tendency toward 
overwork on the part of a core of members, sometimes leading to burn-out‖ 
(Moghadam 2005:95-96, see also Vaux 2001 on Oxfam and Hopgood 2006 on 
Amnesty International). As Duffield observes in relation to work within the 
field in Sudan, the separation of professional life and private life is there 
similarly fragile; strikingly, the division is attempted to be enforced in a 
spatial way with the fortified aid compound as ―a place of refuge‖ for a 
shower, a beer and some television (Duffield 2009:21).  
 
Sarah‘s narrative is worth following a bit further as it touches on a range of 
issues, which other interviewees also connected to the public/private, 
personal/professional divide. In addition, the quote reiterates some of the 
points made in the previous section about the critical discourse on careerism in 
NGOs and the interviewees‘ awareness of and reaction to this discourse. At 
some point in our discussion on this issue, I said to Sarah: “I actually don‟t 
even know if I was thinking about this theme before I started doing the 
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interviews but having talked to people this is just a theme that comes up every 
time. Yeah, and then of course if morality is a very personal thing as well, it is 
very interesting”.  
 
Sarah replies: “Oh yeah, and I would say, probably as you go through you will 
find this is something that will come up almost every time. (…) You know, a lot 
of people and myself included live what you call „hand to mouth‟. And so we 
are not doing it for monetary gain we are doing it because we are following a 
passion. We are not doing it because we have a lack of skills or intelligence 
but because we are driven by a passion and once you are driven by a passion 
it is hard for it to not to become everything. And so you know that is difficult, 
it can be quite difficult to balance. Those who are in this field who work 
professionally, who have children, I know some people -not a lot of people too 
be perfectly honest- who do, but I do know some and they had to take breaks 
from their professional careers for a few years because they can‟t balance, 
manage the separation”.  
 
Sarah‘s narrative includes a reference to combining family life with a career in 
NGOs, which was a theme that persisted in many of the interviews. When 
commenting on the challenge of combining a career in NGO work with having 
a family, some interviewees sketched an image of a hard working, career-
minded female NGO worker who all of a sudden in her 40s finds herself 
without children, and often without a partner as well; often this image was 
used as a reminder to themselves that they did not want to find themselves in 
that situation. Roth‘s research (2008) on humanitarian aid workers supports 
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the impression that the nature of some NGO work, for example when it 
includes frequent relocation, can have an impact of real and perceived 
possibilities for having children (see also Hopgood 2006). In addition, she 
identified a gendered dimension to this finding as well, claiming that women 
NGO workers can be less likely to find long-term partners willing to move 
around with them than their male counter parts (Roth 2008).  
 
For Ruth, having a family is instrumental to maintaining some boundary 
between her private and professional life: “I mean I think it is very connected, 
but I have now since a couple of years, I have a family, I have 2 kids and that 
is my private life and I take time for it and I enjoy it and it is important. And I 
have also friends that are not connected at all to this world and what I am 
doing and it is very important to have also another view on life from other 
people”.  
 
However, while Ruth mentions this opportunity to separate private life from 
work through spending time with her family as a positive change, 
unfortunately this separation is not always regarded as positive in high-level 
NGO and political jobs. Cynthia Enloe (1989) observed the gendered 
(masculine) nature of UN work; women tend to be overrepresented at the 
lower end of the job scale, and gender stereotypes prevent them from being 
recruited to top-level jobs. When the Ad Hoc Group on Equal Rights for 
Women in the UN lobbied in the 1980s to appoint more women to senior 
positions, UN member governments replied:  
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―Women can‘t be put on their own in a world where late-night meetings and 
cocktail parties are de rigueur  [and that] single women‘s presence in such an 
environment could produce embarrassments, while married women do not 
enjoy the mobility so essential for UN work; they are likely to get pregnant; 
they are diverted by family responsibilities‖ (Enloe 1989:121 emphasis 
added).  
 
While the narratives above serve to illustrate the prevalence, poignancy and 
the interrelatedness of the themes private/public, professional/personal and the 
political, it is important to make sense of these seemingly contradictory 
understandings. Susan Gal makes a very enlightening contribution when she 
suggests understanding the distinction between the public and the private as a 
―communicative phenomenon –a product of semiotic processes‖ (Gal 
2004:261). She follows the conclusion drawn by feminist theorists that ―the 
public/private distinction is an ideological one, hence not susceptible to 
empirical counter evidence‖ (Gal 2004:262). Gal‘s proposal is an interesting 
response to the observation made by many theorists, that, when analysing how 
the terms public/private are used, the distinction seems to be both 
contradictory and blurred. She holds that if one takes a semiotic approach to 
the usage of the public/private divide, it becomes clear that there is in fact a 
discernable logic attached to the pair and that the distinction is not blurred 
(Gal 2004). This semiotic approach implies a rejection of the idea that the 
public and private are certain places, practices or institutions (Gal 2004). 
Rather, for Gal public and private are 1) ―co-constitutive cultural categories‖, 
2) ―indexical signs that are always relative, dependent for part of their 
referential meaning on the interactional context‖ and 3) a ―fractal distinction‖ 
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(Gal 2004:264-265). This latter characteristic refers to the fact that the private 
and the public in itself can be constantly subdivided or submerged in broader 
categorisations (Gal 2004).
34
  
 
Gal‘s suggestion to understand the distinction between the public and the 
private as a ‗communicative phenomenon‘ first resonates with one particular 
type of exchange that I had a few times during the interviews. When asking a 
question, for example about the experience of work ‗on the ground‘ or their 
feeling of responsibility, the interview participants would very explicitly draw 
a distinction between their personal and professional view. When I asked 
Pauline for example “And how did you like it when you were there?‖, she 
replies with ―Personally [or] professionally?”. Because it was hard to make 
sense of the distinction outside the context and their particular narrative and 
because I was curious about the distinction the interviewees made, I would 
normally reply: ―Both!”. Gal‘s proposal for a semantic approach is however 
most relevant when looking more broadly at how the women NGO workers 
attempted to (re)draw the boundaries of the public and private sphere. Gal‘s 
suggestion avoids the conclusion that the boundaries of the private and public 
are meaningless as they are unstable or that the categories of the private and 
the public collapse into one another. Rather it stresses how the categories are 
used in discourse to create meaning (Gal 2004).  
 
                                                 
34
 As an example Gal (2004) introduces the distinction between outside the house and the 
house/home, where the outside would classically be categorised as public and the home as 
private; however, within the house, a subdivision could be made with the living room as public 
and the bedroom as private space. Similarly, the street, though often labelled as public, can 
have a private element to it, for example when it is the street in front of the house for which 
one is privately responsible when it needs to be cleared of snow. 
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In hindsight, some of the narratives above can be read in the way Gal 
proposes. Catherine indicates that she feels her work life penetrates into her 
private life when she finds herself analysing her leisure time activities from a 
gender perspective as well. Hence, she explains, it would be ‗too much‘ to also 
engage in other gender activism in her ‗private time‘ while she can imagine 
working on other issues, e.g. environmentalism. So, within her private time, a 
subdivision is potentially made between a ‗public‘ part where she maintains 
her gender perspective, and a ‗private‘ part where she engages with justice 
issues in a different field. Indeed, Catherine‘s case, displays features of the 
third characteristic Gal defined, the ‗fractal distinction‘: ―The public/private 
distinction is reapplied and now divides into public and private what was, 
from another perspective, entirely ‗private‘ space‘‖ (Gal 2004:265).   
 
Sarah knows that work, as a public sphere, is normally associated with 
monetary gain, and careerism, and through stating that her work is not fixed in 
the public sphere, but very private as well, she can foreground passion over 
money. Her assertions only ‗work‘ when one takes into considerations the 
assumptions that underlie the pair public/private. For Ruth, time outside 
regular working hours, which conventionally could be labelled private, was 
still occupied with work. However, since she has had children, she feels that 
the distinction between work and private time is clearer, as she has recreated a 
space, the domestic, within the larger category of ‗private time‘, for her 
children. On a more general level, Gal‘s contribution helps to understand that 
the naming of public/private is a meaningful, meaning-giving practice, which 
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turns out to be vital in the self-presentation and self-understanding of the 
interviewees.  
 
Sarah‘s reply also included a reference to volunteers, for whom, according to 
her, it might be even harder to separate the work from their private life, as ‗it 
is a big part of somebody‘s life‘. It is interesting here to look at two instances 
where the task of volunteers from the project consisted of ‗befriending‘ the 
intended beneficiaries of the project. In both cases the people involved in the 
project, in one case the volunteer coordinator, in the other case the volunteer 
herself, talked about ‗drawing boundaries‘. When I ask Grace, the volunteer, 
‗where befriending stops‘ and shared with her that to me it seemed as if this 
befriending task was partly something professional and partly more personal, 
she replies: “Once they start telling you their stories, and they tell you their 
struggles and talk to you about their problems, you cross that line of being 
somebody who helps and volunteers to run the session; you befriend them.(…)  
So I find keeping that sort of „me and them‟ very hard, that sort of separating. 
And I don‟t think I would try to be honest; whether that is right or not I don‟t 
know, probably not”.  
 
As there is an interesting tension here between saying that she would not try to 
keep the separation and saying that this is probably ‗not right‘, I asked her: 
“Why do you think, probably not?”.  
Grace replies: “A lot of people would say that if you are in a volunteer role, 
that you have to keep your boundaries. And my response to that would be that 
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I have my boundaries and I know what my boundaries are, and that being 
friends with people does not cross my boundaries”.  
 
It is telling that in a situation where the boundaries between the professional 
and the personal are potentially less clear, -both because the work is voluntary 
and unpaid and because of the nature of the work, befriending- the response of 
the outside world is a warning to ‗keep your boundaries‘. As Gal notes, both 
republican and liberal accounts of the private/public divide contain ―narratives 
about the dangers of mutual contamination by public and private spheres‖ (Gal 
2004: 261).  
 
I suggested to Grace that she might set her boundaries in different ways, for 
example in not disclosing personal information in the beginning and she 
answered: “Initially you would not ask people up to your house. It is only 
when you get to know people you invite people into your home, and that has 
nothing to do with colour, has it? This has nothing to do with colour or race 
or anything. Sometimes you do invite people in. But on the whole you ask 
people in when you know them, because your home is your space, isn‟t it? It is 
your space. No, I have no problems having them in the house”.  
 
Apart from the recurring themes of mentioning something (colour) while 
asserting it is not important and of the fear of being accused of racism, which 
have been discussed in Chapter Five, this narrative shows a redrawing of the 
private/public divide. The home is classed as ‗private‘ and the right to be 
invited into the home is only reserved for those women in the project with 
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whom a ‗real friendship‘, a personal over a professional relation, has been 
formed.  
 
In the specific circumstances of Grace‘s project however, with a lack of 
funding for continuation of the project, Grace was forced to consider if and 
how these friendships forged in the public setting mediated through her 
organisation will continue in her private life once the project is over. At the 
same time, the inequality that led her to be in the role of the ‗befriending 
volunteer‘ and the other women in the role of ‗being befriended‘ of course 
persist beyond the project. Hence even if the friendships will be carried over to 
the private, personal sphere, Grace feels: “I think it is going to be me that is 
going to have to do it, because I am the person with the car, I am the person 
who can afford to say „let‟s go out for a cup of coffee‟, they can‟t”.  
 
I asked Grace if she had discussed with the paid coordinator of the project if 
and how the friendships could be continued after the funding of the project 
stopped and suggested it might be different as she was in a paid position. 
Grace: “She is paid, she is paid, so she has to toe the „party line‟ a bit more 
than I do, I can do what I like because I am a volunteer. Even though I am 
answerable, obviously [to the organisation]”. Here Grace‘s narrative suggests 
that being unpaid implies more freedom as a paid position is associated with 
accountability. This neatly maps onto what Benn and Gauss define as the 
‗agency‘ dimension of the public/private divide, in which the public is 
distinguished from the private depending on whether the agent acted on his 
own accord, or publicly (Benn and Gauss 1983:7). As they put it, ―a public 
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official has special duties, (…) which greatly circumscribe his [sic] freedom of 
action in comparison with a private citizen. He [sic] can be accountable in 
ways in which a private citizen cannot‖ (Benn and Gauss 1983:10).  
 
Veronica coordinates a ‗buddy project‘ in which volunteers provide additional 
support to the client, which cannot be offered by formal organisations, which 
could include going to the cinema, exploring the city, cooking together or 
accompanying the client to a service. While the organisation itself presents the 
buddies as providing support in these instances ‗where professional workers 
must draw a line‘, Veronica persistently stresses the importance of drawing 
boundaries for the buddies: “We train the buddies also in mainly setting 
boundaries for yourself, what can you do as a buddy and what can you not do 
as a buddy and what do they have to tell us and me or my colleagues if 
something happens. Well, we try to make the lines very clear, what the project 
is and what they cannot do with them and the lines are crossed sometimes, 
because we always have some volunteers who think they are becoming 
friends”.  
 
In Veronica‘s account it is the paid, professional staff that is responsible for 
drawing and maintaining ‗the boundaries‘ in the relation between buddy and 
‗client‘; in case of ‗trespassing‘, the professional staff need to be consulted. It 
is also striking that in this narrative, ‗professionalism‘ seems to entail a 
capacity to judge whether there is a ‗real friendship‘ or not.  
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This thread continues when she says: “They say they are friends but I think 
that it is very, that is really for discussion because how can you be friends if 
the relationship is not neutral [and equal] because it is not‖.  
She then recalls one exception: ―But there is one couple which I met, [within 4 
months the client called and said „I really like [my assigned buddy] and we 
have such good contact, it does not feel right to be in the buddy project 
anymore, because we are really becoming friends‟. So I called the buddy and 
she also said this was true, so they stepped out of the project and they still see 
each other as a matter of fact, but that won‟t happen much”.  
 
While here, again, the professional needed to ‗license‘ the friendship, more or 
less formally checking with both parties that there was an ‗authentic‘ 
friendship developing, here both buddy and ‗client‘ explicitly engaged with 
the boundaries and redrew them in ways that they felt most appropriate. When 
the project was first started, the organisation drew a boundary between their 
other work and the activities of the buddies, with the first being public, the 
latter private. However, some incidences, specifically related to money 
lending, prompted them to ‗redraw‘ the boundaries, create clear rules, and 
define the ‗public‘ (here: ‗accountable‘) nature of the buddy project. The 
participants that Veronica tells me about, however, resisted the drawing of 
these boundaries by the organisation and decided to drag the relation into their 
private sphere. Here, it is not a question of ―unstable or fuzzy boundaries‖, 
―rather, the intertwining public and private is created by practices that 
participants understand as re-creations of the dichotomy‖ (Gal 2004: 267). The 
fact that they were conscious of these boundaries is expressed in ‗it does not 
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feel right to be in the buddy project anymore‘. The buddies were defined as 
‗public‘ agents with accountability, but because they are also private subjects 
who have their own moral conscience, ―what they perceive as the duties of 
their office may conflict with the demands of their private morality‖ (Benn 
and Gauss 1983:10). The interviewees appeared to understand a professional 
approach as neutral and disembodied in contrast to the personal, emotionally 
engaged friendship that was developing, mirroring indeed the private/public 
division. Benn states that in liberal understandings of morality, ―all morality 
must be in principle public; it cannot have the private standing of ‗gut 
feelings‘‖, meaning that it must be a rationally defensible approach, which can 
be universally shared and agreed (Benn 1983:155).  
 
This last issue of private versus public morality speaks to the third and final 
strand in Sarah‘s account, when she stated that the public and private are 
difficult to separate as people do the work ‗out of a passion‘ and not for 
‗monetary gain‘. Sarah‘s account also touched upon the ‗passion‘ or 
commitment associated with the work as a reason for the blurred boundaries 
between the work and private life. Sylvia‘s story speaks to this commitment in 
even stronger language.  
 
I ask her: “How was it for you this balancing act between the personal and 
your professional life, because I have the feeling this is for many people an 
issue?”.  
She replies: “Extremely difficult. It is definitely easier now. I think when I was 
in this [humanitarian] mission there was a lot of restrictions on movement, so 
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to be honest, you could work or you could go home and you could read books 
and that kind of thing was what you were trying to do. But the volume of work 
was really quite intense so I failed miserably at work-life balance at least the 
first year that I was there. Here it is a bit easier, (…) I think since moving to a 
place that has restaurants and rock climbing clubs and a nice park there is a 
lot more motivation to leave the office, also because the kind of work that we 
are doing (…) we are not saving lives here, it is not as if there is a whole lot of 
things that are really justifying, you know, killing yourself in the office”.  
 
While Sylvia is located in a capital city in Europe at the point I interviewed 
her, where she did work that could be labelled ‗more bureaucratic‘, her former 
work was on the ground in a conflict zone where she did ‗hands-on work‘. In 
the contrast that she sketches, it becomes very clear that both the nature and 
the location of her work have had clear impact on her ability to separate her 
working life and commitment from her personal free time. The metaphor of 
‗killing yourself‘ in her work to ‗save lives‘ of others, is not only quite poetic, 
but has immense explanatory force in showing how far the boundaries can 
potentially be pushed. If one feels that responsibility on one‘s shoulders, there 
is very little leeway to claim ‗private‘ space.  
 
Prokhovnik‘s proposal for a reformulation of citizenship argues for adding a 
moral dimension based on the ―non-instrumental‖ experiences in what is 
normally conceived as the private sphere (Prokhovnik 1998:85). As Kleinman 
observed, ―the model of the professional is that of ‗rational man‘‖ in contrast 
to the emotional woman, much in the same way as the public sphere is 
occupied by rational man and the private realm by emotional woman 
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(Kleinman 2002:277).  Squires notes that one of the critiques levelled against 
the liberal approach concerns the liberal account of subjectivity; the idea of 
human beings as ―equal, unattached, rational individuals‖ (Squires 2004:27). 
In addition, she holds, like Prokhovnik, that there is a different morality at 
stake in the domestic sphere than in public life, with the emphasis in the first 
on ―empathy, relationality and caring‖ and in the latter on ―autonomy, 
individuality and justice‖ (Squires 2004:28). In line with Prokhovnik, one 
interviewee, Anna, made clear that for her the separation between her work 
and her personal sphere was actually undesirable if this was attached to a 
separation of different types of morality. She feels that the work she does can 
be a “sort of philosophy for my life”. She says: “And I guess, I like the fact 
that the work I do is also something that I want to live my life by”. 
 
While in Sylvia‘s narrative, being passionate and committed appears 
necessarily linked to the notion of a moral responsibility to fight for justice, 
Ruth‘s account gives a different picture. She gives an alternative twist to 
Sarah‘s use of the word ‗passion‘ and chooses to understand the term in a 
much broader sense, when she specifically rejects what I suggest to her in the 
interview. Interviewer: “Because you are concerned with justice, it is also a 
very personal thing and not just a professional thing it seems‖.  
Ruth: ―I don‟t know, (…) I don‟t know if that is true, because I think it has to 
do more with the fact that I am the one who is running the organisation and 
somebody who has their own company even if it is not about justice, would 
also be…. or even if it is about art, which is not always about justice but I 
think it depends on how… some people are just not very good at separating 
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their private lives from their professional lives and that is because they do 
what they passionately care about, but that does not need to be justice based. 
(…) I know a lot of people in NGOs that just really do their job and get paid 
for it and there is a lot of NGOs that work for justice but actually that have 
become so much part of this, this funding, foundation, money that they are, 
that a lot of the work that they do is based on where you can get money from 
and not what needs to be done”.  
 
While the specific question about grounds for commitments to global justice 
was the concern of the previous section, at this point it is important to notice 
the apparent contrast between Sarah‘s and Sylvia‘s accounts and Ruth‘s 
narrative. Sarah and Sylvia understand the morality associated with NGO 
work as instrumental in making their work personal/private, while Ruth 
stresses that some ‗just really do their job and get paid for it‘ implying that the 
commitment is strategic and calculated, which is a type of morality 
conventionally associated with the public sphere. Ruth‘s comment is certainly 
resonating with other experiences from the field, which has been discussed in 
the previous section, for example in Menon‘s work (2004) who warns against 
the ‗professionalisation‘ of the feminist movement (see also de Alwis 2009, 
Lang 1997). Menon indeed states: ―Freely available funds also attract people 
with no great political commitment, for whom feminism is often a temporary 
profession‖ (Menon 2004:220).  
 
Without discrediting the important claim that there has been a NGOisation of 
the feminist movement and that this NGOisation has a number of questionable 
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consequences, the interviews with the women NGO workers reinforced the 
idea that the commitment and passion the women experienced in relation to 
their work had a significant effect on the way the women could or rather could 
not separate the personal/private from the public/professional sphere (see also 
Moghadam 2005 and Wieringa 2009). Furthermore, because the private sphere 
is commonly associated with a morality of ―empathy, relationality and caring‖ 
and ‗real‘ feminist commitment in contrast to the ―individualism‖ (Squires 
2004:28) and the careerism of the public sphere (see Menon 2004, de Alwis 
2009), the women NGO workers are under pressure to ‗prove‘ their 
commitment to their work by situating it in the personal sphere and letting 
work encroach on their private lives. However, due to the professionalism 
associated with the public sphere, linked to values of impartiality, rationality 
and accountability (Benn and Gauss 1983, Kleinman 2002, Squires 2004), the 
women NGO workers are at the same time encouraged to position their work 
in the public, professional sphere. This public/private ‗double bind‘ underlines 
the relevance of Gal‘s (2004) understanding of the private/public distinction as 
a communicative and meaning-making strategy.
35
  
 
In order to shed new light on the criticism that feminist NGOs are increasingly 
professionalised leading to a stronger separation between the public and 
private, the criticism can also be reversed; it is possible to see the situation in 
which work commitment invades the private life, as the research participants 
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 This ‗double bind‘ was already exemplified in Chapter Four in Laura‘s narrative in which 
she contrasted her emotional reaction based on her feminist convictions with professionalism. 
Laura: “For example in that particular situation I should have chosen to sort of not let myself 
be provoked by it [but] I did and I think if I had not been such a convinced feminist myself if I 
would be more professional or both I could just let it slide and I did not, I got really pissed and 
I yelled at him”. 
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described, as problematic as well. Sylvia‘s narrative, which continues after she 
has said that during her time in the conflict zone she constantly worked since 
she felt responsible for the lives of others, is interesting in this respect: “When 
you are young and you don‟t have a lot of experience yet and someone puts 
you in a position where it is slightly beyond what you been doing and slightly 
beyond your capabilities for instance there is a lot of pressure to really not 
screw up. And I was definitely in that situation of feeling like I needed to prove 
myself as well”. Strikingly, here the theme of ‗age‘ and the junior position that 
comes with it, pop up again (see also Chapter Four).  
 
When I suggest that it might then be strategic to put these kinds of people in 
such situations, she says: “Oh, completely, yeah. I mean from the hiring point 
of view when you have people like that you know that they are going to work 
themselves to the point of exhaustion. I mean when you are starting up a 
mission, you want people who are going to really work hard. And I think, and 
this might be one of my prejudices that I developed there, you also see a lot of 
people who are very comfortable working for a big organisation, or a UN 
agency or something like that, where they are quite comfortable in their job 
security and then end up actually not really doing much. And I think that 
people who are working on the kind of projects we were working on, they 
would rather have a young person with lots of energy who they know is going 
to do the work than someone perhaps with a bit more experience who they 
worry might not actually do the kind of work that is necessary”.  
 
 260 
Sylvia‘s narrative again echoes some of the concerns underlined by Menon 
(2004) that an increase in funding could either attract a less committed group 
of people to work for NGOs or make current employees complacent. 
However, I read Sylvia‘s account and the earlier account of Sarah who spoke 
about the burn-out of her colleagues also as an important warning against the 
romanticisation of the underpaid, activist work that leaves no personal/private 
space intact. This inclination to overwork is also a ―drawback to [feminist] 
nonprofessionalised organisations‖ (Moghadam 2005:95, see also Hopgood 
2006). While Sylvia ends her statement on a milder tone, emphasising the 
necessity of finding someone ‗that does the kind of work that is necessary‘, 
her strong language about hiring people who work themselves to the point of 
exhaustion, points the potential merits of a position as a ―nine-to-five 
feminist‖ (de Alwis 2009:86). While the NGOisation of the feminist 
movement and the subsequent professionalisation have been associated with 
neoliberal developments of depoliticisation and the NGOs as service providers 
on behalf of a retreating state (Alvarez 1998), it could also be suggested that 
when NGO work is not sufficiently seen as a job but as a vocation, this can 
equally lead to exploitative situations.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged with the critique of the representative role of NGOs. 
I have argued here that some NGOs could indeed better be described as 
advocating a certain ideology rather than representing a constituency. This in 
itself does not need to be seen as problematic, as long as NGOs are explicit 
about their position and unless NGOs claim a moral legitimacy under the 
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pretence of representative status. It is important to note however, that those 
NGOs that attempt to present a more nuanced picture of the needs of their 
target group to policy makers and governments are under pressure to provide a 
simplified summary of the demands. Policy makers are, if willing to listen at 
all to demands of marginalised groups, still less willing to engage with the real 
complexity at stake. Furthermore, processes of formal consultation to gauge 
the views and ideas of the group represented can in multiple ways place a 
burden on those consulted in terms of expectations of authenticity, of ‗proper‘ 
organisation/accessibility as a constituency and pressure to retell and relive 
painful experiences.  
 
Representation itself reveals something about the power differential at stake in 
NGO work when exploring who is in the position to represent and who needs 
to be represented. The women NGO workers are in a comparatively 
advantaged position compared to those they represent and this gap is 
potentially widened since occupying the representative role can bring 
additional career advantages. The women NGO workers who were critical of 
the role their NGOs played as representatives in the lobbying process, at the 
same time felt ambivalent about giving up their position in favour of a 
representative, which would come out of the target group itself. Spivak (1998) 
leaves a similar ambivalence in her famous critique of representation arguing 
that in the current system representation cannot simply be discarded while at 
the same time stressing the need to acknowledge our own complicity in 
silencing the subaltern.  
 
 262 
The theories about global citizenship contain a number of contradictions 
relating to 1) responsibility and alterity and 2) responsibility and privilege. It 
could be argued that underlying these contradictions is the idea that the 
responsibility of the global citizen is premised on her being both similar to the 
one being ‗helped‘, e.g. because of a shared humanity, and different, in the 
sense of having the opportunities to help. In the narratives of the women NGO 
workers this strand of thought indeed emerged; most specifically it was 
expressed when the women said that they felt responsible because they 
themselves had enjoyed so many opportunities. I have argued that their 
expressed desire to let others enjoy these opportunities as well is based on an 
assumption that opportunities of disadvantaged groups can be raised without 
impacting the advantages of the privileged, which disregards the global 
relation between privilege and marginalisation. Contradictory, similar to the 
representative role, the very work of increasing opportunities of others 
provides the women NGO workers themselves with a range of new 
opportunities. These opportunities and advantages need not be financial, but 
could involve meeting other people, making a career, or, least tangible but 
very prevalent, ‗leaving a legacy‘. Within the women‘s movement and in 
relation to a general NGOisation of social movements, there is a persistent 
critique of the professionalisation of NGO work in which careerism is seen to 
be incompatible with altruistic values. The narratives of the women NGO 
workers clearly show an awareness of this discourse, either through supporting 
this discourse, through challenging it, or through justifying their position in 
response to this discourse. While the incompatibility of altruism and careerism 
is commonly assumed, it can be challenged with reference to the fact that 
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arguably, NGO workers driven by ‗selfish‘ motives are on a more equal par 
with those they seek to support as the latter are not dependent on their 
‗benevolence‘.  
 
I have argued here that the boundaries between the public and private in the 
narratives of the women NGO workers are shifting. This does not mean that 
the public/private divide is meaningless, rather the opposite is the case; 
women NGO workers are constantly engaging in redrawing and redefining the 
boundaries between the public and the private, the professional and the 
personal. As Gal has argued, the public/private division in the discourse 
should be understood as a ―communicative phenomenon‖ (Gal 2004:261). 
This act of setting the boundaries gives meaning to the work practices of the 
women NGO workers and is vital for their self-understanding and self-
representation. Through drawing and redrawing those boundaries, the women 
NGO workers make sense of the situation in which work often spills over to 
their private time and in which the relation between work and home, including 
relationships with partners and children, needs to be negotiated. While on the 
one hand, work is often conceptualised as part of the private sphere as it is 
linked to a non-instrumental morality associated with that sphere (work as a 
vocation rather than a job), on the other hand work is sometimes categorised 
as public in order to counter the stress of constant engagement with work 
outside working hours and to stress professionalism. I have called these 
contradictory pressures the private/public ‗double bind‘.   
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In relation to the public/private distinction I have introduced the volunteer as a 
particularly interesting case to illustrate the point that the public/private divide 
should not be treated as fixed categories but rather as negotiable terms; despite 
the fact that the volunteer is seemingly firmly based in the private sphere due 
to the unpaid, informal nature of her work, volunteers are negotiating the 
private and public as well.  Against the romantisation of ‗moral work‘, I have 
argued that the conceptualisation of ‗moral work‘ as being a vocation rather 
than a job, and as linked to a private morality carries a potential danger of 
exploitation.  
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7 - The Relation to the Other: Negotiations 
Across Space 
 
Introduction 
The few recent studies that have explored the role of individuals within NGOs 
and their reflections on their work practices have mostly concentrated on the 
subject positions of people in close geographical proximity to the receivers of 
support (Baaz 2005, Cook 2007, Charlés 2007, Heron 2007). Moreover, in 
these particular studies the close geographical proximity was based on the 
mobility of the aid workers, development practitioners and volunteers rather 
than on the mobility of the Other. In my research however, most of the 
relations between the women NGO workers and the women they supported are 
articulated across spatial distance, in the case of NGOs based in Brussels, 
Geneva or other Northern capital cities. In the other cases where there was 
spatial proximity, this was often based on the mobility of the Other as 
migrants to a Western country.
36
 Hence I became interested in how the women 
NGO workers negotiate their relation with the beneficiaries across distance in 
cases where the women are working far away from those who are eventually 
supposed to benefit from the lobbying, the advocacy and the project work of 
the NGOs. This question of how the women NGO workers ‗negotiated 
                                                 
36
 The term mobility here might potentially mask the difference between the mobility of aid 
workers to the global South and the mobility of Southern migrants to the North. As Duffield 
points out, ―the irony of this fantastic international space of flows is that the beneficiaries that 
aid workers encounter cannot move, at least not legally; they are stationary subjects‖ (Duffield 
2009:7). In the case of the engagement of national organisations with female migrants in this 
research it is clear that the women benefiting from the projects crossed borders; indeed though, 
this was often done through illegal routes.  
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distance‘ encompasses not just the physical bridging of the distance (which the 
women could ‗explain away‘ with reference to the institutional structures of 
communication/organisation which were in place) but also the psychological 
and emotional aspects of reaching across distance.  
 
There are a number of (moral) assumptions regarding space and distance in 
relation to NGO work: there is a strong theme of romanticising field work 
over more bureaucratic work, which is linked to the idea of ‗getting your 
hands dirty‘ instead of ‗staying high and dry‘. Related to this, grassroots 
organisations are often presented as ―unproblematically good‖ and 
international institutions, such as the World Bank, or the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation as ―unproblematically evil‖ (Waterman 1993:10, see 
also Mindry 2001). Moreover, it is often questioned whether one can claim to 
know the needs of the people one is supposed to support when one does not 
witness their particular circumstances. Hahn and Holzscheiter for example 
draw this link between representation and distance: ―First of all, there is the 
risk that NGOs may perceive the interests of their constituency wrongly. Large 
international NGOs are far away from those people whose interests they claim 
to represent‖ (Hahn and Holzscheiter 2005:8). The growing lack of field 
experience among the younger generation of development workers, who 
instead received academic training in development studies, is associated with 
the increasing technocratic approach in NGOs (Duffield 2007).  
 
On the other hand, there is an explicit critique of development workers on the 
ground as intrusive (Goudge 2003). In addition, many argue that those 
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development workers who live in the place where they work, often occupy 
safer and better housing, (sometimes former colonial houses), live in 
expatriate neighbourhoods or even ―fortified aid compounds‖ (Duffield 
2009:1). Hence they are isolated from the group they support in their work, 
only communicating with them during short carefully monitored visits or 
through satellite phone (Duffield 2007). Cornwall and Fujita (2007) for 
example regard the former and latter groups as potentially similarly distant 
from the ‗reality on the ground‘ despite the latter group‘s geographical 
closeness. They state that the World Bank Report ‗Consultations with the 
Poor‟, which used poor people‘s testimonies,  
 
―brought some glimpse of reality of ordinary people‘s lives into the field of 
view of the kind of development actors who live at such a remove from every 
day life in the countries where their work is focussed, that they are in need of 
reminding of what is happening ‗out there‘ –or indeed, in some cases, in the 
worlds that surround the expatriate enclaves and air-conditioned meeting 
rooms in five-star hotels where donors spend much of their time‖ (Cornwall 
and Fujita 2007:51).  
 
However, while space and place and the related (moral) assumptions are 
clearly important themes in the NGO world itself, Duffield (2009) claims that 
the ‗spatial turn‘ in research in the social sciences and humanities, has been 
remarkably absent in development studies. Hence, in contrast to the previous 
chapters, which took feminist, postcolonial and global citizenship/global civil 
society theory as the structuring frames for analysis, this chapter is organised 
around the theme of ‗negotiations across space‘. It does, however, draw 
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heavily on contributions from critical development/critical NGO studies, 
particularly on discussions about NGO partnerships. At the same time it insists 
on the analytical and theoretical depth that feminist theory, postcolonial theory 
and global citizenship/civil society theory have offered to critical 
development/critical NGO studies, over the rather solution-oriented, 
reductionist approach, which is also often a feature of this field.  
 
Distance, space and the relation between the local and the global have also 
been prevalent themes in feminist theory and practice when conceptualising 
the relation between women globally (see also Chapter Four). The term 
‗global feminism‘, which ―conventionally (…) has stood for a kind of Western 
cultural imperialism‖ and which had simplistically assumed global sisterhood 
through universal oppression, was replaced by the term ‗transnational 
feminism‘ (Grewal and Kaplan 1994:17). A transnational feminism should 
emphasise the relation between the local, national and the global, deconstruct 
the unified category of gender, and take account of the variety within and the 
overlaps between different forms of oppression (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). 
The women‘s movement and feminist NGOs have engaged transnationally in 
different forums, such as the UN conferences during the UN International 
Women‘s Decade and through transnational feminist networks (TFNs), where 
organisations come together around a thematic focus. Similar to the 
development/NGO discourse, in debates about space and location the site of 
the grassroots is often romanticised as more authentic (Naples 2002a, Desai 
2002, Moghadam 2005). On a different level, feminists have engaged with 
spatiality in relation to knowledge production, advocating a ‗politics of 
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location‘, which should explicitly recognise the subjectivity and situatedness 
of knowledge (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). Critical feminist approaches, 
however, also emphasise the relationality between women in a global 
capitalist system beyond spatial distance. Ahmed argued:  
 
―The assumption of distance also involves a refusal to recognise the 
relationships of proximity between women who are differently located in the 
world. Western feminists are already in relationships with ‗third world 
women‘ given our implication in an international division of labour (...) 
Women in different nation spaces, within a globalised economy of difference, 
cannot not encounter each other, what is at stake is how, rather than whether, 
the encounters take place‖ (Ahmed 2000b:167, see also Mohanty 2003).  
 
It is important here to interpret distance in a broader sense than merely 
geographical distance. It would be naïve to assume that women NGO workers 
who work on a national level or who work in the field with the women they 
support always have much direct contact with them. In fact for them, the 
burdens of writing funding applications, managing projects, and administrative 
work also increase the ‗distance‘ to the women they work with. Laura said for 
example: “When I worked in Colombia I had the same feelings sitting in 
Bogota where I had a coordinating job (...) it was the same there, I also got 
caught up in administration and dealing with economics and stuff”.  
 
Vita, who works for a national organisation directly with the women who she 
supports rather complains about the effect of the funding competition on other 
organisations than her own: “I don‟t like this project industry; those that can 
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make the applications get the money and many of them never themselves meet 
a foreigner if that is the issue [they are working on]”.  
 
This chapter seeks to explore how the women negotiated their relation with the 
women they supported across distance. I commence by exploring the work on 
myths and stereotypes (e.g. Cornwall et al. 2007) and Chambers‘ (2006) work 
on fieldtrips in the first section of this chapter in relation to the accounts of the 
research participants as potential ways to ‗deal with distance‘. In the present 
global times, both the women‘s movement and the NGO sector function 
through transnational partnerships, in which governments, NGOs, social 
movements and funding bodies are connected linking the local, national and 
global levels. Though the different organisations and bodies are linked by a 
common theme, this does not imply that the styles, interests and agendas of 
the separate organisations in the partnership are always in line with each other 
(Silliman 1999).  
 
In the second section of this chapter, I will suggest that the partner 
organisations, who are the intermediaries between international NGOs located 
the global North and the ‗people on the ground‘, serve both as a ‗bridge‘ and 
as a ‗replacement‘ for the final target group. I will look at some examples of 
how this replacement strategy plays out and problematise some elements of 
this relationship. I will trace the notion of partnership in the interview 
accounts paying particular attention to the funding relation, the donor‘s power 
to select, the burden on partners and the ambivalences of participation. Finally, 
in the last section I will explore how decisions related to distance or proximity 
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were explained and justified by the women I interviewed. So whereas the first 
sections will focus on the ‗strategies‘ to bridge the distance, the last section 
will focus on negotiating distance and justifications of positions taken.  
Myths, Stories and Field Work Experiences 
I asked Sophie how she manages to maintain a link with the people whose 
situation she seeks to improve while she does not see these people on a daily 
basis.
37
 She responds at first by saying that this is the main problem in her 
work because she works on a very abstract level with human rights 
documents. Then she continues: “I deal with it by trying to meet with our 
international programme staff, and I try to get their stories, that is of course 
only their stories and then I, when I am in the countries in the developing 
world I try to get as many „stories‟ as possible”. 
 
While Cornwall et al. (2007) mainly focus on the production of myths in terms 
of the effects in fundraising many elements resonate with my own fieldwork 
and with Sophie‘s account. Cornwall et al.‘s use of the term ‗myth‘ does not 
imply that the stories are necessarily untrue; rather what makes stories myths 
are ―the way in which they encode the ways of that world in a form that 
resonates with the things that people would like to believe, that gives them the 
power to affect action‖ (Cornwall et al. 2007:5). Women of the global South 
appear in these myths, slogans and fables of the development discourse ―as 
abject victims, the passive subjects of development‘s rescue, and as splendid 
heroines, whose unsung virtues and whose contribution to development need 
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 In retrospect, I can recognise more consciously that my interview question displayed similar 
assumptions about the ‗problem of distance‘ to those outlined in the introduction.  
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to be heeded‖ (Cornwall et al. 2007:4, see also Chapter Four on stereotypes). 
Sophie uses the term ‗stories‘ rather than ‗myths‘ as she is referring to what 
people in the countries of the developing world have told her about their lives, 
their needs, and their circumstances. Interestingly, often the ‗stories‘ Sophie 
uses are mediated as she also ‗collects‘ the stories from her colleagues, the 
international programme staff, who are presumably more often in contact with 
what happens on the ground; in this process stories might take the form of 
‗myths‘. When I asked how she maintained a link with the people whose lives 
she seeks to ameliorate, I was initially interested in hearing from Sophie how 
she motivates herself when she is so far away from the target group. Sophie, 
however, indicates that when she calls this distance ‗the main problem of my 
work‘, her concern is only partly about her (lack of) motivation when dealing 
with abstract documents rather than with the ‗real people‘.  
 
Sophie: “But I think my worry is more that I am not telling the truth basically. 
For example when we talk about the access to condoms and we say there is a 
lack of access to condoms and then I met a guy from Uganda and he said 
„there is no lack of access to condoms‟, his experience, in his community „we 
have condoms everywhere‟, like now we say there is a lack of access to 
condoms, don‟t go around and spread that. So that of course is like how do I 
know that I communicate the reality? That is a problem. Absolutely!”. 
 
Here Sophie seems to recognise the danger that the passing on of stories by 
colleagues could result in a ‗Chinese whispering‘ situation where the ‗real 
meaning‘ of the testimony and the intention of the informant get lost (Hahn 
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and Holzscheiter 2005), and the ‗truth‘ on the ground is misrepresented, 
―created in the image of the grievance we understand‖ (Kennedy 2004:xxiii) 
or ―construct[ed as] a world of fantasy that suits politicians‖ (Eyben 
2007b:38). In addition, the ‗story tellers‘ on the ground function only as 
informants, rather than as partners who share their own analysis and 
perceptions (Eade 2007). This interview fragment evokes the question how 
often (and on what basis) Sophie will update her stories. Indeed, she asks 
herself that question explicitly immediately after telling me about the 
refutation of the ‗lack of access to condoms story‘.  
 
However, the phrase ‗don‘t go around and spread that38‘ [there is no lack of 
access to condoms], can be understood as a silencing of alternative messages 
that would undermine the message her organisation seeks to disseminate. Here 
we might identify a resistance towards updating the stories if conflicting 
accounts do not sit nicely with the stated goals of an organisation; the 
testimonies are needed to give the organisation legitimacy. Hence, ―the use of 
particular representations of those whom development seeks to assist are 
worked into ‗story-lines‘ that come not only to frame, but also to legitimise 
particular kinds of intervention and forms of knowledge‖ (Cornwall et al. 
2007:6). At the same time, it rightly or wrongly implies that her organisation 
has better knowledge about the real situation on the ground than the people 
themselves, whose stories function as mere illustration. In contrast to Sophie‘s 
informal collecting of stories, in the 1990s the World Bank made a structured 
                                                 
38
 Sophie‘s phrase ‗don‘t go around and spread that [there is no lack of access to condoms]‘ 
might have raised an ethical dilemma for me in writing about this example; however, in the 
context of the interview, it was clear that this phrase was not addressed to me but to herself or, 
in an imaginary conversation, to the guy who told her that there was sufficient access to 
condoms.  
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attempt to collect testimonies of ‗the poor‘ worldwide (published as 
‗Consultations with the Poor‘ in 1999). Despite the differences in scale and 
methodology, the criticisms related to this endeavour touch upon exactly those 
points that arise from Sophie‘s narrative; the instrumental use of testimonies to 
gain moral authority and to give legitimacy to predefined policies and goals, 
the power relations shaping the framing of the testimonies (Pender 2001, 
Cornwall and Fujita 2007).  
 
Sophie‘s reliance on ‗selected‘ stories can on the other hand be justified for its 
strategic use, as policy makers are ―likely to be more easily influenced by 
sound-bite-style headlines, which pressures NGO workers into providing those 
catchy quotes‖ (Cornwall and Fujita 2007:51). Spivak (1990) advocated a 
‗strategic essentialism‘39, which could be understood as a strategic form of 
identity politics that entails a simplification and homogenisation of reality in 
order to achieve a desired goal, e.g. representation (see also Chapter Four on 
the strategic use of gender stereotypes and Chapter Six on representation). 
Sophie also recognises this when she says: “Since I work with advocacy my 
work is very much linked to hitting emotions of people and then personal 
stories become very vital. If I want decision makers to focus more on sexual 
and reproductive health I need to talk about that taxi driver that I mentioned 
or the young people that I meet”.  
 
One of the research participants, who worked closely with refugees, also 
emphasised how face-to-face contact and personal stories had a very different 
                                                 
39
 Spivak has since decided not to use the term ‗strategic essentialism‘ anymore as to her 
surprise it quickly became a widely adopted phrase, serving merely as ―the union ticket for 
essentialism‖ instead of serving as a strategy (Spivak 1993:35).  
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and much stronger effect than images on television. She explains how her 
work actually narrowed the distance between them and her, which again 
underlines the significance of distance in NGO work. Grace: “You know about 
refugees broadly, don‟t you, (…) but your image of refugees is more television 
viewing, you have seen these vast refugee camps in Sudan or Pakistan (…), 
people that fled across the border and it is only when you get involved with 
them individually that you realise the horror of what they have gone through. 
When you see it collectively, it is grim and it is awful, but it is not personal. 
And once you get involved (…), getting to know people (…) you realise the 
suffering that these people had and I think that‟s what has changed for me, the 
understanding of loss that these people have had”.  
 
Chambers‘ (2006) discussion on fieldwork provides another way to 
understand possibilities for relating to Others across space. It also gives insight 
into the circumstances under which stories are often collected. Chambers 
argues that ―rural development tourism‖, by which he means field visits, 
provides the main source of information, ―perceptions and misperceptions‖ 
about poor people for many development professionals (Chambers 2006:11). 
He identifies a number of ―traps‖ related to rural field visits of development 
practitioners, notably what he used to call the ―urban trap‖ and what he now 
calls ―the headquarters and capital traps‖ (Chambers 2006:8). He argues that 
the effect of the international career system with its incentive schemes is that 
successful development professionals are promoted to urban and international 
centres away from rural areas. These urban and international spaces do not 
only offer better career prospects, but also better accommodation, schools, 
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hospitals, shops, and other facilities and fulfil the increasingly stringent 
requirements of insurance, safety and security  (Chambers 2006, Duffield 
2009). The result is that those who ‗end up‘ high in the hierarchies of 
development organisations‘ often base their policies and visions on past 
experiences in the field, which potentially means that those in the most 
powerful positions are also most out of touch with the ‗reality‘ of the field 
today.  
 
Many of the women I interviewed had had more extensive experience working 
in the field prior to taking up their current position. I will discuss this more 
extensively when exploring in the third section why these women chose a 
position where they were geographically removed from the beneficiaries 
despite the difficulties they identified with that position. An ‗urban trap‘ 
emerges as destinations of the field visits are often relatively urban due to the 
logistical limitations. For example, Beth told me that she always ends up going 
to the same places in the global South; the capital cities, where she is familiar 
with the café on the corner of the hotel, without knowing and seeing the rest of 
the country. She experiences a stark contrast between her current work‘s field 
visits and her previous work as a volunteer for another organisation when she 
lived for two years in the community she worked in, learned the language, and 
made friends there. 
 
One research participant, Pauline, who specifically expressed her familiarity 
with and admiration for Chambers‘ work felt that her experiences and 
commitments resonated with his ideas: “So that for me, is one of the 
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interesting things that he really advocates people to go out and they do, I hate 
the term „field work‟, they do and...because you know, the field can be 
someone from the UN in Geneva going to Dhaka, that‟s the field, but it is not, 
that‟s a capital city, with air-con and you might see a few slums, but you are 
not seeing what the country is like. But I really find him interesting because he 
talks about how people should be in the situation and it should not be just a 
flying visit of 2 hours to see what the poor people are doing, it should be real 
genuine attempt to understanding. (…) One thing that was always going back 
to my mind was this what he said, because I know that in Mongolia this was 
always what I was trying to do (…) so it was always in the back of my mind 
that I really needed to genuinely attempt to understand these women and 
genuinely attempt to understand these community leaders that I interviewed as 
well. And I guess I was still trying to be my own worst critic, because I think 
that is important to go „ok, that‟s fine I have done this research, but really 
have I seen it?”. 
 
Pauline clearly refers here to the ‗urban trap‘ that Chambers identified, making 
a distinction between ‗doing the research‘ and actually ‗seeing‘ and 
understanding the situation on the ground. In addition, she comments that ‗she 
hates the term field work‘, which reveals that after her encounter with 
Chambers‘ and possibly other critical approaches to development work, the 
term ‗field work‘ has become an ideologically laden term. She is keen to point 
out that she is critical of it and therefore does not want to use it in an 
unproblematic way. Many of the research participants had a university 
background related to their current work, with degrees in women‘s studies, 
 278 
politics or development, and it is clear that they often reflected on their 
experiences through the theories that they had learned about. Pauline‘s 
statement here is the most explicit example of the possibility of dialogue 
between theory and practice. Pauline talks about a certain ambition to 
‗genuinely attempt to understand‘, a commitment that she has derived from 
Chambers‘ theory. However, it is also possible that Chambers‘ theory might 
have appealed to her in the first place because it resonated with her 
experiences and her disposition to her work already.  
 
Most of the research participants stressed the importance of field trips for their 
work. Kate, for example says: “It is certainly, it is clear that if you work at a 
level like here, you getting pretty far from reality (…) if I am travelling and 
have that [situation of being closer to concrete contexts] from time to time, it 
makes it a huge difference in the way you can learn and can perceive the 
situation or reconsider or get insights and a better understanding and hear 
yourself, it depends on how open you are, but if you are there you can perhaps 
hear much more that you were told or see other things which have not been 
communicated to you because you are in the situation”. 
 
Kate stresses the value of field visits mainly in terms of the extra information 
one can extract when one is on the ground, which prevents one from getting 
too far removed from reality and which prompts to reconsider certain 
viewpoints. At the same time, she states “you don‟t have to be everywhere all 
the time”; rather “you need to get in touch with a reality you are working with 
from time to time”. Her stress on ‗a reality‘ rather than ‗the reality‘ seems to 
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imply her awareness that her view remains partial and incomplete even when 
visiting the field. It could also imply that she considers most circumstances on 
the ground similar enough to be comparable.  
 
Casey echoes Kate‘s account when she answers my question whether field 
visits are important for her work by saying: “Mmh, yeah, because otherwise it 
becomes too administrative here. And because we have good discussions on 
what works, what doesn‟t work (…) So I think it is important to be in the 
country and sit and discuss because in the meeting you give a lot of ideas it is 
not the same by email. It is quite important”.  
Also similarly to Kate she stresses that there are certain things she will not be 
told when she is far away from the project in her main office: “They don‟t 
describe the full development in their reports to us so it is important to come 
there”.  
 
However, Casey is also aware that even when coming to the country she is 
perceived as “very much a donor, but I feel that I get a good discussion, 
because I have so much experience as I have. So I am very familiar, very 
experienced in the development administration, but they can also feel that I 
have a relatively good understanding on what to do when we discuss it. But 
there is no doubt that my visits are seen as donor visits. (…) I am the one 
issuing the money, so they will try to…they will sketch a favourable picture of 
their progress”.  
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Here Casey identifies what Chambers calls the ―project bias‖ of field visits; 
the fact that donors are often taken to ―the nicely groomed pet project or 
model village‖ where the successes of a particular project are clearly visible 
(Chambers 2008:34). Chambers illustrates the problems he identifies with 
field visits and the pressure on those visited to give the ‗right‘ message by 
sketching an imaginary field visit:  
 
―A self-conscious group (…) dressed in their best clothes, are seen and spoken 
to. They nervously respond in ways which they hope will bring benefits and 
avoid penalties. There are tensions between the visitor‘s questions and 
curiosity, the officials‘ desire to select what is to be seen, and the mixed 
motives of different rural groups and individuals who have to live with the 
officials and with each other after the visitor has left‖ (Chambers 2006:16).  
 
It is interesting in the above narrative that Casey counterbalances what she 
perceives as a lack of honesty about the real state of the project (‗sketching a 
favourable picture‘) because of her power position as a donor with her 
experience and knowledge about the field (‗I get a good discussion, because I 
have so much experience‘). One could also imagine that her experience and 
her good understanding might add to her power position, and hence increase 
the power imbalance, which might lead to even less open dialogue. Heron 
(2005), in an article on social worker‘s reflexivity about subjectivity and 
subject position (as they are as well in a power position of ‗helping‘ someone) 
uses a Foucauldian framework to emphasise how in power relations subjects 
are constituted. She argues that ―the constitutive effects of being in a 
structured position of power over other people would need to be examined‖, in 
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other words ―what does this to her sense of self‖, and what kind of investment 
someone has in maintaining a certain self-image (Heron 2005:348).  
 
Casey‘s recurrent emphasis on being experienced, which returns in a statement 
quoted below, might betray her investment in a self-image as a very 
experienced NGO worker. This might in turn, when left acknowledged or 
unquestioned, prevent her from critically interrogating her behaviour and 
position. The acknowledgment that she is in a donor position and that this will 
have an effect on the interaction still situates the power dynamics as ‗external‘ 
to her. It situates them in the organisation she is working for that happens to be 
a donor organisation, rather than in herself. Rather, her own qualities (being 
experienced) are presented as compensating for the external situation.  
Casey also feels that the difficulties she sometimes encounters as a donor when 
the partners tend to sketch a too favourable picture of the project are partly 
resolved when she can deal with partners in the South who she identifies as 
similar to her.  
 
Casey: “In some of these projects I have the advantage of dealing with women 
managers and they are more or less the same age as me and it makes it easier. 
Personality wise, we are quite similar even though it is so different 
circumstances. [T]hey have taken part in these discussions for so many years. 
We are at the same phase more or less, they have been developing in their 
organisations, had a lot of exposure to European countries, it is quite easy I 
feel”. This fragment shows the importance of partners in relation to field visits 
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specifically and in bridging the distance more generally, as will be discussed 
in the next section.  
 
Both Kate and Casey are in a position where they can choose which field visits 
they would wish to make. Casey stresses: “I am a very experienced consultant 
so I decide myself what kind of visits should I go on. Should I go and see the 
target group, should I focus on capacity building at the partners or how do I 
involve the embassy? Because of my experience I have the freedom to do what 
I like and I find that very interesting, sometimes I do this and sometimes I do 
that”.  
 
From this account it becomes clearer that with experience comes the power of 
selecting who and what to see and do on a field visit; this power of selection 
will be further discussed in the next section of this chapter. These ‗targeted 
visits‘ might indeed be more productive but could potentially contain the risk 
of overlooking those fields, those projects that are not on the radar of the 
donor organisation, or of the specific representative.  
 
Not everyone finds it essential, though, to make field trips to the regions that 
feature in their work. Sonia who works with women in Africa had never been 
to Africa before she started working for the organisation. During the time she 
has been working for the organisation she has visited African countries, so I 
asked whether that changed her perception of her work or of the women she is 
working with. She says: “No, from the moment I started having responsibility 
here, I started being committed. I am a very responsible person and because I 
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really like what I do I am very committed and it does not change the fact that I 
see the people or that I don‟t see them. It is better now that I know them and 
now that I see the project moving forward but it doesn‟t change anything”.  
 
It is noticeable that she understands my question to be indicative of some 
mistrust on my side concerning her commitment, as she immediately stresses 
her dedication. It is remarkable that she stresses very clearly that it does not 
matter in her work whether she has ever met the people she is working with 
and for, while at the same time she states ‗it is better now that I know them‘.  
 
Later in the interview, Sonia indicates she would now like to visit the 
particular conflict-ridden region for which she coordinates projects. She 
explains that initially she did not want to visit the region as she was afraid of 
the violence, “but I would like to go, to see the things that I am working on, 
that I have heard of because of these women, but that I have not seen with my 
own eyes”.  
When I ask her whether a visit would be important for her work, Sonia says: 
“Yes, for my work, but also for me as a person. To see how a human being can 
treat another human being, how terrible things people can do, but how still 
there are people that have hope”.  
 
So whereas on the one hand, she now does acknowledge that seeing the 
situation on the ground could possibly be beneficial for her work practices, on 
the other hand, she seems to consider the visit more important as a ‗life lesson‘ 
for herself. As she does not elaborate on how it could be important for her 
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work, she does not mention the use of the field visit to gather information or to 
establish relations with the women she supports. For Sonia, the field visit is 
not central to her credibility as a committed NGO worker; rather it is seen as 
enabling her to gain more experiences for self-development (see Chapter Six 
for a more extensive discussion on the personal and career development of 
NGO workers through their work).  
 
As mentioned previously, Chambers also observed the use of ‗old‘ 
experiences in the field for current practices. Gill feels that she can tap into her 
experiences from a previous job. When I ask her whether she meets the 
women in the South that she has described to me earlier in the interview, she 
responds: “Yes, although I have to say, this is also an office were we have a 
lot of things on our plate, so we don‟t always have the time to go into depth 
with someone, there are limitations to that, but I think it helped me that I 
before joining this organisation, in my previous youth organisation, the 
international one, I have done some conferences, for instance organising one 
in India, co-organising one in Uganda and I made a lot of contacts there and 
also some friends, so I know more of these regions and I have an idea how it 
works there, and I have been there, that also helps”.  
 
While she suggests that the work pressure in her organisation does not allow 
her much contact with people on the ground, Gill does not problematise basing 
work on past experiences in a different organisation. However, later in the 
interview she stresses: “If you are working on North-South relations, you 
should have had some time in the South. Because otherwise I don‟t think you 
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can be an efficient policy officer in the North”. She indicates that if she 
continues working in the area of development, she feels that she will have to 
go and work in the South as well:  “I would need this experience for me, I 
think, morally, I would need it to justify that I work in that area”.  
 
For Gill, in contrast to Sonia, experience in the global South is tied to her own 
sense of integrity and credibility in her NGO work. Here, it appears as though 
she recognised that her past experiences have an ‗expiry date‘; for now, she 
feels it is justifiable to base her work on previous rather than current contacts 
and on memories of the field but in the long term this would be ‗morally‘ 
untenable. Similarly, Laura speaks of the ‗freshness‘ of experiences, which 
passes after a while. “I think all of us working in this department have past 
experiences of working in the field and I think somehow you rely on that, but 
that‟s fresh, it is something that goes away, the feeling of it goes away so you 
have to renew it and we know that, we know that we have to travel otherwise 
we will become bitter and depressed”. 
 
For her, the experience of being closer to what happens on the ground is 
important for motivation, as she feels that ‗change‘ is more easily observed 
there. Laura‘s personal circumstances (getting pregnant since she started the 
job and now caring for two young children) have prevented her from 
‗renewing‘ this experience. Interestingly, she compensates for her lack of 
opportunities to witness positive change on the ground abroad with 
experiences much closer to home: “But I think also for me personally I also 
have, I work in a women‟s shelter here as a volunteer and I think that has 
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proven to be very helpful for me because that is very, very practical and it is 
sort of the kind of work where I can see, I meet the actual women that have 
been raped or beaten up and I can sort of see, meet someone that is changing, 
so sometimes I feel that I get that there when I don‟t get it in my work”. 
 
Laura emphasises how her volunteer work gives her very practical face-to-face 
contact and proximity to change, which is lacking in her formal employment. I 
would argue that this is a very powerful ‗replacement strategy‘: it shifts the 
focus from the distant Other, addresses the lack of practical ‗hands-on‘ field 
work, lack of direct contact with the beneficiaries of the projects, and lack of 
visibility for those based in Western NGOs in capital cities close to centres of 
national governments, the EU or the UN. This will be discussed in further 
detail in the next section.  
 
Partner Organisations: Bridge and Replacement  
 As I suggested in the previous section, another ‗strategy‘ –and I would 
suggest here that this was the most dominant approach among the research 
participants– for bridging the distance is that partner organisations (the 
intermediaries between those NGOs in Brussels, Geneva, Stockholm and 
Copenhagen and the ‗people on the ground‘) serve both as a ‗bridge‘ to and as 
a ‗replacement‘ for the beneficiaries or target group. While the focus of this 
section is on the perceptions of the women NGO workers of the role of their 
partners in reaching out across distance, it is imperative to provide a structural 
context of the functioning of partnerships. Stirrat and Henkel (1997) maintain 
that nowadays many Northern NGOs have no direct contact anymore with 
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their beneficiaries but relate to them only through a chain of Southern NGOs, 
who are described as ‗partners‘. Since a possible task of partner organisations 
can be the ―receiving and entertaining‖ of visiting representatives of Northern 
NGOs and the provision of ―stories and pictures‖ (Eade 2007:636), there is a 
clear link between field visits, stories and partnerships (Hudock 1999:9).  
 
The notion of ‗partnership‘ suggests a more equal relationship, rather than the 
asymmetric relationship of giver and receiver of funding. However, with many 
other critics, Stirrat and Henkel note that ―partnership is a peculiarly 
ambiguous concept‖ (Stirrat and Henkel 1997:75, see also Hudock 1999), 
while Smillie claims that the notion of partnership can mask ―the same 
paternalism the South started to know when Portuguese navigators first sailed 
down the coast of West Africa‖ (Smillie 2000:185). On the one hand 
‗partnership‘ can denote a shared identity, while on the other hand it masks the 
differences between the NGOs due to the remaining asymmetry of power 
between givers and receivers (Stirrat and Henkel 1997, Noxolo 2000). 
Moreover, Stirrat and Henkel (1997) note that partnership as a shared identity 
serves the Northern NGOs well as it provides them with certain legitimacy 
when they can claim to represent the authentic needs and desires of Southern 
people.  
 
One way in which the asymmetry of power between Northern NGO and 
Southern partner is expressed is that the donating Northern NGOs are in the 
position to choose their partners, which logically results in a choice of partners 
with similar aims and goals (Smillie 2000). Implications of the power of 
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Northern NGOs to select their partners (―donor ‗cherry-picking‘, treating 
NGOs like a buffet lunch, taking what they like and leaving the rest‖) means 
that Southern NGOs have to spend considerable time writing funding 
proposals, that they cannot be certain of long term continuation of funding or 
coverage of overhead costs, and that they have to survive delays in decision-
making and money transferring processes (Smillie 2000:185). The result of 
this structure is a weakening rather than a strengthening of Southern NGOs 
(Smillie 2000:185). However, as Eyben (2006) points out, it is important to 
realise that the binary of donor-recipient obscures the fact that many 
organisations, (including some of the Northern organisations the women NGO 
workers that I interviewed worked for), both receive and donate money.  
 
Having provided a sense of the significance of the relations with the partner 
organisations, I will now trace the notion of partnership in the interview 
accounts paying particular attention to the funding relation, the donor‘s power 
to select, the burden on partners and the ambivalences of participation. Many 
of the research participants stated that their main contact was with the partner 
organisations rather than with the beneficiaries of their projects. For example, 
when I ask Stacey whether she has contact with the people who eventually 
benefit from the projects of her organisation, she says: “Do I have a direct 
contact with them? Do I have direct connection? Yes, sometimes. In a mission 
there is always opportunity for direct contact. The people that I meet though 
on mission tend to be other partners”. Casey states: “Right now I am working 
with other NGO partners, (…) and I relate to them, to the partners, not 
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necessarily to the target group in the streets of Uganda or in a hilly 
environment in Vietnam”.  
 
Laura reacts thus: “Not that much, no. I mean our primary strategy, what we 
are interested in is effects in the target groups and in the partner 
organisations. The whole focus of [my organisation] is to work with civil 
society organisations but of course at the end of the day what concerns us is 
that it has some effect on the target group. But we have chosen here to work 
mainly through the [national] organisations and their partner organisations, 
which means that our team, we sort of rely on a chain that works, we are not 
sure all the time how well it works but we rely on that somehow to work”.   
 
Laura‘s response betrays some doubts and insecurity about whether the long 
‗chain‘ from her organisation, to national organisations, to partners and finally 
to beneficiaries always functions. However, at the same time, as she says, she 
also needs to rely on this chain to work. The image of a ‗chain‘ might not 
adequately describe the irregularities within the partnership due to the power 
differences and the different contexts. Eyben suggests the idea of a ―web‖ 
instead of a chain to capture ―the diversity and complexity of networks and 
connections of power‖ between different organisations that are partnered in 
the aid system (Eyben 2006:2). Anna‘s account similarly betrays some 
discomfort about the lack of direct relation with the beneficiaries of the 
project.  
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Anna: “And I think on that note, I am just trying to think about whether I 
feel… I feel responsibility towards [my organisation], I feel less responsibility 
for the…, I can‟t believe I am admitting this, but I feel less responsibility for 
the recipients of the project. But I feel responsibility towards the national 
partners, and so I feel that somehow I feel responsibility towards them, and 
they in some way they take on the mantel of responsibility towards the people. 
Because I think on just some level, it is just impossible for me to feel connected 
to each recipient”.  
 
For Anna, the question of the relation between her and the ‗recipients‘ (as she 
calls them) is not only a question of whether her work has still any effect when 
it is mediated through so many different parties (as in Laura‘s account) but it 
is one of responsibility. She states that she feels more responsibility towards 
the national partners, and while she tells me this, she feels quite uncomfortable 
about that as well, which is expressed in her hesitations and her insertion of ‗I 
can‘t believe I am admitting this‘. At the same time, Anna justifies her lack of 
feeling of responsibility towards the people on the ground by saying that she 
thinks it is just impossible for her to still feel connected across such a distance 
to people she might either never meet or only fleetingly. Anna, after telling me 
what is quoted above, continued questioning herself and her choice to work in 
a place far removed from ‗the field‘ and notices that she must feel a degree of 
guilt about it as she otherwise would not try so hard to explain ‗why I do what 
I do‘. I will return to Anna‘s feeling of guilt and to reasons why the research 
participants decided to work and to be based in Northern capital cities despite 
the clear discomfort they experienced in the next section of this chapter.  
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Casey is quite confident about her own dealings with the partners due to her 
experience: “I am quite familiar with NGO partners in Africa, in Asia. Not 
these particular partners but in general, so I have so many communications, 
relationships with this type of partners, (…) it does not mean that I know them 
deep at heart, but I am quite familiar with this working relationship”. 
Interestingly, she perceives her partners not necessarily in terms of their 
specific identity but rather in terms of their common identity as partners. 
Casey emphasises the nature of the working relationship, which she feels is 
very familiar to her now due to her experience, over the aims or the quality of 
the partner organisation itself.  
 
She continues however also to problematise this relation: “Basically, because 
there is a constant schism within development work, because you are at the 
same time a donor with a strong employer identity, but you are also a political 
partner in development work as such. And this conflict is the main conflict in 
this type of work”. So on the one hand, Casey identifies the asymmetric power 
dimension in the relation with the partners as she remains the donor, while on 
the other hand, politically, she views the partner organisations as allies in a 
common struggle. She even calls this the ‗main conflict‘ in the work. This 
resonates very closely with Stirrat and Henkel‘s idea that ‗the gift‘ is central to 
the inequality in the relation between Northern (donor) organisations and 
Southern organisations on the receiving end. They state:  
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―The gift creates a series of problematic relations, frequently ambiguous in 
terms of their meaning and often paradoxical in terms of their implications. 
Most notably, while the gift is given in ways that attempt to deny difference 
and assert identity between the rich giver and the poor receiver, a gift in 
practice reinforces or even reinvents these differences‖ (Stirrat and Henkel 
1997:69, see also Eyben 2007b).  
 
Whereas with the term ‗partners‘ the ambiguity of the power relation can be 
maintained, the term ‗donor‘ leaves no doubt about who is at the giving end of 
the relation. Maria Erikson Baaz argues that the language of partnership 
instead of that of donors and receivers, ―does not, of course, imply a reversal 
of the economic conditions characteristic of the aid relationship‖ (Baaz 
2005:75). 
 
Kate is similarly aware of how money disrupts the partner relationship and 
influences the power dynamic. Hence, she feels fortunate that in her work she 
does not decide on the funding for partners: “Now, I am in a bit of a privileged 
position because we are not giving money to any of the partners we are 
dealing with, so the funding issue is out [of that relationship]. Because I 
would say, as soon as you have money and funds, it is clear that you have a 
difference of position and the demanding partner can be quite self confident 
and know what to do but as a matter of fact the imbalance is there, because of 
the dependency on that money. (…) So what I see with colleagues who are in 
the position of doing funding, they are in a privileged position because they 
are important, because they have the money, so you have to credit them, so a 
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partner will relate differently to someone who is their funding relating partner 
than someone else”. 
 
Significantly, Kate attributes the word ‗privilege‘ to both the position of not 
having to give out funding and to the position where one does give out 
funding. She seems to deliberately have chosen to use the word ‗privileged‘ in 
the first instance in a counter intuitive way, being privileged because you have 
less power and hence less of a power imbalance. However, her second use of 
the word ‗privilege‘ slips back in the conventional use of the term to indicate 
power and status. She continues to explain that her lack of funding power 
makes it possible for her to “perhaps engage in a more frank dialogue” with 
her partners as they are not forced to take her suggestions on board, which 
they would have been if there was money at stake. Also, the lack of money 
means that the outcome of their cooperation is not dictated in advance.  
 
Elisa mentioned that her organisation “always look[s] for strong partners in 
the region”. By ‗strong‘ she means that the partner is experienced and well-
connected both with the mainstream and the grassroots level. Because her 
organisation is in the position to give the partner organisation some money, 
they have decided that if a Southern partner receives money from them “they 
must get involved in fundraising [in their country], there is no reason why the 
countries should not be interested in these issues so they should be targeted 
and when they see, when they realise that there is co-sponsor, is it an 
important process, an empowerment process and whenever you do projects 
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now everyone asks for co-funding now, this is the new world, nobody will give 
you the full amount anymore”.  
 
Here one can observe that the discourses of dependency and independence are 
simultaneously articulated. On the one hand, it is only by virtue of dependency 
on their funding that the Northern NGO can compel the Southern partner to 
also seek funding within their own country. On the other hand this is clouded 
in the language of empowerment; partners should be empowered to get 
additional funding. This capacity building, empowering the Southern 
organisation to do their own fundraising does not address the power difference 
between Northern and Southern organisations, which is essentially the root of 
the issue (Hudock 1999). Strikingly, the countries‘ ‗interest in these issues‘ is 
equated with giving out funding. Finally, when Elisa says ‗that this is the new 
world‘ in which nobody gets full funding anymore, she diminishes the 
difference in position between the Northern and Southern organisations. This 
is also expressed in her idea that ‗there should be no reason‘ why countries in 
the South should not be interested in the proposed projects which ignores the 
specific local situations.  
 
In contrast, Ruth‘s organisation, because of its radical agenda, does not get 
any structural governmental funding but is rather dependent on private funding 
and is not in a donor position. Similar to Kate‘s ambivalent use of the term 
‗privilege‘, Ruth uses ‗luck‘ in a contradictory way to indicate that the positive 
feature of not getting funding is that their organisation is positioned outside 
the funding competition among NGOs. Ruth: “Well, we are lucky in that sense 
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that it is really hard to get funding, well, it is not lucky, I mean of course we 
are not lucky but government funding we never got and we will never have 
because it is much too controversial what we are doing”.  
 
As a consequence of their own weak financial situation and the fact that they 
do not donate money, the relation between Ruth‘s organisation and their 
partner organisations is different. Rather than demanding from their partner 
organisations to do their own fundraising (like Elisa‘s organisation), they help 
their partner organisations to fundraise, diminishing the financial dependency 
power relation between the Northern and the Southern organisation.  
 
Ruth: “I am not giving them my money (…) and that is nice because they don‟t 
have to pay responsibility to me, you know they have to do it to the funders 
and not to me and I help them; I know the funders so I can. (…) And that 
makes it more equal as well, they don‟t have to say „you gave us 10 000 
dollars this is what we did with it‟, no, I don‟t care as long as we have an 
agreement; this is your responsibility to pay for that, that‟s our responsibility 
to pay for this”.  
 
While the notions of partnerships and capacity building of Southern 
organisations originated from a left-wing political tradition, nowadays it is 
often used to advance a ―neo-liberal ‗pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps‘ 
(…) economic and political agenda‖ (Eade 2007:632). It is important for 
NGOs who use this partnership rhetoric to be conscious of how these 
competing agendas play out (Eade 2007) and for them to realise that the 
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problems that occur in the relationship between Southern and Northern NGOs 
are ―essentially political, not organisational‖ (Hudock 1999:31). Moreover, the 
procedures and criteria for selecting partners or members of a network used by 
powerful organisations, like Elisa‘s organisation, are not without criticism.  
 
The European Women‘s Lobby (EWL), the largest umbrella organisation of 
women‘s associations in the European Union and first point of call for the EU 
in relation to women‘s issues, has for example been criticised by Czech 
women NGOs for taking an ―exclusive and monopolistic‖ position, which they 
can only afford due to their powerful status (Hašková 2005:1103). They 
argued that the EWL with its ‗power to select‘ excluded feminist organisations 
with a different perspective on prostitution while allowing organisations in 
their network who were in fact marginal players in the Czech context and 
therefore not representative of the Czech women‘s movement. Despite their 
criticism, however, as one of the women from the Czech women‘s NGOs 
pointed out, due to the EWL‘s powerful position they also decided to sign up 
for membership:  ―We are a bit sceptical about the organisation, but we want 
to be members from the practical point of view. It is better to be in than to be 
out‖ (Hašková 2005: 1103). It is therefore necessary to imagine this ‗other 
side of the story‘ when reading the women NGO workers‘ narratives about the 
selection of partners for their own networks.  
 
Like Elisa, Sonia links the issue of working through partners with selecting 
partners: “I think that it is true that this organisation does not fully, directly 
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work with grassroots women maybe we work with women through the women 
that we have selected first”.  
She then continues: “I think that is also because it is for them to be able to 
talk to each other better, I think. Like maybe we are at a level because of 
probably our education that we can talk directly to these women that we have 
invited and all those things but maybe it would be more difficult for us to talk 
to the others [at the grassroots], so it is through the [women we invite] that we 
have to reach the others”  
Interviewer: “So the people you are talking to are some kind of mediators 
almost?” 
Sonia: “Yes, yes. There are people you know that can talk to the grassroots 
level and at the same time can come here and talk to [highly placed 
politicians]” 
 
Kate similarly argues: “Because in the lobbying advocacy process you need 
people, who need to be both; they have to be part of, and distinguished from 
their group to be really able to say something valuable or new here. Because 
if they would only be very closely linked to their context or their broader 
group and then you put them here in the context [and] you have a policy 
discussion or debate and there is a particular question which is new to the 
person, [because] they have different policy debates back home, you would 
need a person (Interviewer: “that can travel both contexts”), yes, they can 
reflect for themselves and think and give the appropriate answer”. 
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Firstly, Sonia‘s account shows a homogenising of the people placed in the 
Southern country, which is reflected in Sonia‘s use of the word ‗them‘. At the 
same time, Sonia divides this group in those who are not educated and those 
who are, arguing that those who are educated and who have a professional 
career have the capacity to communicate both to the ‗uneducated in the South‘ 
and to the ‗educated in the North‘ and represent the South politically. What is 
interesting is that education is presented here as both enabling, (because the 
women from the South who are partners and presumably educated have an 
increased mobility) and also as disabling for the people who work in the North 
(because according to Sonia it posits barriers to understanding).  
 
Southern NGOs have become increasingly important in the development 
process due to assumptions that ―they are ‗closer to the people‘ and share a 
common culture with those who are to benefit from the activities supported by 
Northern NGOs‖ (Stirrat and Henkel 1997:74). Thus ideas of affiliation are 
here based on ‗sameness‘ of identity rather than on, for example, shared 
political goals. While Sonia recognises the qualities of the Southern women 
they work with and the difficulties for her organisation to communicate 
directly with grassroots women, she also defends the existence of her 
organisation by asserting that the ‗women on the ground‘ do not have the tools 
to report back to donors, to design and implement projects, to lobby the UN 
(as they lack consultative status) and that they do not have stable structures.  
 
However, if Northern NGOs continue advocating on behalf of the Southern 
partners, the danger is that the capacities of the Southern partners are 
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diminished and that they are not empowered to speak on their own terms 
(Eade 2007). This is reinforced by the fact that Northern NGOs, aided by their 
good connections and cultural capital, often continue to be seen as the most 
reliable providers of knowledge about the situation in the global South (Hahn 
and Holzscheiter 2005). As Kothari (2005:428) argues, the ―intellectual 
distance between donor and recipient‖ is sustained and the status of donors 
and expatriate development consultants is maintained through (the constant re-
invention of) cultural capital, such as forms of professionalism, awareness of 
new fashions in development (such as participatory approaches), and new 
techniques (see also Hahn and Holzscheiter 2005).  
 
Sonia‘s account is also still centred on the unquestioned assumption of the 
centrality of the organisation she works for, for whom ‗issues of 
communication‘ need to be resolved. She does not question why her 
organisation can demand to work with partners that can ‗translate‘ between the 
two levels. This is problematic. In Kate‘s account we can see the same thing; 
in order to be regarded as ‗contributing something valuable‘, partners are 
required to both ‗be part of, and distinguished from their group‘. This means 
that they carry a double burden, which organisations in the North do not carry. 
This signals a wider issue of the demands placed upon partner organisations in 
the South, which in many cases are very short staffed and have few resources. 
It reflects a peculiar relation in which the Northern organisations are often 
dependent on partner organisations in the South for credibility, ‗translating‘ 
between grassroots women and Northern organisations, while at the same time 
their power (sometimes directly expressed in financial power of the Northern 
 300 
organisation) means that they can demand cooperation, including reporting 
and accountability from their Southern partners (see Smillie 2000).  
 
For example, Catherine talks about the contact between her organisation and 
its national partners: “The big problem is that they are very busy, so they work 
at the national level and then we come to ask them for more work. It is really, 
like we send papers and ask them to comment or ask them to send amendments 
and that is really a lot of work so that can be really difficult and you have to 
go back to people several times and respect the fact that they have a lot to do 
and have little resources etcetera, so that can be challenging sometimes”.  
 
Gill is even more specific than Catherine in her evaluation of her demands and 
the burden that it puts on the partner organisations in the South: “I mean, it is 
very easy for me to get a little bit frustrated at home, „I need this information 
now from my volunteer in the South, and why doesn‟t he deliver or why do I 
get it in a way that I don‟t understand?‟ without really having an 
understanding of the kind of struggles he or she has to deal with and the 
difficulties of living there. I mean I know a little bit of this picture, but I think I 
will need more of this picture to really understand how it is for them to really 
work in this situation, what are the struggles really and then it is more easier I 
think to assist them or to collaborate with them in a North-South relation”.  
 
Kate stresses the need for flexibility in the relation with partners: “If it is a 
new partner, (…) you have to learn about the person, how that person is 
setting a situation and how flexible they are, and how ideological maybe, or 
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how non-political, what is their mandate or their internal constraints, how far 
they can go. And I think the better one is understanding the realities of the 
different actors and accepting perhaps that there are different constraints and 
different flexibilities, the more easy you can construct or do something 
together”. 
 
All three narratives quoted here show an awareness of the difficult 
circumstances and the restrictions the Southern partner organisations are faced 
with. Research in 1992 among Kenyan and Zimbabwean NGOs about their 
reflections on their relations with their Northern NGO partners found however 
that there was a discrepancy between the way the Northern and the Southern 
organisations viewed the relationship, with the Southern organisations being 
much less happy than presented by the organisations in the North (research by 
Carmen Malena quoted in: Smillie 2000). It is important that in this process of 
consultation with the Southern NGOs, Northern NGOs also feel a 
responsibility for accounting back to the Southern partner (Eade 2007). The 
accounts of Catherine and Gill both suggest some discomfort in having to ask 
the partners to do certain jobs. However, the fact that Southern organisations 
do not always immediately ‗deliver‘ (due to for example their financial 
limitations, their shortage of staff) also discloses the dependency of the 
Northern organisations on the Southern organisations, e.g. the non-delivery 
causes ‗frustrations‘, ‗problems‘, it is ‗really difficult‘ and ‗challenging‘.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that not all Northern NGOs choose their partner 
organisations in the same way. As Naomi explains, NGOs that are 
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membership organisations work with their members as partners: “[It is also] 
challenging to support (…) member associations. You know we are different 
from many global humanitarian organisations or global NGOs who basically 
pick and choose who their country level partners are, you know the Oxfams of 
this world decide who they want to work with, so they choose the best of the 
bunch and if for some reason they are not meeting their reporting standards of 
whatever they can just drop them and move on to someone else. Whereas we 
work with our member associations so that gives a different set of challenges 
you know. You have to work with the women who are running these 
associations, (…) and we don‟t have authority to be able to say „this is mother 
world [organisation‟s name omitted] talking, and you know you must do 
this‟(…). And I guess also, we also can‟t control how responsive the [national 
member organisations] are (…) they may not have the capacity or they may 
not have the desire to want to do that, (…) I mean obviously we negotiate, we 
talk, we do what we can do, but ultimately at the end of the day it is up to 
them”. Naomi explicitly contrasts her experience of her cooperation and 
partnership with the situation for ‗the Oxfams of this world‘ and also talks 
about the challenge of ‗supporting them‘ rather than just receiving their 
support in terms of information and moral legitimacy.  
 
Gill works in a secretariat that is the focal point of a worldwide network. She 
speaks about the importance of the partners in legitimising the actions and 
policy proposals of the secretariat: “because as a network you can do much 
more than as a secretariat and I mean especially in advocacy work of course if 
you don‟t have organisations in the South fighting against Free trade 
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agreement, who are we? It is of course good to have Northern NGOs say also 
„yeah, that is really bad‟, but you need the South, that‟s as simple as that”.  
 
As Gill points out, they need the Southern organisations to legitimise their 
work; this is much more than just needing information from the ground. In the 
mid-1980s Northern development NGOs faced an ―identity crisis‖ when the 
intervention of Northern development workers on the ground was questioned, 
which resulted in the fact that since the 1990s most Northern NGOs have 
worked with Southern partners, introducing new concepts such as 
accountability and participation (Smillie 2000). In addition, it has become 
clear from the above accounts that partnerships are not only essential for the 
legitimacy of the organisation, but are also important as sources of information 
and motivation for the women NGO workers, in other words, for bridging the 
distance between the ‗office‘ and the ‗field‘ (see also Hudock 1999). Sizoo 
(1996) points to the fact that Northern donors also have an interest in 
providing money both on an organisational level as it justifies the existence of 
the organisation and on a personal level where it brings job satisfaction and 
new relations.  
 
At the same time, for some reason this clearly mutual dependency does not 
seem to result in a real equality between the organisations. Is that because 
money transfers from the Northern to the Southern organisations are often 
prior to the work delivered so that the Northern organisations can still demand 
delivery from a Southern organisation that ‗owes‘ them something? If the 
relation is perceived that way, it is conceptualised as ‗reciprocal‘ rather than 
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‗mutual‘, with the first one implying the return of a favour, ―action-reaction‖, 
while the latter implies ―independent action from both sides‖ (Sizoo 
1996:197:ftn.7). The recognition of mutuality in the relation through the 
recognition of the value of non-material contributions could alter the 
understanding of partnerships between the global North and the South (Sizoo 
1996). If the partnership is conceptualised as a common journey that both 
organisations embark on, the fact that ―[the Northern NGOs] paid to fill up the 
tank does not give [them] the right to determine the route‖ (Eade 2007:637). 
However, as Kapoor recognises ―self-constitution is (…) integral to the gift‖ 
as the donor invests not only in another organisation but also in its own status 
and identity (Kapoor 2008:77). As long as NGOs and NGO workers are not 
willing to relinquish this, partnerships will remain contaminated by money.  
 
It is worth following Gill‘s reflections on partner organisations a bit further as 
her account betrays exactly the kind of contradictions in partnership that 
Stirrat and Henkel (1997) address. The contradictions of her account on 
partnership arise at two different levels. First, Gill presents partner 
organisations as equal in power and contrasts this relation to the relation with 
other organisations that are outside the partner network. She describes a 
particularly painful and challenging encounter with a Southern organisation 
and expresses her belief that this situation would have been resolved if there 
had been a partnership between the organisations. On the second level, 
however, as will become clear, later in the interview she identifies some 
insecurities and a lack of confidence on the side of the partners that do show 
that there are still inequalities also in that relationship.  
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Gill says: “I feel like the women we are working with, they are so empowered 
and so strong and so capable, I mean, yes, it is good sometimes to enable them 
to go to meetings and offer financial support and it is good for us to have them 
at our conferences, but I definitely don‟t feel, I mean we are helping each 
other, it is not like we are helping them, it is from both ways. So I don‟t feel 
there is an [Interviewer: “unequal relationship”], yeah”. 
 
Unfortunately, I have interrupted Gill here and suggested the term ‗unequal 
relationship‘ which she confirms with her ‗yeah‘ but in her own words she 
says that ‗we are helping each other‘ denoting a relationship of reciprocity. It 
is interesting to see how she describes the women as empowered, strong and 
capable, which raises the questions: ‗are others less capable?‘ and ‗is this a 
measure of equality or inequality?‘ Additionally, the term ‗empowering‘ still 
denotes a position prior to the empowerment that was inferior and/or victim-
like. Do we all need to be empowered or is this term only applicable to some 
of us? 
 
I asked Gill whether there were ever situations in which a Southern 
organisation challenged the position of her secretariat. She then recalls an 
example of a ‗group of women that were from Africa‘, not partners, who were 
introduced to them by another organisation. This group told them that they felt 
Gill‘s organisation should work on a certain policy issue, which Gill‘s 
organisation had decided not to regard as one of their main priorities: “And 
they were like „yeah, but Africa is not really prioritised‟ you could kind of feel 
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like „we are being marginalised again‟, that kind of atmosphere. We tried to 
kind of, you know, be polite and also be open to say „ok we will try if you have 
issues we will pass them on to [a certain] working group and you are always 
welcome to contact us and if you have issues please let us know.‟ And this is 
then how you try to resolve it. But sometimes it is difficult if you don‟t really 
have the time to go into depth, to really explain from your perspective that 
they understand it and for them not to feel „ok we are being marginalised‟ or 
„ok, it is again the Western European imperialists that are telling us what to 
do‟, because sometimes you feel this kind of tension and they also said 
something in that direction”.  
 
It becomes clear from this narrative, as has been discussed in the fifth chapter, 
that current relations between Northern and Southern organisations are still 
mediated through the history of colonialism and racist discourses. Gill 
explains that she personally ‗did not lie‘ awake over this situation but that a 
colleague found the situation very challenging. What is interesting is that this 
exchange does not seem to have prompted her to reconsider the position of her 
organisation; rather, she focussed on making the group of African women 
understand why they made a certain strategic decision. So the ones that 
misunderstand the situation are the African women, not her secretariat in the 
North.  
 
As she indicates that there ‗was [no] time to go into depth‘, I asked her 
whether she thought that with more time this issue would have been resolved. 
This is where she introduces partnership as a way to establish an equal 
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relationship: “In one meeting you don‟t resolve this, this is really something 
you resolve through a partnership, and even then I heard stories from people 
and even then if organisations are not really open to discuss their initial ideas, 
even then it cannot be resolved, so…”.  
 
Further in the interview she repeats this idea: “What also makes a network 
strong is that you work with people, you try to build enduring relations, with 
the people in the network, because they all share the same political vision, 
they work on the same issues, I think you can then create a collective identity. 
So then -I mean I don‟t know what they have thought before they entered that 
process- but definitely then they see [my organisation] also just as partner and 
not in this North-South division”.  
 
Gill‘s narrative is exemplary of the tendency of Northern NGOs who can 
select their own partners to select those organisations with which they share a 
common agenda so that the relation can be more easily based on mutual trust 
and equality. However, in the context of differences in power, a common 
agenda does not automatically lead to mutual accountability. While Gill points 
out the importance of taking to time to build a relationship with partner 
organisations, institutional pressures can result in trying to establish a relation 
with the partner organisations during ―two-hour meetings around a bargaining 
table‖, which is not conducive to good partner relationships (Smillie 
2000:194).  
 
When I suggest that another reason why they could not discuss this tension 
openly might have been the formality of the meeting, Gill says: “I don‟t feel 
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this was because of the formality of meeting but more if people have these 
engrained ideas (…), that they are being the poor South, and the people in the 
EU are not listening to them, and the NGOs are also much stronger than them 
and they have this perspective. I think sometimes it takes much more time to 
change that, maybe if they have the chance to live here for a month and work 
in this kind of organisation, that maybe helps to change their mind but there is 
not that… or maybe even if they keep exchanging with their partners they 
would change their mind, I don‟t know”. 
 
Again, the source of the tension is attributed to some misunderstanding on the 
side of the African women. Elsewhere, Gill does indicate that she also 
identified her own prejudices when she travelled to Uganda and in that sense 
she sees the holding of prejudices as something that is common to everyone. 
On the other hand though, she implies that mobility, experience in other 
countries and contact with other cultures take away these prejudices. She 
recognises that the average person from the South has a smaller chance to be 
able to travel abroad than a person in the North and concludes that therefore 
for them it is even harder to rid themselves of their prejudice. So while on the 
one hand, she seems to believe that people from the South cannot help holding 
prejudices (as they have less opportunity to have the myths they hold about 
others challenged through travelling), she also holds them responsible for the 
uncomfortable atmosphere in the meeting. So the burden of overcoming this 
tension is mainly on the side of the African women. In addition, she dismisses 
the claims of the women that they were not being prioritised linking these to 
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‗engrained ideas‘ or prejudices rather than as being rooted in real historical 
practices and material realities.  
 
We could see above that Gill suggested that partnership was a way to 
overcome North-South divisions, which could initially be present in 
encounters between her organisation and a Southern organisation. She stressed 
how ‗strong and empowered‘ the Southern partners are and how the helping 
relation is mutual. Later in our conversation, however, she tells me that one of 
the main challenges she would like to address in her work is to encourage the 
partner organisations to take and have more ‗ownership‘ of the network, for 
example, by being involved with making the annual plans. When I ask her 
what the current obstacles are to this involvement, she says: “Of course time is 
an issue, also that they feel there is a competence here, that they don‟t feel 
maybe that their ideas will be that good or that they will be that competent to 
really contribute or also that they are not the persons that will really do the 
implementation”.  
 
This means that the same women who she called capable, strong and 
empowered at the same time display an insecurity concerning their 
competence to contribute. Rather than attributing this contradiction to Gill‘s 
personal account as simply incoherent, I would argue that this contradiction is 
indicative of the ambivalent discourse on partnerships between Northern and 
Southern organisations as being equal and unequal at the same time. A 
contradictory relationship like this one explains other apparent contradictions, 
like ‗being forced to be empowered through own fundraising‘, and ‗being 
forced to be an equal participating partner‘.  
 310 
 
Anna similarly notices that the ideal of a participatory approach in her work 
has not always translated easily into practice: “I mean there are downsides as 
well, the downsides I would say are when you focus very much on the sort of 
participatory approach (…) you sometimes can get project proposals which 
sort of just mirror the language that [my organisation] would use and it is 
hard to know where the national partners‟ real thoughts are, because what 
they are putting in there is more a reflection of what [my organisation] is 
putting out there from the start”.  
 
Here it is clear that the partners still feel under pressure to produce what they 
expect the Northern funding organisation would like to hear from them, 
implying that the process of participation is very much influenced by the 
power dynamics at stake. Baaz (2005) similarly observed that donor 
organisations working with the idea of partnership present themselves as open 
to the ideas of the partner organisations and as seeking to strengthen the 
partners‘ position in expressing their needs. As she states:  
 
―In this way the partners are urged to articulate their needs and goals as if 
there were no stakes involved. This is, of course, not the case. There are 
stakes involved, which, among other things, concern access to, or potential 
access to, economic resources‖ (Baaz 2005:74, see also Noxolo 2000).  
 
Charles Elliott describes the ‗dialogue‘ between partners, between the donors 
and Southern organisations, as ―a dialogue of the unequal‖ which is 
characterised by a ―reality (…) that the donor can do to the recipient what the 
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recipient cannot do to the donor‖ (Elliott 1987:65, see also Sizoo 1996). He 
also stresses with the term ―well-intentioned dialogue‖ (Elliott 1987:65) that 
this is not necessarily a question of bad intentions on the side of the donor 
organisation; rather the power inequality is so deeply embedded that good 
intentions cannot eradicate this. Elliott (1987) also observes that many 
Southern partner organisations have developed strategies to deal with the 
demands of the donor without fundamentally changing their own way of 
working. This would include using the ‗right‘ language by saying what donors 
want to hear and by making changes that the donor demands in ways that are 
only seemingly effective, as they do not address the real concerns.  
 
These ambivalent discourses also have an impact on Pauline‘s work. The 
organisation that arranged the volunteer placement for Pauline asked its 
partners to do a needs assessment to determine what skills they would like the 
volunteers to bring to them. The engagement between the Northern volunteer 
and the Southern partner organisation should be based on the ‗skill-sharing‘ of 
the volunteer.  
 
Pauline reflects: “It is a really good idea to get the organisation to say what 
needs they have, and find people to deal with these things, but it is very 
difficult for an organisation that can‟t think long-term and can‟t strategically 
plan long-term to sit there and go „well, this year I think we need a public 
health educator, and next year we have this, and next year we have that…‟”. 
Hence the idea of her Northern organisation responsible for the volunteer 
placement to give the Southern organisation more independence resulted in an 
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extra burden on the organisation. In addition, the request for initiative from the 
Southern organisation is still premised on the decision on the appropriate 
procedure from the Northern organisation.  
 
Pauline found herself torn between the demands of the organisation that sent 
her abroad and the organisation she volunteered for: “And it was difficult 
sometimes, in terms of, sometimes the organisation wanted me to just do the 
job, sometimes they wanted me just to write the project proposal, and I had to 
do discussions and do certain, think about certain methods that I could do to 
get them involved because to me, one of the agendas of [my Northern 
organisation] was skills sharing, so it is difficult to think about these kind of 
things and how that affects you”.   
 
Her loyalty seems to lie eventually with the Northern organisation that 
selected her as a volunteer, but at the same time she seems to display some 
discomfort or at least experiences a challenge in ‗forcing‘ the Southern 
organisation into a participatory relationship of ‗skill sharing‘ which seemed 
counter to the demands of the particular organisation at that time. Stirrat and 
Henkel contrast the ‗gifts‘ in relief work, which are normally tangible material 
goods, with the gift in other development work, which normally takes the form 
of empowerment programmes. They describe ―a certain embarrassment‖ in 
foreign NGO workers when they give out goods (as it very openly shows 
dependency) while ―persuading the poor to form groups, to participate, to 
empower themselves‖ is seen as ―proper development‖ (Stirrat and Henkel 
1997:73).  
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Negotiating Distance 
The accounts above, in some way or another, always maintain a division 
between the organisation in the North, the partner organisation in the South 
and the final beneficiaries on the ground. Stacey, however, challenged that 
split and claimed adamantly that the dominant assumption that those are neatly 
separated is wrong. When she describes that indeed she often meets the 
partners rather than the designated beneficiaries of the projects, she says: “I 
think often you know there is an automatic assumption that when we work on 
gender that people that are working in gender are not affected by gender 
relations, which is completely not true (…) Inevitably the people that I meet 
along the way who are in what some would consider positions of power in 
their own communities are still very much affected by gender inequality, still 
live the, you know norms, roles and relations that affect everyone and not 
simply marginalised groups. (…)  So for me the women that we work with in 
that sense are very much also a part of my target audience, it is not only the 
women that are coming to health centres for services but it is also women who 
are making decisions as to how these health centres work whether they be 
members of government whether they be members of another agency or fellow 
staff members (…) they are also part of it”.  
 
In this account, Stacey collapses the distinction made between partners and 
target group saying that the partners are effectively her target group. She 
justifies this both by pointing to the obstacles the partners are facing due to 
gendered power structures and to the fact that her organisation‘s mandate 
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states a responsibility towards the partners. So, in contrast to some of the 
above accounts (where partner organisations are perceived as the bridge 
between the Northern organisations and the eventual beneficiaries, or where 
the partner organisations even become the main focus), for Stacey, the 
distinction between these different groups is not very meaningful. She speaks 
of an ‗organisational blindness‘ towards these women who are part of her own 
organisation or partners of her organisation in the sense that these women are 
often perceived as standing outside the gender inequalities that they seek to 
address worldwide. There is a dominant assumption, and one that I arguably 
also made in the interview with her, that the women who are working in her 
field are an ‗emancipated‘ elite with very different experiences compared to 
those ‗on the ground‘. Stacey however emphasises the continuity between the 
gender struggles of all women wherever they are positioned, in the sense that 
all face similar structural inequalities, or as she puts it ‗norms, roles and 
relations that affect everyone and not simply marginalised groups‘. Whereas 
the above account is more focussed on the idea of partners in the South as 
target group, later in the interview Stacey also speaks of herself and her 
colleagues in the North as being equally implicated in gender struggles and 
inequalities. As this extract has a real poignancy, it is worth quoting at greater 
length.  
 
Stacey: “Going back to something I said before that people assume that those 
of us that work in international institutions that work on gender equality and 
women‟s empowerment that we don‟t have to deal with these issues ourselves. 
That assumption is very, very clear and that has played out, that, for example 
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once someone asked me to review footage of some film clips that they were 
planning on showing in last year‟s international women‟s year event which 
was around ending impunity for violence against women in emergency and 
conflict settings, and there was no warning that the material I was about to 
open was very graphic, very difficult. No warning as to what the content 
would be at all, so that I could choose to open it or that I could not open it. No 
support provided, no thought. (…) And the fact that that had not been thought 
through that not only the women also the men might have gone through 
something just as traumatic, may have experienced gender based violence in 
their own life, whether through physically experiencing it or through 
supporting someone else through it (…), that that was not thought about, I was 
quite shocked about. And that aspect of my identity, in terms of being not only 
somebody that works on an issue but somebody that can also have experienced 
an issue is often ignored, (…) but I think it is important for institutions [like 
ours] to think about”.  
 
This quote very powerfully describes the impact of the assumption that the 
women working for Stacey‘s organisation are not facing any of the issues they 
are working on. It shows very clearly why Stacey feels that the battle she 
fights for gender equality worldwide really means ‗at home‘ and abroad. 
Hence, even though she is located in the North, she does not see the people 
who benefit from her work as far removed from her. Rather it is people like 
her, her counterparts abroad and her colleagues in the North who are part of 
the same gender struggle. With a similar logic, albeit in a different field, 
Smillie claims that Northern and Southern organisations in the field of human 
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rights often have a better relation with one another than those in the field of 
development as they ―share more intellectual common ground‖ (Smillie 
2000:194). While it is important to remain vigilant against resorting to a 
notion of global sisterhood in universal oppression (see Chapter Four), 
Stacey‘s account can be a productive way to rethink the relation between 
donors, partners and final beneficiaries.  
 
As became clear in the previous sections some of the interviewees seemed to 
struggle with negotiating the distance between themselves and the 
beneficiaries of their work. In addition, they seemed to be aware of the 
discourse in which proximity to the target group is often equated with ‗better‘ 
or more courageous work and hence often seemed to feel the need to defend 
their choice to remain in one of the Northern capital cities. I will now explore 
how this decision was explained and justified by the women I interviewed. 
 
In the previous section Anna had explained how she feels more responsibility 
towards the national partners than towards the beneficiaries and that she thinks 
it is impossible for her to feel connected to each recipient when she only meets 
some of them shortly on field visits. She continues: “I mean that, I can hardly 
say that I work at a grassroots level, I just don‟t, if I visit that town for a few 
days, a visit, that is just not the work that I do. Although I guess there is, as I 
am trying to explain this to you, there must be a certain amount of guilt that I 
feel towards not being able to say I work at a grassroots level, which is why I 
am trying so hard to explain why I do what I do”.  
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The fact that Anna mentions a feeling of guilt links directly with the discourse 
in which field work is more positively valued than more bureaucratic work in 
capital cities.  
 
When I prompt her: “So do you feel some guilt?” she replies: “Yes, I think 
that I feel a certain amount of guilt and again I think the guilt is related to the 
fact that (…) to a certain extent I do like the academic path, I do like 
intellectual work, not that it is necessarily…they are not mutually 
incompatible, you can do both, but in order to do a job that is both personally 
satisfying and that I feel can be of benefit of others, I feel that the work I do at 
this moment combines both elements (…). But I guess more generally in the 
type of rhetoric that we hear, about NGO work or civil society work, „this 
NGO work is good and that NGO work is bad‟. I guess the other thing you get 
used to in Brussels, (…) I mean it is the centre of advocacy and policy, (…) 
You might visit the site for a week or something like that but in another way 
you are totally disconnected from these people and you get used to using the 
language of like „oh, I am not a field person, I am a Head office person‟, and 
it is accepted in Brussels in a way that perhaps in other milieus people would 
just automatically say, „what the hell are you talking about, you are a head 
office person, you are not a field person, what does that mean?‟, but we don‟t 
always pose these questions to ourselves because Brussels is such a unique 
environment”.  
 
Anna, as well as some other interviewees, justifies being located in Brussels in 
two ways: first, by stating that this is the ‗kind of work that she likes‘ and 
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second, by arguing that this is the way she can make herself most ‗useful‘. 
Anna describes directly what she calls the ‗rhetoric‘ in which NGO work is 
seen as ‗good‘ or as ‗bad‘. At the same time she indicates that being in 
Brussels to some extent ‗sanctions‘ the focus on the policy and advocacy level 
as that is the dominant strand of NGO work there. In a similar way, Naomi 
stresses the importance of the contact with her member organisations in order 
to still be connected to ‗reality‘ as “Geneva is not such a, in your face kind of 
place, it is a very nice environment”. The division between ‗field persons‘ and 
‗HQ persons‘ that Anna describes in Brussels, was also noticed by Sylvia who 
told me that “there is a certain tension (…) between the people who are very 
much EU institution focussed and the people who have more field operations 
and that are more field focussed”. The binary presented by Anna and Sylvia is 
contrasting those working in the ‗field‘ and those in advocacy/policy positions 
in capital cities. It is not so surprising that the work of local or national NGOs 
in the North who work directly with people from the South is left out, since 
career paths mainly go between the first and latter rather than taking the ‗side 
turn‘ of working for smaller national organisations.  
 
The narrative of Fay, who works for such a smaller national organisation but 
who is also familiar with the larger lobbying platforms, can however also be 
placed in the discourse, identified by Anna, which evaluates distance 
negatively. Fay: “I understand that on an international level there is much on 
the agenda (…) and you are trying to influence decision making on a very high 
level (…) but it is a huge spectacle, a theatre play. (…) Of course there have 
been also results sometimes, sure, I mean I believe that all the UN women‟s 
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conferences and all this have been important and valuable things (…). It is 
very interesting work, yes it is very „wow, you travel to a lot of places, meet a 
lot of interesting people and so on‟, but I don‟t know if you can do just that 
and still be passionate about something. Because what would it be? Or where 
would it be, if you have no kind of home base? Or if you work within the UN, 
even worse, because what would you then be passionate about if your 
organisation is not something that has this emotional connection to you?”.  
 
While Anna has described herself as a ‗Head Quarters person‘ in the face of 
possible criticism relating to her distance to the women she seeks to support, 
other interviewees that I talked to were less convinced that their strengths 
came out better at the policy and advocacy level and they had rather made the 
decisions out of practical reasons, such as needing to ‗put down roots‘ or 
having to leave the stress of living in a conflict zone. Sylvia‘s narrative can be 
contrasted to Anna‘s when she says: “When you are used to being able to be 
working on the ground with beneficiaries and seeing the impact of your work, 
really at the level where it is most needed, then to make that transition to the 
Brussels level, advocacy where you are talking about „toolkits‟ and 
„communications‟ and „conclusions‟ and things like that, you do get a certain 
amount of frustration, of „well, this is good, but what does it actually mean for 
people on the ground?‟.”  
 
Sylvia expressed her frustration with the abstract advocacy vocabulary, which 
seems to bear very little relation to what happens on the ground. The 
abstractness of the vocabulary has been exacerbated by the professionalisation 
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of the NGO sector (see Chapter Six) as it is now ―common for humanitarian 
purposes to be overtaken by the institutions and professional practices which 
express them‖ (Kennedy 2004:xx).  Sylvia continues using the two arguments 
Anna mentioned -‗working where your strength lies/where you can be most 
beneficial and where you like the work best‘- to explain why she wants to 
move back to a job where she can work in the field again: “I don‟t think [this 
institutional work] is the kind of thing that I need to be doing or it is not where 
my strengths are. So I think I would be better suited for going back out to the 
field for a while. (…) I don‟t think I am bad at it, but in terms of where my 
enjoyment is, I like being in developing countries, I like being able to have as 
part of my work, visits to schools (…), to meet with communities to see the 
impact on the ground. That is what I need to feel like I am accomplishing 
something”.  
 
So while Sylvia and Anna use the same set of arguments to justify their 
positions, their final decisions of where they are ‗best placed‘ are different. 
Sylvia points out that to foster her motivation she really needs to see changes 
‗on the ground‘. Some of the NGO workers who have moved away from the 
field to capitals to do project based work where they manage funding, lobby 
and work on policies ―have [experienced] alienation from the values with 
which they came into development and a loss of sense of purpose‖ (Eyben 
2006:46).  
 
Throughout the interview Stacy has described to me how important it is for 
her to be in close contact with the women whose lives her projects seek to 
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improve and she has explained that the work she did previously was much 
more grassroots and community based. It is striking to notice that ‗distance‘ 
still seems to matter, despite Stacey‘s insistence that the distinctions between 
her, the partners and the final beneficiaries are overstated. When I ask Stacey 
why she still chose to work for this large international organisation that 
operates on a higher level further removed from ‗the field‘, she describes how 
until then she had been annoyed and puzzled with how organisations like the 
UN functioned. She told me that she evaluated its practices very negatively 
but at the same time felt incapable of ‗taking it on‘ as she did not understand 
sufficiently how it operated.  
 
She says, when she describes how she initially took on a short-term contract 
with the organisation: “And I thought to myself [in] 11 months I can at least 
figure out, I literally thought of it as going into the belly of the beast and I 
thought I will figure out what is happening for myself, not for any other 
grandiose reason but just for myself. It was like there was a tension within 
myself, coming from political science, and believing in political structures and 
believing in the overall goals of the UN and at the same time being so severely 
disappointed in the results and outcomes, I could not overcome it myself and 
felt like I am at a crossroads now, I can continue what I am doing and feeling 
that I am making piecemeal progress towards something that I believe in, but I 
do not have the ear of the government and I do not have the position even to 
represent the groups I was working with to go to the government. Certainly 
not as a young woman, certainly not as young brown woman in certain 
contexts, and so on a personal level it was important for me to understand 
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how the UN worked and to understand why there was such a disconnect and 
not with any grandiose notions of changing the world but how can I position 
myself better to contribute to what I want to do, which was to ensure better 
living conditions for women and girls”. 
 
‗Going into the belly of the beast‘, as Stacey describes it, is a powerful 
metaphor for an attempt to engage in a productively complicit way with an 
institution that is very firmly embedded in the unequal power structures that 
she seeks to address. However, rather than turning her back on the 
organisation as she recognises the harmful outcomes of its actions, Stacey, 
similar to some other interviewees, decides to engage with it and work through 
it because she recognises the power of the institution and its strategic position. 
This act is, though operating on a very different level, similar to Spivak‘s 
suggestion in ‗The Critique of Post-colonial Reason‘ where she introduces 
‗constructive complicity‘ (see also Chapter Five): ―Our sense of critique is too 
thoroughly determined by Kant, Hegel and Marx for us to be able to reject 
them as ‗motivated imperialists‘, although this is too often the vain gesture 
performed by the critics of imperialism‖ (Spivak 1999:6-7). Hence, just as in 
the Humanities, Kant, Hegel and Marx cannot be simply dismissed (because 
of their role in the colonial process of universalising the experience of the 
West but should invite a critical -for Spivak deconstructive- reading precisely 
because of their immense influence), Stacey cannot reject the UN without 
engaging critically with it.  Or as Kapoor expresses it in his reading of Spivak:  
 
―Thus, for instance, the World Bank and IMF may well be ‗imperialistic‘ 
organisations, but they are too important and powerful to turn our backs on; 
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instead, we can engage them unrelentingly from all sides to try to make them 
accountable to the subaltern‖ (Kapoor 2008:55).  
 
Stacey does not let the tension be ‗paralysing‘ but rather works through it. 
Stacey speaks of a very clear goal ‗ensuring better living conditions for 
women and girls‘ and subsequently analyses the power of a global institution 
like the UN and also her own position as a woman, as being young and being 
‗brown‘ and decides that given these conditions she needs to position herself 
within this international organisation.  
 
Stacey‘s emphasis on her specific positionality as young, female and ‗brown‘ 
deserves some further attention here. Following a constructionist instead of a 
structural approach to intersectionality I would stress that rather than 
understanding the women to be ―passive bearers of the meanings of social 
categories‖, processes of subject construction are simultaneously ‗subjecting‘ 
individuals and constituting them as subjects (Prins 2006:280). Stacey is not a 
passive recipient of her identity, but also the agent, which can be shown 
through her narrative in which she describes her decision to work for her 
organisation based on her careful evaluation of her positionality as a ‗young, 
brown woman‘. 
 
Stacey worked previously for a smaller grassroots organisation, while her 
current large organisation is associated to the UN. She justifies her move to 
her current organisation, against which she initially had and continues to have 
significant reservations, by referring to her realisation that ‗I d[id] not have the 
position even to represent the groups I was working with to go to the 
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government; certainly not as a young woman, certainly not as young brown 
woman in certain contexts‘. This Foucauldian reading of identity categories as 
both constitutive and oppressive means as Haraway expresses it: ―To be a 
subject with a sense of self in complex complicity with and resistance to the 
matrix of forces that made one possible‖ (quoted in Caraway 1992:2). 
Similarly, Stacey‘s move can be both interpreted as in ‗complex complicity 
with‘ and ‗resistance to‘ the identity structures that shape her. To continue 
with the metaphor of going into the belly of the beast, Stacey recognises that 
she has become part of the beast as well, functioning according to the logic of 
the beast; she for example realises that there are certain things she cannot say 
as a ‗bureaucrat‘ which she would have expressed when she was still an 
activist. However, Stacey expresses that while constantly weighing up the 
benefits and the disadvantages of the work she feels the balance is still 
positive enough to remain in her position away from her former work in the 
field.  
 
Conclusion 
In order to answer the question of how women NGO workers relate to their 
target group when they are at a (spatial) distance from the beneficiaries of their 
projects, I have first investigated whether and how myths, stories and field 
trips feature in this relation. I have argued that especially in lobbying work, 
NGO workers in capital cities in the North sometimes rely on ‗stories‘ that 
they have been told about their target group in their work. The risk of working 
with ‗stories‘ is that they might not always be adequate, as they are mediated 
and they might present an overly simplified version of reality. However, it 
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could be argued that strategically the lobbying process always builds on 
simplified and reductionist images in order to bring their message across. 
Potentially, as Spivak has argued, a ‗strategic essentialism‘ could be a 
constructive approach when conscious of the dangers involved.  More 
commonly, NGO workers referred to their field visits or field experiences 
(which also function as sites for the collection of ‗stories‘) in earlier jobs as a 
significant way to remain connected with those whose lives they seek to 
ameliorate. However, those memories of earlier fieldwork might not 
correspond very neatly with the current target group the NGO workers are 
working for, as the geographical location and the nature of the beneficiaries 
might be different. As Chambers (2006) has importantly pointed out, field 
visits contain a number of ‗traps‘, one of which is the ‗urban trap‘ which 
entails that field visits might often be confined to visiting urban areas. 
Furthermore, encounters between the Northern NGO worker and the 
beneficiaries or Southern NGO partners during such a field visit are mediated 
through power structures, which might compel the latter to present a more 
favourable picture of the progress of a certain project (see also Chambers 
2006).  
 
I have argued here that in order to understand how the physical and arguably 
‗imaginary‘ distance between women NGO workers in the North and their 
final beneficiaries is bridged, it is essential to look into the role partner 
organisations play in the conceptualisation of that relation. While at some 
points, partners are described as bridging the geographical divide, in some 
instances we can see that they almost replace the final beneficiaries in that the 
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latter become (or stay) invisible. Stirrat and Henkel‘s account of partnership 
(1997) is pertinent here in that it lays bare the contradictions and tensions 
covered by the benevolent term ‗partnership‘. Hence, the accounts presented 
here clearly show that there is a mutual dependency between organisations in 
the North and the South:  the Northern organisations need their partner 
organisations for the provision of information, for moral legitimacy and to 
increase their motivation through feeling connected with ‗the ground‘. 
However, this mutual dependency has not resulted in a more balanced power 
relation; rather the partner relation is still mediated through a power imbalance 
expressed in the power to select the partner and financial aid coming with 
certain demands.  
 
In the final section I have explored narratives in which the women NGO 
workers justified their spatial position in relation to the women they supported. 
In addition, I presented Stacey‘s account to show an alternative way in which 
the distance between North/South is negotiated, which is through the effective 
collapse of the rigid distinction between the categories. I have argued that the 
justifications to work either in the field or in headquarters were made at three 
different levels: by reference to personal preference, to practical reasons and to 
strategic reasons, beliefs about where one can be most effective. As Baaz 
(2005) argues, a common assumption among those who write critically about 
notions of partnership in development is that the idea of partnership is merely 
used by Northern organisations to hide their real motives without any intention 
to really change their practices. On the basis of the interview narratives, 
following Baaz (2005), I would be critical of such a conclusion that implies 
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some sort of conspiracy of Northern organisations. As Baaz (2005) writes, the 
term partnership is not reflective of a conspiracy, but rather has conflicts, 
ambivalences and tensions subsumed under it.  
 
Baaz in her research on partnership observed that ―a spirit of critical self-
reflection (…) informed many of the interviews, in some cases accompanied 
by feelings of alienation and self-doubt‖ (Baaz 2005:91). In the interviews I 
conducted there was similarly this element of self-doubt and alienation 
particularly with respect to the relations across space and, related to that, many 
of the women displayed an awareness of the discourse which negatively 
evaluates NGO work carried out at a distance. Given the moral assumptions 
regarding space and distance in relation to NGO work and the real challenges 
associated with bridging the distance through stories, field visits and partner 
organisations due to power differences, it is imperative that the bridging of the 
distance and its implications for the relations between the people supported is 
critically interrogated.  
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8 - Conclusion  
 
“We need to ask: Where am I in this picture? Am I positioning myself as the 
saviour of less fortunate peoples? as the progressive one? as more 
subordinated? as innocent? These are moves of superiority and we need to 
reach beyond them.” (Razack 2001:170) 
 
This research has asked questions about how women located in the global 
North who are active for non-governmental or intergovernmental 
organisations seeking to support women in/from the global South understand 
their work practices and relate to those they support. For this purpose, twenty 
interviews and one pilot interview were conducted with women NGO workers 
and volunteers. Some of those women worked for explicitly feminist 
organisations, some worked for organisations with a wider remit, but had 
dedicated roles related to women and gender. In the above quote, Razack hints 
at potential positions these women can take as ‗the saviour‘, as ‗progressive‘, 
‗subordinate‘ or ‗innocent‘. Razack‘s statement should be understood as part 
of the critique expressed by black women in the 1980s who felt that their 
experiences were not sufficiently taken into account by the mainstream white, 
middle class feminist movement, which relied on a simple assumption of a 
natural bond between women, ignoring differences in position (Lorde 1984, 
hooks 1981, 1986, Carby 1992, Lazreg 2000). In addition, white feminists 
have been accused of claiming that their subordination is more real and 
fundamental than other oppressions rather than understanding patriarchy as 
―interlocking‖ with other forms of oppression like racism and classism 
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(Razack 2001:14). Related to this charge, (and expressed in Razack‘s term 
‗saviour‘), is the concern that the women from the global North understand 
themselves as liberated and independent in contrast to an image of women 
from the South as oppressed and in need of help.  
 
Razack‘s quote can also be read in terms of another critique, which considered 
the development industry a neo-imperial and post-colonial project (Shiva 
1989, Escobar 1995, Stirrat and Henkel 1997, Gronemeyer 1999, Kothari 
2005, Nederveen Pieterse 2006). Despite this accusation of neo-imperialism, 
since then their number and influence have increased, producing ‗global 
citizens‘, a transnational elite at home everywhere to practice its sense of 
global responsibility (Anheier et al. 2001, Taylor 2002, Desforges 2004, Baker 
and Chandler 2005). Concurrently, while the women‘s movement has 
arguably been less visible in the last decades than before, feminism has been 
institutionalised both in the academy and in development organisations 
through the subsequent policies of WID, WAD, GAD and gender 
mainstreaming. These developments have been met with scepticism and 
charges of bureaucratisation, depoliticisation and cooptation (Lang 1997, 
Alvarez 1998, Silliman 1999, Menon 2004, de Alwis 2009). Sceptics tend to 
favour social movements, as movements ‗from below‘, over the more top-
down NGOs dependent on (state) funding. They also prefer the women‘s 
movement with feminist activists to the so-called ‗femocrats‘. This research 
has taken the approach that the construction of a binary in which social 
movements and feminist activists are considered ‗good‘ and NGOs and 
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femocrats ‗bad‘, reduces the diversity within both camps and takes insufficient 
account of potential similarities between both groups.  
 
Both the black feminist critique and the development critique importantly 
challenge the notion that those who are active within non-governmental 
organisations or the feminist movement have a moral innocence by virtue of 
their efforts for some form of justice. This study has not been intended to 
repeat these critiques; but rather to try to understand the perspectives of 
women situated at their nexus. How did they relate to ‗the Other‘ whom their 
organisations were targeting? Did these women realise the contentiousness of 
their position? If so, how did they negotiate this? Furthermore, this first goal 
implied a second aim for this study, which was an evaluation of the relevance 
of the critique of the 80s and 90s for today. 
 
While I considered it imperative to bring the dilemmas and ponderings of the 
women in those positions to life (by making extensive use of interview 
material in the text), it is not intended to ‗name and shame‘ individuals. 
Rather, this analysis attempts to provide what Spivak calls a ―constructive 
reading‖, which is ―unaccusing, unexcusing, attentive, situationally productive 
through dismantling‖ (Spivak 1999:81). In the quote at the beginning of this 
conclusion, by using the personal pronoun ‗I‘, Razack does not exempt herself 
from the necessity of critical introspection and reflection. In the same way I 
have not wanted to (nor do I believe one can) position myself as ‗innocent‘, 
meaning neither as non-complicit, nor as more ‗progressive‘ than the women I 
interviewed. Volunteering for different projects of a refugee organisation has 
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shown me the pervasiveness of my own prejudices and racist assumptions. It 
helped me to realise my complicity in perpetuating structures of inequality not 
just outside the volunteering but inside these projects; for example when I 
acted in awareness raising sessions as the white middle-class ‗expert‘ on the 
asylum process while the asylum seeker was allowed to provide the ‗oral 
history‘ or ‗local knowledge‘ by presenting his or her experiences. In the 
context of these personal experiences and the encounter with these theoretical 
critiques, Spivak‘s hope for ―a constructive complicity‖ (Spivak 1999:3-4) 
seemed very relevant and appealing. However, as it remains difficult to derive 
from Spivak‘s writing affirmative examples of what such constructive 
complicity would look like, this study has attempted to identify instances of 
constructive complicity in the accounts of the interviewed women and tried to 
evaluate its potential as an ethical positioning for our current times.  
 
I have attempted to sketch a multi-faceted picture of these women by 
structuring this work in different chapters which each take a different main 
approach to the subject and introduce the different critiques that combine in 
the women‘s practices. These have been feminist theory, post-colonial theory, 
global citizenship/civil society theory and critical development theory. It is 
important to note that in a few interviews the women positioned themselves 
and their organisation explicitly as different from other NGO workers and 
their organisations, and that women NGO workers sometimes took very 
different positions, for example on contentious issues like sex 
work/prostitution or regarding the use of ‗culture‘ as an explanatory proxy for 
race. I would also argue however that the women NGO workers shared more 
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than they might have expected. This will be illustrated in the following 
synthesis of the different insights yielded by the respective chapters.  
 
Chapter Four has combined a feminist and a gender analysis and has analysed 
which type of feminism they pursued, how the NGO workers understood their 
relations with the women they support and how gender shaped the experiences 
of the women NGO workers. I have argued that the different understandings 
of feminism in the narratives of the women NGO workers, rather than neatly 
reflecting socialist, radical, and liberal strands of feminism, actually displayed 
the major thematic debates within feminism: the institutionalisation of 
feminism, responses to backlashes and critiques of feminism, essentialism 
versus anti-essentialism, and inclusion or separatism. The private/public divide 
and its relation to the ‗political‘ are key topics in both feminist theory and in 
global citizenship/civil society theory. I have argued that the process of 
(re)drawing the boundaries of the public and the private, the professional and 
the personal is vital for the women NGO workers‘ self-constitution. Through 
exposing how the public and private gain moral meaning in impassioned 
practices, I have enriched the traditionally rather abstract and disembodied 
discussion within citizenship and civil society theory on the public and the 
private. Furthermore, I have shown that whilst the notion of the public serves 
to maintain their idea of professionalism, the idea of the private is central to a 
non-instrumental morality. I have warned against the romanticisation of moral 
work encroaching on private time as it arguably leaves space for exploitation. 
The narratives of the women NGO workers showed their awareness of the 
persistent discourse against the professionalisation of NGO work in which 
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careerism is seen as incompatible with moral work, either through their 
support or rejection of it.  
 
In Chapter Four I paid particular attention to the notion of sisterhood in the 
narratives of the women NGO workers in relation to their understanding of the 
relation between themselves and women in the global South. While the notion 
of sisterhood has been heavily contested by black feminists due to its 
association with the simplified idea of common subordination, silencing the 
way women have oppressed other women, I have observed that ‗sisterhood‘ 
still has currency among the women NGO workers. I would also argue 
however, that an alternative form of sisterhood is present, without being 
named as such, in the repeated expressions of the sheer pleasure associated 
with working with women across the globe. The black feminist critique of the 
1980s appears relevant also in today‘s context since some of the women NGO 
workers indeed performed the ‗race to innocence‘ (Fellows and Razack 1998), 
privileging gender oppression over other oppressions and thereby turning a 
blind eye to other forms of oppression and their potential complicity.  
 
In Chapter Five, these potential complicities took shape when I introduced 
Kothari‘s (2006a) argument that the notion of ‗race‘ has been replaced with 
‗culture‘ without losing the connotations associated with the former. This is 
still instructive for understanding some of the narratives of the women NGO 
workers in which they made sense of their experiences with women from the 
global South. These women NGO workers explained differences between 
themselves and the women from the global South by referring to ‗culture‘, and 
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risked homogenised and hierarchical understandings of ‗culture‘. In addition, 
‗culture‘ sometimes served to position women in the North as more liberated 
than women in the South. However, other women NGO workers consciously 
destabilised homogeneous accounts of culture. In addition, this process is 
complicated in the case of research participants with a migrant background as 
they experience both identification and differentiation in relation to the women 
from the South they seek to support. This tendency of reification of ‗culture‘ 
as stable, homogeneous, ‗something of them rather than us‘ defies the 
intended purpose of adding to a mere economic or social understanding of 
phenomena. Furthermore, this understanding of ‗culture‘ seems to leave little 
space for other approaches that transcend either liberal tolerance or relativism. 
I have also argued that dominant understandings of racism, which are highly 
individualised, prevent critical reflection on complicity in the perpetuation of 
racial images through notions of cultural difference, which would be promoted 
by an alternative, more structural account of racism. Situating the women‘s 
narratives both in relation to the critique of black feminism and of postcolonial 
feminism is a significant corrective to the common practice to either discuss 
the one or the other, without looking at the combined merits of these critiques.  
 
The fact that some of the testimonies of the women NGO workers contained 
direct links to colonial times (showing that colonialism is still lurking in the 
histories of some organisations and in the education of its members despite the 
fact that the women tended to situate colonialism firmly in the past), 
underlines the significance of post-colonial critiques. As discussed in Chapter 
Six, Anderson and Rieff (2004) make implicit reference to these colonial 
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continuities when they label global civil society organisations, which claim 
representative status despite the absence of a global state and global 
democratic procedures, ‗missionaries‘. I have argued in this chapter that 
representation involves a number of ‗burdens‘, which obstruct the 
representative process. First, NGOs are often under pressure from 
governments and policy makers to provide a simplified picture of the group 
they represent. Second, the represented group is expected to ‗perform well‘ in 
the consultative process, which, given the power inequalities involved, can 
posit a great burden on those represented. These same burdens surfaced in 
Chapter Seven, which explored how the distance between the women NGO 
workers and the women they supported was negotiated. The stories and 
‗myths‘ (Cornwall et al. 2007) that linked the women NGO workers with their 
beneficiaries failed to provide a nuanced picture. In addition, the cooperation 
with partner organisations to bridge the distance involved a range of demands 
on the partners, like providing information and ‗translating‘ between the 
Northern NGOs and the grassroots, which were sometimes hard to meet, given 
their precarious financial situation and lack of staff.  
 
In addition, I have argued in Chapter Six that in the representative process, the 
power inequalities are potentially exacerbated, since the status of 
representative bestows a number of privileges. However, with Spivak (1998) I 
would claim that given the requirements and limitations of the current political 
system, representation could not be discarded completely. Like Anderson and 
Rieff (2004), Hutchings (2005) pointed to global inequalities underlying the 
mobility and the feeling of responsibility of the ‗global citizen‘. The women 
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NGO workers often articulated their sense of responsibility by reference to the 
opportunities they had enjoyed. The dominant understanding of opportunities 
among the NGO workers however disregarded the relation between their 
privilege and others‘ marginalisation. In addition, similar to the fact that the 
representative role came with privileges, the NGO work -conducted to 
improve the lives of others- also improved their own opportunities. I have 
argued that contrary to the view that altruism and careerism or other 
instrumental motivations are incompatible, ‗selfish motives‘ might sometimes 
serve a positive purpose by steering away from a ‗benevolence‘, which 
underlines power inequalities. 
 
Throughout the work, I have pointed to ruptures and resistances to the 
hegemonic discourses and power structures using notions such as ―negotiated 
solidarity‖ (hooks 1986), ―constructive complicity‖ (Spivak 1999) and 
―critical reflexivity‖ (Harding 1991, Haraway 1991). In Chapter Four I have 
argued that some of the participants problematised sisterhood, either moving 
to a negotiated solidarity (as suggested by hooks) or by using critical 
reflexivity to analyse the power relations at stake. I would suggest that ‗critical 
reflexivity‘ is an important tool to deconstruct the ‗innocence‘ of sisterhood 
and one‘s complicity in maintaining that innocence. Thereby I have shown the 
wider applicability of reflexivity beyond the realm of its original inception, 
namely (feminist) knowledge production. At the same time, I maintain that 
there is a risk that it could result in ‗navel gazing‘ or a return to ‗innocence‘ 
when reflexivity turns ‗transparent‘. In a similar vein, in Chapter Five I have 
argued that the identification of racialised discourses needs to be 
 337 
complemented with resisting and challenging these discourses. Some of the 
research participants‘ challenges consisted of conscious efforts to address 
cultural and racialised stereotypes that arise on both sides. In addition, 
Spivak‘s notions of ‗unlearning privilege as a loss‘ (Spivak 1990) and 
‗learning to learn from below‘ (Spivak 2000), could be potential responses to 
this challenge. However, while in some of the narratives these strategies can 
be traced, simultaneously they run the risk of narcissism or failure due to 
power and geographical differences.  
 
I have suggested in Chapter Four that another way to avoid the ‗race to 
innocence‘ is to destabilise gender as a fixed category by looking at the 
interaction between gender and other categories. Using an intersectional 
approach to analyse the women‘s narratives about gender I illustrated that 
their experiences of ‗gender‘ often take on meaning in conjunction with other 
categories, like age, and ethnicity, producing for example ‗the young woman‘ 
or the ‗honorary man‘. In both Chapter Five and Seven I have attempted to 
find practised, lived forms of ―constructive complicity‖ (Spivak 1999) -a 
responsibility which should be articulated through an (always incomplete) 
acknowledgement of one‘s embeddedness in structural injustices- in the 
narratives of the women NGO workers, respectively in relation to racial 
discourses and spatial distance to the women supported. The attempt to trace 
―constructive complicity‖ in practice is an important addition to the abstract, 
theoretically dense work of Spivak, whose deconstructive approach rarely 
allows affirmative examples.  I noticed that it is possible to catch glimpses of 
Spivak‘s intended responsibility, but also that these are sometimes limited to 
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short reflexive moments with an easy ‗closure‘ rather than a continued 
vigilance. In Chapter Seven I discussed a narrative, which presented a 
constructively complicit position with regard to taking an advocacy position 
away from the ‗field‘ in a powerful international organisation. However, it 
needs to be acknowledged that this position is a dangerous and precarious one 
as well, as it is a challenge to guide against complacency in the work and to be 
vigilant for cooptation when organisations circumscribe the possibilities.  
 
As mentioned previously, this work can be situated within a relatively new 
genre within critical development literature, which focuses on the 
subjectivities, experiences, and identity constructions of NGO and 
development workers (Goudge 2003, Baaz 2005, Charlés 2007, Cook 2007, 
Heron 2007) in order to complement the traditional organisational focus 
within critical development literature. The insights generated in these studies, 
particularly those inspired by a post-colonial reading of the reflections of the 
NGO workers display strong similarities with some of the conclusions of this 
research, despite differences in the exact focus and location of the research. 
Baaz and Heron both allude to processes of questioning (Baaz 2005:152) and 
critique (Heron 2007:124) among the development workers, which I have here 
identified as ‗reflexivity‘. In addition, this research aligns itself with those 
studies in foregrounding theoretical depth and nuance over quick-fix solutions 
that risk reductionism. Some of the studies (Goudge 2003, Cook 2007, Heron 
2007) explored the role of gender and or of white feminism in the 
development enterprise, used insights from feminist theory or only 
interviewed female development workers. This research has attempted to 
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contribute to these rich and important studies by concentrating more explicitly 
on the experiences of women who support only women or who have a specific 
gender focus in their work and by emphasising the role of feminism and the 
gendered dimensions of the women‘s experiences. Hence, as elaborated above, 
the findings include a discussion of the role of sisterhood, the ‗race to 
innocence‘, gender stereotypes, the interpretation of feminism, post-colonial 
images of the female Other compared to the Western feminist Self, and of the 
private/public divide. I have applied intersectional approaches, as generated in 
feminist theory, in order to highlight the mixed positions the women NGO 
workers occupied in terms of their (often) white, middle-class privilege 
combined with their gender. In addition, this study has broadened the field of 
enquiry these studies have helped to create, by engaging extensively with 
global citizenship/global civil society theory and its discussions of 
representation, responsibility and the public/private divide.  
 
Chapter Seven has concentrated on a key difference between the present study 
and existing studies, namely the fact that in this research many of the 
interviewed women NGO workers were not located in the global South and 
supported women in the South across distance. It discusses the theme of space 
and distance in relation to NGO work in order to complement the existing 
studies about NGO workers who work in physical proximity to the people they 
support, by exploring how the women NGO workers negotiated distance. 
More generally, it inserted the theme of space and place in critical 
development/NGO studies. Throughout, this research has been testimony to 
the different ways in which mobility is understood depending on the direction 
and goal of the journey and on the actor involved; from field trips to 
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trafficking, from migration to travel and from fleeing wars to international 
careers. Specifically, I have suggested that NGO workers in capital cities in 
the North referred to field visits (and the stories collected during such visits) 
as a significant way to ‗stay in touch‘ with what happens on the ground. The 
danger is that both field trips and stories might present oversimplified, 
incomplete pictures and be mediated in several ways; through the ‗urban trap‘ 
(Chambers 2006), through power structures, and through repeated telling.  
 
However, I would argue that the main strategy or aid for bridging the distance 
was identified as the contact with the partner organisations in the South. While 
most often partners are described as bridging the geographical divide, in some 
instances it seems as if the partners almost ‗replaced‘ the final beneficiaries as 
that the latter disappear out of view. However, the role of the partner 
organisations in negotiating distance needs to be contextualised with reference 
to the power imbalance, which means that Northern organisations can often 
select their partners, and often function as donors with a range of demands. 
While the interview narratives clearly showed the mutual dependency between 
organisations in the North and the South - the Northern organisations need 
their partner organisations for the provision of information, for moral 
legitimacy and to boost motivation - this mutual dependency has not redressed 
this power imbalance. Many of the women NGO workers displayed an 
awareness of the discourse, which negatively evaluates NGO work carried out 
at a distance and provided explicit justifications for their spatial position in 
relation to the women they supported. I have argued that these justifications 
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took three forms: personal preference, practical reasons and strategic 
arguments.  
 
I would generally argue that the analysis of the narratives of the women NGO 
workers has shown that many of the women were quite aware of the 
contentious issues related to their position and that they at times displayed a 
reflexive approach to their own work practices. This reflexivity was 
sometimes aided by their awareness of the mechanisms underlying gender 
oppression. At the same time, however, I would maintain that the 
circumstances of their work which put them in a more vulnerable position –the 
fact that ‗gender‘ was often a marginalised theme in their own organisation or 
in the wider NGO world, some of their own experiences of gender 
discrimination, their overwork and huge pressure on their private time- at 
some moments could lead to a less reflexive stance. This either happened 
because the other pressures left little time for reflection (as also suggested by 
Mawdskey and Porter 2005:79) or because the ‗victim‘ role allowed in 
Fellows and Razack‘s (1998) words a ―race to innocence‖.  
 
After one of the interviews, one research participant who had been particularly 
open about her reflections and ambivalences regarding her work stressed to 
me the importance of confidentiality for her cooperation in the research, as she 
would otherwise risk being fired. Whilst this suggested that not all 
organisations encourage reflexivity and critical engagement with the 
organisation and one‘s own work practices, I would argue that this critical 
reflection and engagement should be the point of departure for any NGO 
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endeavour and that staff should receive time, space and support for this. Eade, 
in the context of capacity building actions of NGOs suggests that if NGOs 
want to make a sustainable contribution to change this ―means a commitment 
to learning as intrinsic to their interventions to build the capacities of others‖ 
(Eade 2007:634, see also Eyben 2007b:44). While reflexivity and the 
acknowledgement of complicity might neither always be comfortable or easy, 
as some of the narratives have shown it does not need to be ―incapacitating‖ 
(Kapoor 2008:57) or ―paralysing‖ (Spivak 1999:3).  I hope that the relevance 
of these conclusions, while arising from the particular focus of this project, 
extends to other areas and sectors beyond the NGO sector or the women‘s 
movement.  
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Appendix 1: Sample Email Interview Request 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am a PhD student at the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice, 
School of Politics and IR at the University of Nottingham (UK) and I am 
working on a research project about the reflections of women working for 
international organisations concerned with gender/women on their work (for a 
brief project outline see below). [Name of Organisation Omitted] is of 
particular interest to me because of its position as a European network and the 
global reach of its aims. I would be grateful if I would be granted the 
opportunity to interview a (female) staff member of the department. The 
interview would last max. 1 hour and interviewees are offered the possibility 
to remain anonymous. I am planning to make my field research trip to 
[location omitted] in the week commencing Monday the 31st of March and I 
will stay for that week. 
Brief Project Outline: 
The purpose of my PhD research is to analyse some of the tensions and 
complexities related to global citizenship, otherness and responsibility. The 
empirical part of my research consists of interviews with 'global citizens', 
i.e.women working for organisations concerned with women/gender with a 
global reach. Here I investigate how people working for organisations with a 
gender dimension understand their own work practices while the wider 
 370 
research project seeks to relate this to debates on global citizenship and global 
justice. The interview themes include motivation to do the work, the impact of 
the work, the relation to the group that is supported, possible 
tensions/difficulties that arise and responsibility. 
If you have any more questions, please don't hesitate to contact me again. I 
would be grateful for your reply. 
Kind regards, 
Sara de Jong 
Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice, School of Politics and IR 
University of Nottingham 
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Appendix 2: Interview Consent Form 
 
Explanatory Statement 
 
The empirical part of this research project investigates how people working 
for organisations with a global justice dimension understand their own work 
practices while the wider research project seeks to relate this to debates on 
global citizenship and global justice. The interview themes include motivation 
to do the work, the impact of the work, the relation to the group that is 
supported, possible tensions/difficulties that arise and responsibility.  
 
The interview is designed to take approximately an hour. The research is 
conducted by Sara de Jong, Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice, 
School of Politics and IR, University of Nottingham, UK. 
 
Consent 
I agree to take part in the research project as described in the explanatory 
statement. I have had the project explained to me, and I have read the 
explanatory statement, which I may keep for my records.  I understand that 
agreeing to take part in this project means that I am willing to:  
 be interviewed by the researcher  
 allow the interview to be recorded on audio tape 
 allow information to be used in a PhD thesis and any related future 
publications 
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I am aware that my participation in this interview is voluntary.  If, for any 
reason, at any time, I wish to stop the interview, refuse to answer a specific 
question or discontinue the participation in the research project, I may do so 
without having to give an explanation.   
Name:........................................................................................... 
Signature:  .......................................................................…… 
Date: ............................. 
Name of Organisation: …………………………………………………….. 
 If you would prefer to remain anonymous (your name will be changed in 
the text) please tick this box.  
OR  
I understand that I have given approval for my name and/or the name of 
my organisation to be used in the final report of the project, and future 
publications. 
 
 
